delighting in discovering ways and means to defeat and not to exalt the great and noble ends of republican government, broad based upon the peoples' will. The truly loyal citizens of the State should not, and will not, either view with cold indifference, or quietly brook the disfranchisement of so large and patriotic a class of electors, without being pointed, in justification, to the most solid, clear and conclusive reasoning; for the hand which dispenses such wide-spread and startling consequences, drying up so many fountains of civil authority, and sapping, more or less, the very foundations of a government by the people, should be able to vindicate itself by the most pow erful and unanswerable considerations; and in this connec tion it may well and truly be remarked, that courts do not and will not hold statutes unconstitutional in cases merely substantially doubtful, but only when they violate the constitution clearly, palpably, and in such a manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation on the minds of the court. Surely, then, sophistry or truckling policy would be a most unsatisfactory recompense for thousands of citizen soldiers' suffrages, which, marked and dignified by their intelligence, probity and devotion to liberty and the country, as they would be, the genius of our institutions, in times like these, when great dangers menace upon every hand, cannot afford to lose.

It is true that in the States of Pennsylvania, Connecticut and New Hampshire, statutes of such a character have been held unconstitutional, while in the States of Iowa and Wisconsin they have been sustained, and this, too, by their highest judicial tribunals. Looking into the Constitutions of these States, it will be observed, however, that those of the three States first named widely differ in their phraseology, upon the subject of voting, from our own, while those of the two States last named are substantially the same intending, like our own, to simply establish the time of holding elections and the qualifications of electors, leaving all else to be regulated by legislation. Hence, our references to the Constitution of this State have ever been not to learn the place or method of

voting, but the time of holding elections and the qualifications of electors.

May we not then most confidently hope that speedy and ample provision will be made, securing to these noble men, covered with immortal glory, the exercise of this inalienable right?

In the matter of the application of Hon. John M. Gregory, Superintendent of Public Instruction, to the Supreme Court, for the writ of mandamus to issue and be directed to Hon. Emil Anneke, Auditor General, the facts, question raised, and decision made, are substantially as follows, to wit:

An act of Congress, approved September 28, 1850, granted to this State certain lands known as swamp lands. The object of this act was the reclamation of those lands, making them. fit for cultivation. Act No. 106, of the laws of 1857, of this State, vests the supervision and sale of these lands in the Commissioner of the State Land Office, fixes the minimum price at $5 per acre, and provides the method of sale, terms of payment, &c., for the execution and delivery of patents. Section 9 of this act of 1857, is in language as follows, to wit:

"Sec. 9. Of the proceeds of the sales of said swamp lands, paid or to be paid into the State Treasury, twenty-five per centum shall be reserved and set apart as a drainage fund, for the purpose of aiding the counties in which the lands sold may lie, the interest of which, at the rate of seven per cent., shall be, in pursuance of law, appropriated to drain such of the said lands as are situate in the county, and which, in the opinion of the supervisors, are capable of drainage, and can be profitably drained, and shall not have been sold under the provisions of this act; and the balance of such proceeds, after deducting the necessary and lawful expenses of such sales, shall be appropri ated to, and constitute a part of the Primary School Fund. Said balance shall be considered as loaned to the State at an interest of seven per cent. per annum, which interest shall be paid to the Primary School Fund annually, and the principal thereof is hereby appropriated to the payment of the outstanding in

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debtedness of the State, secured by its bonds or stocks, in the order in which they shall fall due."

It was claimed by Hon. John M. Gregory, that the appropriation of seventy-five per centum of the proceeds of the sales of the swamp lands, after deducting the expenses of sales, as made by said section 9, to the Primary School Fund, was a grant, perpetual and irrevocable, made so by article 13, section 2, of the Constitution of this State, and applied to all of those lands, without reference to the date of sales; and, therefore, that all acts and parts of acts of the Legislature, diverting the whole or any part of the seventy-five per centum of those moneys, after deducting the expenses of sales, were unconstitutional and void. Accordingly the Superintendent requested Hon. Emil Anneke to include in his notice of the amount of the income of the Primary School Fund, the annual interest, at seven per cent., on seventy-five per cent. of the proceeds of the sales of all swamp lands received into the Treasury, and of all payments made in lands on swamp land road contracts, after deducting the expenses of sales. The Auditor General, not understanding the act of 1857 to assume the character and force of a grant, perpetual and irrevocable, of the great body of the swamp lands, but simply of the proceeds of the sales of such as were sold before the amendment or suspension of said section 9, less the expenses of sales, did not comply with the request of the Superintendent mentioned.

