as it would were he running 11 miles an hour. The charge eliminates from the case all question of whether the respondent, in good faith, believed he was running within the statutory limit, and makes a mistake of judgment on the part of respondent amount to a crime. While it is not the law that, in order to convict the respondent, it must be made to appear that he knowingly violated the statute, because he is bound to know the law, yet there is authority to the effect that he must have been aware, in order to be convicted, that he was doing the unlawful act complained of. It seems to the board that the reasoning in the case of People v. Barnes is applicable in the case now before us. There is nothing in this record to indicate that this accident might not have happened just as it did happen if the deceased was running his car 14 miles per hour."

The important question for our consideration is, Was there any evidence to support the findings of fact of the board? Turning to the testimony we find the following: Julius Kern, the manager and representative of the brewing company's business at Detroit, testified that he employed Mr. McMinn, who had been in the company's employ for about a year and a half, as collector and solicitor. He testified in part:

"Q. In this employment were the hours stated hours of employment, or were they irregular hours of employment? A. Well, no; I would not say that these hours were regular. He came to work at different hours in the morning and he quit at different hours in the evening. Q. Would his employment, if he had certain leads to follow, or certain business to solicit, would that take him into-would his duties continue into the evening? A. At times. Q. When did you last see Mr. McMinn. A. I saw him the day before he was killed, I think on a Wednesday. I forget the date. Q. Did you know of any prospect which Mr. McMinn had to solicit business from, in the village of Ecorse? A. Why, he mentioned a party out there the day before he was killed, the last day I saw him, that he was going to go out there. Q. Do you recollect the name of the party. A. Mr. Perrigo was his name, was the name of the party he was to see. Q. Well, now, as to that sort of employment, Mr. Kern, would you, or did you, rather, superintend or command or supervise that employment, or would he be left to his own devices, and his own resources as to obtaining such prospects? A. Well, I should say it was both ways. He would use his own judgment and he would suggest to me certain people, and at times he would suggest to me where he was going to go, and what he would do that day; if I would consent to it he would do it; if I did not he would not do it. Then sometimes I would suggest certain people that he would call on. * * Q What kind of a conveyance or vehicle did he have; what was it, a Ford machine? A. A Ford car. Q. Who owned that machine? A.

* *

* * *

Why, the company owned the machine, the Kern Brewing Company. * Q. This automobile which Mr. McMinn used, which you say belonged to the company, state where that was kept nights. A. Why, it was kept he kept it generally at his garage at the house. Q. Likewise, Mr. Kern, is it a fact that Mr. McMinn would be required, and did make some collections in the evening occasionally? A. Yes, he occasionally made collections for the company in the evening. Q. From customers? A. Yes. * * * Q. By Chairman Zierleyn: What were the duties of Mr.; that is, as to hours, the duties of Mr. McMinn, as relates to hours, Mr. Kern? A. Why-we didn't have any set hours. He would probably come to work; if he didn't finish his work for the day until 6 or 7 o'clock, or 5 o'clock, why, he would not come back until the next morning, probably 9 or 10 in the morning. I never asked him to come back at a certain hour in the morning. He came around when he was ready to do so. I never had any words with him to that effect. He always used his own judgment. I was satisfied he was doing business. I never told him to come back in the morning, unless it was for a certain purpose. He generally came around 9 o'clock in the morning, sometimes half past 9. At times at half past 8 in the morning. Q. Would his duties take him to this Perrigo's place, if he were a prospective customer? A. Yes, it might take him there any time; I might say any reasonable hour in the afternoon or evening. Any time he would tell me, 'Well, I can't see this certain party until 7 or 8 o'clock at night, that is when they are generally home. Q. If he were there at the time, it would be within the hours of his employment, if he were there in the interest of his employment? A. He would talk business to them, naturally, I presume he would. Q. Do you know that Mr. McMinn had him in contemplation as a customer? A. He mentioned his name as one of them he was going to call on." The man Perrigo was examined, and after testifying that he had known Mr. McMinn well, about 4 years, the following appears:

* * *

"Q. Do you recall any time prior to the time of Mr. McMinn's death that you had any appointment with him with reference to a business matter relating to his line of business, the brewery business, for instance? A. Yes, I met Mr. McMinn prior to his death, and Mr. Zimmerer. Q. Mr. McMinn and Mr. Zimmerer? A. No, just Mr. McMinn. I was talking with him in regard to changing draft beer. Q. Where did you meet Mr. Mcminn at the time? A. At the-Zimmerer's place; it was about two weeks prior to this ball game; I think this ball game was partly suggested. Q. The ball game had been partly arranged? A. Had been partly arranged for this certain day. I spoke to him in regard to changing beer. He said that he would see what he could do about it. [Here follows the testimony of this witness

quoted in the board's finding.] Q. Were you at the ball game yourself? A. I played with them. Q. Now, at the time you first or that the matter of changing beer was first spoken of in Mr. Zimmerer's place, did you bring up the matter? A. I did. Q. You brought it up? A. Yes. I approached him on the subject. Now, in coming back from the ball game, he met with his accident, of course. Q. Were you in the same car? A. No, I was in my own car. They left ahead of me, and I passed them on the road. I was home, and as I went into the hotel I drove around to the back as usual, and I went into the hotel, and one of the waiters came up to me and said, "There has been a terrible accident out there.'"

