explain that he had an ingrowing toenail, and when he put on a new pair of shoes this caused whatever appearance of lameness he exhibited, and that he had always been in good health before the accident. The credit of the testimony was for the board. It is true, as claimed by the defendant, that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs. But where there is testimony in the record, to sustain the finding of the board we cannot disturb such finding in the absence of fraud. Whether the testimony introduced by one side preponderates over that of the other is exclusively for the determination of the board. We have had occasion to consider cases of an accident followed by a subsequent injury, where the original injury was held by the board to be the proximate cause of the disability for which compensation was awarded. Cook v. Charles Hoertz & Son, 164 N. W. 464; Reiss v. Northway Motor & Mfg. Co. et al., 166 N. W. 840, and in each case affirmed the finding of the board. The instant case is not sufficiently unlike these cases to require further comment. [2] Deceased was unmarried. There is much controversy over the question of the dependency of the plaintiffs. Testimony was introduced showing that they occupied a house owned by a brother of deceased, the rent of which was admitted to be worth $7 per month; that the father owned a farm of 40 acres; that the parents sold butter and milk; that deceased was usually well dressed, owned an automobile, and took a young lady whom he was engaged to marry to shows and entertainments; and that his wages were not large. On the other hand, it was testified that the farm was heavily incumbered, did not produce enough to pay taxes and interest; that the father was injured in an accident 7 or 8 years previous, and had since been unable to work; that deceased bought all the groceries and gave his parents cash for their necessities; that he clothed the little sister, and the mother positively testified that he had supported them since he was 15 years of age. While the exact sum furnished to plaintiffs by the deceased was not made as definite as it might have been, or should have been, we are not persuaded that we can say that there is no evidence upon which the board could base its conclusion of partial dependency or the weekly amount thereof found by it. [3] Defendant did not operate its plant the entire year. Its "campaign," which is conducted in the fall, appears from this record to average some 60-odd days. The parties seem to agree that firemen are employed a few days longer, and it is agreed that they average 74 days' work during the year. The employment in defendant's plant may be termed seasonal, and the case falls squarely within Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182 Mich. 298, 148 N. W. 684, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 724. That case so fully discusses the four classifications found in the statute that it is only necessary to refer to it. The compensation in the instant case should have been computed under the fourth classification in accordance with the holding in that case. The award will be vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA. STATE EX REL. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. ข. DISTRICT COURT OF HENNEPIN COUNTY ET AL.* LE BARON ບ. CURTIS HOTEL CO. (No. 20889.)* MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT -FINDINGS—EVIDENCE. Testimony considered, and found to be sufficient to justify the findings of the trial court, and that there were no prejudicial errors in the rulings on the admissibility of evidence. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. §§ 405[1], 417[8].) Certiorari to District Court, Hennepin County; Charles S. Jelley, Judge. Certiorari by the State, on relation of the Maryland Casualty Company, to review an order of the District Court of Hennepin County awarding compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act to George O. Le Baron, an employee, against the Curtis Hotel Company, employer. Order affirmed. Barrows & Stewart, of St. Paul, for relator. Geo. R. Smith, H. Stanley Hanson, and Leo J. Gleason, all of Minneapolis, for respondents. QUINN, J. This is a proceeding under section 8225, General Statutes, to determine what compensation, if any, George O. Le Baron, now deceased, was entitled to, under chapter 84a of the statute, for injuries sustained by accident on January 3, 1917. The cause was tried to the court in July. Within two days after the trial was completed, and before the decision was filed, Le Baron died, and his widow was substituted as plaintiff. In its decision the court found that on January 3, 1917, and for several years prior thereto, Le Baron had been in the employ * Decision rendered, May 17, 1918. 167 N. W. Rep. 1039. Syllabus by the Court. explain that he had an ingrowing toenail, and when he put on a new pair of shoes this caused whatever appearance of lameness he exhibited, and that he had always been in good health before the accident. The credit of the testimony was for the board. It is true, as claimed by the defendant, that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs. But where there is testimony in the record, to sustain the finding of the board we cannot disturb such finding in the absence of fraud. Whether the testimony introduced by one side preponderates over that of the other is exclusively for the determination of the board. We have had occasion to consider cases of an accident followed by a subsequent injury, where the original injury was held by the board to be the proximate cause of the disability for which compensation was awarded. Cook v. Charles Hoertz & Son, 164 N. W. 464; Reiss v. Northway Motor & Mfg. Co. et al., 166 N. W. 840, and in each case affirmed the finding of the board. The instant case is not sufficiently unlike these cases to require further comment. [2] Deceased was unmarried. There is much controversy over the question of the dependency of the plaintiffs. Testimony was introduced showing that they occupied a house owned by a brother of deceased, the rent of which was admitted to be worth $7 per month; that the father owned a farm of 40 acres; that the parents sold butter and milk; that deceased was usually well dressed, owned an