Cases on the Law of DamagesRalph Stanley Bauer |
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Common terms and phrases
actual damages actual malice affirmed alleged allowed amount appellant appellee assessed awarded breach of contract brought cause of action charge circumstances cited claim compensation compensatory damages complained concur condition consequence considered cost Defendant appeals defendant's delivered demurrer effect entitled to recover error evidence exemplary damages fact fire follows ground held intervening cause J.-This judge jury land liable liquidated damages loss malice market value Mass measure of damages ment mental suffering N. Y. Supp natural negligent act nominal damages opinion owner paid party penalty person plaintiff in error probable profits proof proximate cause punitive damages question Railroad Co railroad company Railway reason received recover damages recovery refused reversed rule slander special damages stipulated supra sustained testimony thereof tiff tion tort trespass trial court verdict wrongdoer wrongful act
Popular passages
Page 59 - Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, ie, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself...
Page 71 - ... such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, ie, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of a breach of it.
Page 167 - In determining what is proximate cause, the true rule is that the injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence; such a consequence as, under the surrounding circumstances of the case, might and ought to have been foreseen by the wrongdoer as likely to flow from his act.
Page 460 - The plaintiff sought to recover the value of such work as an item of damages, but the court held that the measure of damages was the difference between the value of the oxen at the time of the conversion and their value at the time they were retaken by the plaintiff.
Page 481 - Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the measure of damages, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damages of a greater amount, is the difference between the contract price and the market or current price of the goods at the time or times when they ought to have been delivered, or, if no time was fixed, then at the time of the refusal to deliver.
Page 494 - Where, under a contract of sale, the property in the goods has passed to the buyer, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the terms of the contract, the seller may maintain an action against him for the price of the goods.
Page 82 - The proximate cause of an event must be understood to be that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new, independent cause, produces that event, and without which that event would not have occurred.
Page 165 - IT were infinite for the law to consider the causes of causes, and their impulsions one of another; therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause, and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree.
Page 493 - The measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach of contract.
Page 36 - Now, in the present case, if we are to apply the principles above laid down, we find that the only circumstances here communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants at the time the contract was made, were, that the article to be carried was the broken shaft of a mill, and that the plaintiffs were the millers of that mill.