The witness then described the scene of the accident which he at once visited and where he saw-McMinn- this was about a half block from his hotel.

On cross-examination the following occurred:

"Q. When was the arrangement made relative to your going out there to your hotel for dinner? A. Right on the ball ground. Q. On the ball ground? A. Yes. I knew nothing of their coming out. Q. You didn't know anything abount their coming out there before that time? A. Not coming out there for dinner. I knew nothing about it until I came to the ball ground, until I talked with Mr. McMinn."

Being further examined by Chairman Zierleyn, this appears: "Q. When you talked with Mr. McMinn relative to the transfer of your business to him, I did not quite get the answer. When was that? A. That was about two weeks prior to the ball game. Q. Had there been an appointment made at the time? A. Nothing definitely, any more than he would see me about that time. Q. When did you next see him again? A. At the ball game. Q. What was said at the time relative to it? A. I spoke to him in regard to it. I asked him what he had done about it, and the reply he made in regard to the price, he said, that 'some of the boys and myself are coming down for supper or dinner after the ball game, and I will have a talk with you then.' Q. This was that he would come to your place after the ball game? A. Yes. Q. That was said at the ball game, after which he was killed? A. That was said before the ball game started."

By Mr. Alexander, one of the arbitrators:

"Q. Did Mr. McMinn have anything personally to do with getting the game up? A. Nothing more than anybody else. Q. Then, during the game itself, he did not talk to you about any business, did he? A. Nothing only just what was said. I spoke to him in regard to it. I didn't know then that he was coming down until he told me he would be down after the game, him and some of the boys."

By Chairman Zierleyn:

"Q. That he would come down to your place? A. He would come down to my place and talk it over. Q. How many of the

boys came down at the time this accident happened? A. Why, I think there were 7 or 8. Q. Those in your machine, and the ones in his? A. No, there was one more machine."

[1, 2] There was other testimony of conversations with Mr. McMinn, most of which was objected to as hearsay. What we have quoted is not, we think, subject to that objection. It was competent for the manager of the brewing company to testify to the nature and scope of the employment, and of conversations about the business. And we think that it was also competent for Mr. Perrigo to testify relative to the negotiations, and the arrangement with Mr. McMinn for the meeting at the hotel.

[3] We have repeatedly held that, under the statute, if there was competent evidence to support the finding, we will not review or weigh the evidence. We think there was some evidence in support of these findings. We are of the opinion that. from the evidence which we have quoted, an inference can be drawn that Mr. McMinn, at the time of his accident, was on his way to the place of business of Perrigo, in the course of his employment, and that the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. We consider the case a close one upon the facts, but it is not our duty to weigh the evidence.

[4] We shall not add to what has been quoted from the findings and conclusion of the board, upon the subject of intentional and willful misconduct. We call attention, however, to a lengthy note to the case of Clem v. Chalmers' Motor Co., found in L. R. A. 1916A, 355. It is there stated that the subject or question is one of fact. It will be noted that in the instant case the board found that the respondents had failed to show that the deceased was guilty of any intentional or willful misconduct within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. That is to say, from the record as made, the board was unable to find that deceased was guilty of such misconduct. Such being the finding upon this question of fact, we think it is our duty to affirm the findings and order of the board; and the same will stand affirmed.

SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.

MEDLAND

HOULE BROS. ET AL. (No. 94.)*

2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION.

Under Workmen's Compensation Act, award of $9 a week was not excessive for death of a husband drawing $14 and board, board being worth $4 a week, although employee occasionally dined elsewhere. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. §*386[1].)

Certiorari to the Industrial Accident Board.

Proceeding by Grace Medland under the Workmen's Compensation Act to obtain compensation for the death of her husband, James Medland, opposed by Houle Bros., employer, and the Chicago Bonding & Insurance Company. There was an award of $9 a week, and the employer and insurance company bring certiorari. Award affirmed.

Argued before Ostrander, C. J., and Bird, Moore, Steere, Brooke, Fellows, Stone, and Kuhn, JJ.

Frederick J. Ward, of Detroit, for appellants.

Cross, Foote & Sessions, of Muskegon, for appellee.

MOORE, J. James Medland, the husband of the claimant, was, on the 22d day of May, 1917, in the employ of Houle Bros. While working in the course of his employment he got a steel sliver in his finger. He received treatment and was removed to a hospital. On May 26, 1917, he died at the hospital. Later the appellee made claim upon the respondent for compensation as the widow and dependent of the deceased under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Pub. Acts 1912 [Ex. Sess.] No. 10). The respondent denied the claim of the appellee. The board of. arbitration made an award of $9 a week for 300 weeks to the claimant.

It is claimed: (1) That claimant was not the widow of James Medland, deceased and therefore has no right to compensation as a dependent under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state of Michigan. (2) That James Medland did not meet his death as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. (3) That James Medland met his death from a disease known as delirium tremens, which was independent of and not in any way connected with his employment or with any injury that he may have received. (4) That death from delirium tremens is not an accident within the meaning or contemplated by the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state * Decision rendered, July 18, 1918. 168 N. W. Rep. 446.