automobile, and took a young lady whom he was engaged to marry to shows and entertainments; and that his wages were not large. On the other hand, it was testified that the farm was heavily incumbered, did not produce enough to pay taxes and interest; that the father was injured in an accident 7 or 8 years previous, and had since been unable to work; that deceased bought all the groceries and gave his parents cash for their necessities; that he clothed the little sister, and the mother positively testified that he had supported them since he was 15 years of age. While the exact sum furnished to plaintiffs by the deceased was not made as definite as it might have been, or should have been, we are not persuaded that we can say that there is no evidence upon which the board could base its conclusion of partial dependency or the weekly amount thereof found by it. [3] Defendant did not operate its plant the entire year. Its "campaign," which is conducted in the fall, appears from this record to average some 60-odd days. The parties seem to agree that firemen are employed a few days longer, and it is agreed that they average 74 days' work during the year. The employment in defendant's plant may be termed seasonal, and the case falls squarely within Andrejwski v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182 Mich. 298, 148 N. W. 684, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 724. That case so fully discusses the four classifications found in the statute that it is only necessary to refer to it. The compensation in the instant case should have been computed under the fourth classification in accordance with the holding in that case. The award will be vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA. STATE EX REL. MARYLAND CASUALTY CO. V. DISTRICT COURT OF HENNEPIN COUNTY ET AL.* LE BARON V. CURTIS HOTEL CO. (No. 20889.)* MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT -FINDINGS—EVIDENCE. Testimony considered, and found to be sufficient to justify the findings of the trial court, and that there were no prejudicial errors in the rulings on the admissibility of evidence. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. $$ 405[1], 417[8].) Certiorari to District Court, Hennepin County; Charles S. Jelley, Judge. Certiorari by the State, on relation of the Maryland Casualty_Company, to review an order of the District Court of Hennepin County awarding compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act to George O. Le Baron, an employee, against the Curtis Hotel Company, employer. Order affirmed. Barrows & Stewart, of St. Paul, for relator. Geo. R. Smith, H. Stanley Hanson, and Leo J. Gleason, all of Minneapolis, for respondents. QUINN, J. This is a proceeding under section 8225, General Statutes, to determine what compensation, if any, George O. Le Baron, now deceased, was entitled to, under chapter 84a of the statute, for injuries sustained by accident on January 3, 1917. The cause was tried to the court in July. Within two days after the trial was completed, and before the decision was filed, Le Baron died, and his widow was substituted as plaintiff. In its decision the court found that on January 3, 1917, and for several years prior thereto, Le Baron had been in the employ * Decision rendered, May 17, 1918. 167 N. W. Rep. 1039. Syllabus by the Court. of the defendant as night watchman at its apartment house; that on that day, while at work in the course of his employment, carrying some letters from the desk in the apartment house to the mail box on the sidewalk, Le Baron slipped on the topmost step of a flight of six stone steps leading from the apartment, and fell to the sidewalk, a distance of several feet, thereby accidentally injuring his left knee, hip, and back; that immediately thereafter he felt considerable pain in his knee, and a dull pain in his back in the region of his kidneys, which continued to the time of the trial; that the injuries from the fall caused a gradual impairment of his health, and that acute nephritis developed from such injuries, resulting in his permanent total disability-and ordered judgment for the plaintiff. The case was brought to this court for review by certiorari. The defendant contends that the findings of fact made by the trial court are not justified by the evidence, and that the court erred in its rulings on the admissibility of evidence to the prejudice of defendant. It appears from the record that decedent, prior to the trial, was, by order of the court, required to submit to an examination by a physician other than one of his own choosing. After making such an examination the physician was called and testified as a witness on behalf of defendant, to the effect that he examined the decedent on June 27 for the purpose of learing his trouble and the cause thereof, and that after so doing he was of the opinion that the man was not suffering from acute Bright's disease, or nephritis, but that he had chronic Bright's disease, and that he did not think the accident had anything to do with causing it; that he found him in such a state that he did not think that the disease could have developed since January 3; that he must have had it before. Defendant insists that the doctor, having been appointed by the. court, was practically an officer of the court, and that, while the court was not bound by his opinion, yet it was bound by his testimony, unless there was some judicial reason for disregarding it and substituting the opinion of another physician of equal standing and ability. We are unable to agree with counsel in this contention. The testimony is conflicting as to decedent's trouble and the cause thereof. Two qualified witnesses testified as physicians on the part of the defendant, and one on the part of plaintiff, and their testimony materially differed as to the probable cause of decedent's trouble. Dr. Reginald Platt also testified along the same line. He is a graduate of the American School of Osteopathy at Kirksville, Mo., and duly licensed to practice osteopathy in this state, and had practiced his profession for some six or seven years. He had attended and treated decendent from March 12 to the time of the trial, and was competent to testify. What disease decedent was suffering from and |