Hence the Superintendent applied to the Supreme Court, at its last July term, to issue the writ of mandamus, directed to the Hon. Emil Anneke, Auditor General, commanding him to include in his notice to the Superintendent, as a part of the income of the Primary School Fund, the annual interest, at seven per centum, on seventy-five per cent. of the proceeds of all sales made of the swamp lands and of all payments made in swamp lands on road contracts, after deducting the expenses of sales, treating Act No. 31, of the laws of 1858, of this State, and all other Acts, so far as they contravened the provisions of said section 9, as unconstitutional

and void. This application for the writ of mandamus was submitted to the Court at its July term, upon briefs, myself appearing as counsel for the Auditor General. The application was then taken under advisement by the Court, and, at its last October term, was overruled and the writ denied; the Court substantially holding, that the appropriation in question was not perpetual and irrevocable as to the proceeds of the sales of all swamp lands belonging to the State, but only applied to such as were sold before said section 9 was amended by said Act No. 31, of the laws of 1858-the appropriation being not the lands, but simply the proceeds of the sales of those disposed of, less the expenses of sales, to such a time as the Legislature might choose to enlarge or diminish the ratio, or to wholly arrest it; a power which the Legislature had exercised.

The question presented in this proceeding, also, had frequently, during the last few years, more or less embarrassed legislation, and was one of more than ordinary interest to the people of the State. Its judicial settlement, for the sake of settlement, may, therefore, if viewed in no other light, be regarded as in no small degree fortunate to all concerned.

At the last October term of the Supreme Court, I appeared, on behalf of the People, and argued the case of George C. Evans, plaintiff in error, vs. the People, defendants in error. The plaintiff in error had been convicted of manslaughter in the Circuit Court for the county of Kent, at its last June term, and the case was pending in the Supreme Court, by his bill of exceptions. At the same term the Court rendered their decision in the case, overruling the exceptions.

At the same term of the Supreme Court, having become satisfied that the River Raisin and Lake Erie Railroad Company was doing an unlawful banking business, to wit: issuing bank notes as a circulating medium without any lawful authority, at the city of Monroe, in this State, I filed against that Company an information in the nature of a quo warranto, in the Supreme Court. The writ has een duly issued, served and returned,

but the company has not yet pleaded to the information, the time therefor having been extended, by the order of one of the Supreme Court Judges, till the 20th proximo.

Also, at the same term, an application was made, to the Supreme Court by George W. Blair, a member of the 5th Michigan Battery of Light Artillery, for the writ of mandamus to issue and be directed to William Hammond, Quartermaster General of the State, directing the latter to pay him, Blair, the sum of $50 as a State bounty-myself appearing and arguing the motion on the part of the Quartermaster General. The application was based upon the following facts: Blair was a substitute for a man who had been drafted in this State into the military service of the United States, in the month of February last, for the period of nine months; but May 13th, 1863, volunteered and was mustered, as a private soldier, into such service for the period of three years, or during the war, and had ever since served as such soldier in said battery. Thereupon, he claimed to be entitled to the State bounty of $50, contemplated by act No. 51, of the laws of 1863, of this State, and ordered to be paid to volunteers by your Excellency. The application was sustained by the Court, and the writ of mandamus directed to issue accordingly.

On the 3d day of October last, a suit was commenced in the Circuit Court for the county of Tuscola in chancery, by Martin Watrous and David G. Slafter, complainants, v3., Emil Anneke, Auditor General, and Alson Greenfield, county treasurer of that county, defendants. The object of the suit is to prevent the sale of certain lands delinquent for certain taxes assessed thereon, to defray the expenses of ditching; the taxes being claimed, for various reasons, to be illegal and void. I have entered the appearance of the Auditor General and the County Treasurer in the suit, and a copy of the bill has been served, but the defendants' answer has not yet been put in.

The three chancery suits commenced against the Auditor General in 1861, one of them in the county of Wayne, and two in Bay county, for a like purpose, and referred to in the last