the same, under known and visible lines and boundaries, and under colorable title (a) for seven years, no entry shall be made or action sustained against such possessor, by any person having any right or title to the same, except during the seven years next, after his right or title shall have descended or accrued, who in default of sucing within the time aforesaid, shall be excluded from any claim thereafter to be made; and such possession, so held, shall be a perpetual bar against all persons; subject to the qualifications in sections twenty-eight and twenty-nine (§§28-29) of this title. A paper writing purporting to be a will proved before the proper tribunal in 1810, by one witness, is color of title to lands disposed therein. McConnell v. McConnell, 64-342. * Building a shed, quarrying rock and cutting wood to burn lime, on the premises for more than seven years, uninterruptedly, constitutes an adverse possession, which will give title to one claiming under it. Moore v. Thompson, 69-120. 21.--Proviso in case of Judgment for Plaintiff reversed, &c. If in any action for real property, the plaintiff be nonsuited, or judgment be given for him, and the same be reversed for error, or a verdict pass for the plaintiff, and judgment thereon be arrested, then in any such case, the plaintiff may commence a new action from time to time, within one year after non-suit, judgment reversed or stayed as aforesaid, notwithstanding the time limited in the foregoing section ($20) for bringing such actions may have expired, if the action first brought, was commenced within the time above prescribed for bringing such actions. {22.-Seizure within twenty years, when necessary. No action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, shall be maintained, unless it appear that a As to what constitutes "colorable title," see, also, Grant v. Winbourne, 2 Hay. 56; Armour v. White, ibid, 69; Pearse v. Owens, ibid, 234; Evans v. Satterfield, 1 Mur. 413; University v. Blount, T. R. 13; Hill v. Wilton, 2 Mur. 14; Jones v. Putney, 3 Mur. 562; Campbell v. McArthur, 2 Hawks, 33; Rayner v. Capehart, 2 Hawks, 375; Tate v. Southard, 3 Hawks, 119; Dobson v. Murphy, 1 D. & B. 586; Ross v. Durham, 4 D. & B. 54; Williams v. Council, 4 Jones, 206; Hardin v. Barrett, 6 Jones, 159; Kron v. Hinson, 8 Jones, 347. the plaintiff, or those under whom he claims, was seized or possessed of the premises in question within twenty years before the commencement of such action; subject to the qualifications in sections twenty-nine and thirty (§§ 29—30.) The possession of one tenant in common for twenty years without any acknowledgment of title in his co-tenant, and without any claim on the part of his co-tenant to rents, he being under no disability, formerly raised a presumption of title, but now, under the Code, has the effect of an absolute title in fee against all persons not under disability. Covington v. Stewart 77-148. 23.-Adverse possession for twenty years. No action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, or the issues and profits thereof, shall be maintained when the person in possession thereof, or the defendant in such action, or those under whom he claims, shall have possessed such real property under known and visible lines and boundaries adversely to all other persons for twenty years; and such possession, so held, shall give a title in a fee to the possessor, in such property, against all persons not under disability. The clearing and fencing to a line of marked trees constitutes a notorious adverse possession, though the intention was to clear only to the real line between two grants, which line was not identical with such marked line. Mode v. Long, 64–433. The title being out of the state, and there being evidence tending so prove a possession for twenty years, by those under whom the plaintiff claims, the jury may presume a grant from one having title. Melvin v. Waddell, 75-361. When one possession of land conveys the same in trust to pay debts and afterwards it is sold at execution sale and bid in for the benefit of his wife, and he continues in possession during his life, and the wife until action brought, held, not to be a possession adverse to the trustee or to a purchaser at the sale under deed of trust. McNeil v. Riddle, 66-290; Covington v. Stewart, 77-148, snpra § 22. 24.-Action after Entry. No entry upon real estate shall be deemed sufficient or valid, as a claim, unless an action be commenced thereupon, within one year after the making of such entry, and within the time prescribed in this title. 25.-Possession presumed—Occupation when deemed under legal Title. In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, or damages for a trespass on such pos session, the person establishing a legal title to the premises, shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of such premises by any other person shall be deemed to have been. under, and in subordination to, the legal title, unless it appears that such premises have been held and possessed adversely to such legal title, for the time prescribed by law before the commencement of such action, 26.