is not that the jury must determine the number of years that the disability will continue to exist, and then multiply this number by the yearly compensation the party has earned in the past. Damages for future losses in cases of this kind are not susceptible of computation by a strictly mathematical calculation. Evidence may be given of the age of the party injured, the probable duration of life, the effect the injury has had upon the ability of the person to earn money, of the probability that the injurious effect on the ability to earn money will continue in the future, either during life or for a lesser period, and of the business or occupation in which the person was engaged, and the compensation, whether by wages, fees, by a fixed salary or profits that resulted therefrom; and, from the facts thus proven in evidence, it is for the jury to award such fair sum as will, in their judgment, compensate the party for the decreased or destroyed ability to earn money in the future, due allowance being made for the contingencies and uncertainties that inhere in such matters. Railroad Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Railway Co. v. Needham, 10 U. S. App. 339, 351, 3 C. C. A. 129, 148, and 52 Fed. Rep. 371, 378. We are of the opinion that the charge of the court on this subject is open to the criticism that the jury would naturally infer therefrom that they must compensate the defendant in error for this future loss by allowing her the yearly compensation she had earned as a teacher for the length of time they deemed the disability would continue, thus assuming that, if this accident had not happened, the defendant in error would certainly have continued to teach at that rate of salary for her lifetime, or for the length of time the jury determined the injury would continue to affect her ability to earn money; and, as already said, this is not a correct statement of the rule to be observed by the jury in estimating damages of this nature. For these reasons, the judgments rendered must be reversed, and the case be remanded for a new trial as to both the city of Denver and the electric company. THAYER, Circuit Judge (dissenting). I am not able to concur in all the propositions considered and decided in the foregoing opinion. If a city authorizes a telegraph, telephone, or electric light company to erect a tall wooden pole, burdened with wires, on one of its public thoroughfares, it is affected with knowledge, from the very nature of the structure, that, in course of time, it will decay, and become dangerous to those who have occasion to use its streets. I am of opinion, therefore, that a municipality which authorizes such poles to be erected on its streets is under an obligation to the public to see that they are examined in a proper manner and at reasonable intervals, either by its own agents or by the persons or corporations whom it has authorized to erect them, and that the duty of inspection does not rest exclusively upon the latter, as the opinion of the majority seems to hold. Moreover, I do not understand that the charge of the trial judge, when considered altogether, imposed upon the electric light company the duty of exercising more than ordinary care in the matter of inspecting its poles. From the fact that the jury were instructed very pointedly that there could be no recovery against either of the defendants unless negligence on their part was proven, it is apparent, I think, that the trial judge did not entertain the view, or intend to convey the idea to the jury that the electric light company was bound at all hazards to see that its poles were in a safe condition. Considered as an entirety, the charge on this branch of the case meant, I think, that the electric light company was required to adopt a proper method of examining its poles, — one which would be liable to develop any interior rottenness, and to examine them at reasonable intervals. This direction, in my judgment, was substantially correct. ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RAILROAD Circuit Court of Appeals, United States, Sixth Circuit, July, 1898. CARRIER AND PASSENGER - RELATION EXISTS WHEN PASSENGER HAS TEMPORARILY ALIGHTED. Where a passenger, without objection by the company or its agents, alights at an intermediate station, a station for the reception and discharge of passengers, for any reasonable and usual purpose, like that of refreshment, of the sending or receipt of telegrams, or of exercise by walking up and down the platform, or the like, he does not cease to be a passenger and is justified in the belief that the company is exercising due care for his safety (1). SAME. Plaintiff, an employee of a telegraph company, alighted from a train that stopped about 1,500 feet from the station, the usual place, and, according I. As sustaining the proposition the court cited Dodge . Steamship Co., 148 Mass. 207, 3 Am. Neg. Cas. 843; McKimble v. R. R. Co., 141 Mass. 463, 3 Am. Neg. Cas. 831; Parsons v. R. R. Co., 113 N. Y. 362, 363; Packet Co. 2. True, 88 Ill. 612, 2 Am. Neg. Cas. 617; Dice v. Locks Co., 8 Oregon, 60, 6 Am. Neg. Cas. 202; Railroad Co. v. A contrary view is announced in State v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 58 Me. 176; De Kay v. Railway Co., 41 Minn. 178, 4 Am. Neg. Cas. 233. to his evidence, he started to walk to the station to see if there was a telegram for him from his employer, and according to defendant's evidence he was merely loitering between the tracks. He was struck and injured by a car being switched upon a side track. The question whether he was entitled to the care due a passenger or only the care due to a stranger was properly left to the jury. SAME CARE TO BE EXERCISED WHILE PASSENGER GOING FROM TRAIN TO STATION. - When a passenger is proceeding in the usual way from a train to the station, he has the right to assume that the company will not expose him to danger without full warning; and, though this does not relieve him from the duty of exercising ordinary care in a yard where trains are moving about, it is for the jury to say whether it did not justify him in assuming that a train on a main track would not suddenly be switched across the only practicable path open to him to reach the station without some special warning (1). ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Tennessee. WM. L. FRIERSON, for plaintiff in error. CHAMPE S. ANDREWS, for defendant in error. Before TAFT and LURTON, Circuit Judges, and SEVERENS, District Judge. This is a writ of error to reverse the judgment for the plaintiff below in an action for damages for a personal injury inflicted in Georgia. The plaintiff, Coggins, was a lineman or telegraph repairer in the employ of the Western Union Telegraph Company. His wages were $50 a month, and his expenses. He was furnished by his employer with an annual pass over the defendant's road. Upon what consideration this annual pass was issued by the railroad company to the telegraph company did not appear in the evidence. The contract was called for by plaintiff's counsel, and was not produced. The court charged the jury that the rights of Coggins were the same as if he had paid his fare, and this, though excepted to, is not assigned for error. The evidence for the plaintiff tended to show the following state of facts: Coggins was directed by his superior to take passage on this train, which was a freight train carrying passengers, for Crudup, where the telegraph line needed repair. At Rising Fawn, Ga., an intermediate station, the train stopped to do some switching. The caboose in which Coggins was riding stopped about 1,500 feet from the station. This was the usual place for passengers by freight trains to alight. The only practicable way of reaching the station from this point was to walk between the main track and the house or scale track, which lay parallel to the main track 1. For other actions bearing on this point see vols. 2-7, AM. NEG. CAS., and vols. 1-4, AM. NEG. REP., and the current numbers of AM. NEG. REP. on the right. Coggins had inquired of the brakeman how long the train would remain at Rising Fawn, and, on being told that its stay would be half an hour in length, alighted from the caboose, and walked between the tracks towards the station, to inquire whether there were any telegraph messages to him from his superior. It was customary for his superior, when he was out on the line, to telegraph. orders to points where his train was likely to stop. As Coggins walked towards the station, he saw part of the train upon which he had come backing towards him on the main track. As it approached, he concluded it would be safer to cross over near to the house or scale track, lying parallel. A cut-off or switch track crossing diagonally from the main track to the house track lay just in front of him, and at his side. He crossed this, towards the scale track. His left side was now towards the approaching train. As he stepped over the second rail of the cut-off track, he heard a brakeman on the ground back of him calling in a loud voice to another brakeman on the approaching train. To see the cause of the calling, he turned half round towards the right, just as he reached the end of the ties of the cut-off track. As he did so, the cars, which, instead of continuing on the main track, as he expected, had been switched on to the cut-off track, struck his right shoulder, whirled him about, and threw him on his back, with his left arm under the wheels. He was more or less familiar with the yard at Rising Fawn, and the brakeman engaged in switching the train had told him that they were about to switch a number of cars on to the furnace tracks, which lay to the east of the main track, and on the side opposite to the house or scale track. Hence he did not anticipate that the train, as it approached, would be switched over on the house track cut-off. Both the brakemen engaged in switching the train were where they could have seen Coggins had they looked; and one did see him, but was made so speechless at the sight of his danger as not to give him. warning, and the other one, who was on the rear end of the backing train, did call, but not until it was too late for Coggins to escape. This is the case for the plaintiff. The defendant introduced evidence to show that the accident occurred fifteen or twenty minutes after the train stopped at Rising Fawn; that Coggins was loitering along between the tracks, talking with acquaintances whom he met there; that he had no ground to anticipate the receipt of telegraphic orders at that point; and that he was standing on or near the track, looking up at the telegraph. wires, when struck. Counsel for the railroad company excepted to that part of the charge of the court in which, after explaining the high degree of care a railroad company owes to its passengers, the court submitted to the jury as an issue of fact whether Coggins was to be regarded as a passenger when he was injured. The points decided are stated in the syllabus. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by TAFT, Circuit Judge. WEISS v. BETHLEHEM IRON COMPANY. Circuit Court of Appeals, United States, Third Circuit, June, 1898. MASTER AND SERVANT - EMPLOYEE RUN DOWN BY LOCOMOTIVE WHILE CROSSING PRIVATE RAILWAY TRACK. The rule to stop, look and listen, regulating the conduct of a traveler upon a highway when about to cross a railroad track is not the criterion by which to determine the degree of care required of an employee in a rolling mill when about to cross a private railway of the mill. In such case the employer is bound. not to expose its servant, conducting its business, to unnecessary peril against which it might have guarded with reasonable diligence; the serv. ant has the right to assume that the employer will not subject him to needless danger and is bound only to observe reasonable care to avoid danger which is obvious or which was known to him or of which he might have acquired knowledge by the exercise of proper attention. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Before ACHESON and DALLAS, Circuit Judges, and BRADFOrd, District Judge. GEORGE DEMMING and M. HAMPTON TODD, for plaintiff in error. JOHN G. JOHNSON (FRANK P. PRICHARD with him on the brief), for defendant in error. This is an action brought by John Weiss against the Bethlehem Iron Company to recover damages for bodily injuries alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff by reason of the negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff went into the employment of the defendant company at its steel works on the evening of April 27, 1896. He worked at night from six o'clock in the evening to six o'clock in the morning, and his duties were to wheel fire brick and clay in a wheelbarrow to a place in the defendant's mill, where new furnaces were in course of erection, and to wheel therefrom old fire brick, and dump them at a refuse pile in the defendant's adjoining mold yard. While engaged in this latter work, shortly after nine o'clock on the night of April 30, 1896, the fourth night of his. employment, the plaintiff was struck by a moving car which |