-Relation of Landlord and Tenant. Whenever the relation of landlord and tenant shall have existed between any persons, the possession of the tenant shall be deemed the possession of the landlord, until the expiration of twenty years from the termination of the tenancy; or, where there has been no written lease, until the expiration of twenty years from the time of the last pay ment of rent, notwithstanding that such tenant may have acquired another title, or may have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord. But such presumptions shall not be made after the periods herein limited. Reid v. Chatham, 75-86. A delay by a femme covert tenant in common of three years after the death of her husband and seven years after the death of her father, who had a life estate in the land, does not bar her action. Day v. Howard, 73-1. 27.-Persons under disabilities. If a person entitled to commence any action for the recovery of real property, or to make an entry or defence founded on the title to real property, or to rents and services out of the same, be, at the time such title shall descend or accrue, either, 1. Within the age of twenty-one years, or 2. Insane, or 3. Imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution upon conviction of a criminal offence, or Then such person may, notwithstanding the time of limitation prescribed in this title be expired, commence his action, or make his entry, within three years next after full See also § 56 post, which allows a married woman to sue alone in 28.-Cumulative Disabilities. When two or more disabilities shall co-exist, or when one disability shall supervene an existing one, the period prescribed within which an action may be brought, shall not begin to run until the termination of the latest disability. Where a femme plaintiff did not become of age until 1866, the suspension of the statutes of limitation saved her rights until 1870, and if she incurred the disability of coverture before the date last mentioned, the statute does not begin to run until the removal of her coverture. Lippard v. Troutman, 72–551. See also, cases cited under § 16. 29.-Rail Roads, &c., not barred. No Rail Road, Plank Road, Turnpike or Canal Company, shall be barred of, or presumed to have conveyed, any real estate, right of way, easement, leasehold or other interest in the soil which may have been condemned, or otherwise obtained for its use, as a right of way, depot, station-house or place of landing, by any statute of limitation or by occupation of the same by any person whatever. CHAPTER III. TIME OF COMMENCING ACTIONS OTHER THAN FOR THE RECOV- 30.-Periods of Limitation prescribed. The periods prescribed for the commencement of actions, other than for the recovery of real property, shall be as Old star sime, & stat as to presumption aussuc su Acts 1866-7 Ch 17 sec 8. & Ch 18. 74-46815-75-M6-132-5-23. 74-46815--75-M. 123-523.- 70 M6 189 1. An action upon a judgment or decree of any Court of the United States, or of any State or territory thereof; 2. An action upon a sealed instrument against the principals thereto; [Amended by striking out “not negotiable," Act of 1871-72, Chapter 206.] The interest on such instrument is not barred until the principal is, though it is agreed to be paid annually." Knight v. Braswell, 70-709. 3. An action for the foreclosure of a mortgage, or deed in trust for creditors with a power of sale, of real property, where the mortgagor or grantor has been in possession of the property, within ten years after the forfeiture of the mortgage, or after the power of sale became absolute, or within ten years after the last payment on the same; 4. An action for the redemption of a mortgage, where the mortgagee has been in possession, or for a residuary interest under a deed in trust for creditors, where the trustee or those holding under him, shall have been in possession, within ten years after the right of action accrued. 32.-Seven years. Within seven years; 1. On a judgment rendered by a Justice of the Peace; 2. By an creditor of a deceased person against his personal or real representative, within seven years next after the qualification of the executor or administrator and his making the advertisement required by law, for creditors of the deceased to present their claims, where no personal service of such notice in writing is made upon the creditor; and a creditor thus barred of a recovery against the representative of any principal debtor, shall also be barred of a recovery against any surety to such debt. 232.a-Where personal service is made on creditor. [Acts of 1868-169, Chapter 113, Section 32-Battle's Revisal, Chapter 45, Section 48.] The executor, administrator or collector may cause the notice, [provided for in Section 29, Chapter 113, Acts 1868-'69-Bat |