even if it can be run so that the last course and distance will correspond with the line of the highway, that alone will not warrant the presumption that it was intended to convey the land to the middle of the highway." In Tag v. Keteltas (1882) 16 Jones & S. (N. Y.) 241, it was held that no right to the fee was given by a description beginning "at the side" of a road, and after sundry courses returning to the place of beginning "along" the road. In Maynard v. Weeks (1868) 41 Vt. 617, the fee was held to be excluded by the following description: "Beginning on the west line of Vermont & Canada Railroad, and southeast corner of land west of said railroad, owned by said Philo Weeks. Thence south on the west line of said railroad 28 rods. Thence west, etc." The court said: "In this case the description of the land commences, 'in the west line of the railroad;' thus far there is no room for doubt or construction; the words that follow are, 'and southeast corner of land west of said railroad, owned by said Weeks;' these words, if standing alone, would undoubtedly be construed to mean the southeast corner west of the center line, as Weeks owned to and across the railroad at that point; but, when taken in connection with the words that precede them, and being followed by te words 'thence south on the west line of said railroad,' etc., it seems to us impossible to raise a doubt as to the intention, or to find room for construction. It would have been difficult for the parties to have expressed more clearly an intention to bound the land conveyed on the west line of the road, and not upon the center line." Where the description runs by courses and distances, or metes and bounds, from a stake or monument at the side line of a highway, it has been held that the grantee takes to the side line only. Walker v. Pearson (1855) 40 Me. 152; Chadwick v. Davis (1886) 143 Mass. 7, 8 N. E. 601; Phillips v. Bowers (1856) 7 Gray (Mass.) 21; Sibley v. Holden (1831) 10 Pick. (Mass.) 249, 20 Am. Dec. 521; Smith v. Slocomb (1857) 9 Gray (Mass.) 36, 69 Am. Dec. 274, followed in (1858) 11 Gray (Mass.) 280; Adams v. Saratoga & W. R. Co. (1851) 11 Barb. (N. Y.) 44, reversed on other grounds in (1852) 10 N. Y. 328; Jackson ex dem. Yates v. Hathaway (1818) 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 447, 8 Am. Dec. 263. Compare Van Winkle v. Van Winkle (1906) 184 N. Y. 193, 77 N. E. 33, wherein the fee to the center of the highway was held to be conveyed by a description stated by the court as follows: "Beginning at a stake by the fence on the crossroad leading to Harlem, 50 links from the southeastern corner of the fence, then running north 45° east, parallel to the boundary fence 10 chains 65 links to lot number 5. The description then continues around the lot, returning on the westerly boundary 'to the public. road; thence south along the to the place of beginCompare also McKenzie v. Gleason (1904) 184 Mass. 452, 100 Am. St. Rep. 566, 69 N. E. 1076, wherein title to the center of the highway was held to pass by a description from "a stake and stones near" a road, thence "by said road" to a stake. road ning.'" In Neal v. Hopkins (1898) 87 Md. 19, 39 Atl. 322, the description in controversy began "at a post planted" at the intersection of two streets, thence northward, etc., and finally "thence to a post planted" on the line of the street. It was held that the grantee took only to the street line. In Van Winkle v. Van Winkle (N. Y.) supra, it was said: "Where a line runs to a stake or mark upon a fence or a tree upon the bank of a stream or upon the side of a highway, and thence along the meandering of the stream or along the highway, the stake, mark, or tree will be deemed to indicate the place of the line, and not the end thereof, by reason of the difficulty of maintaining a visible object marking the corner in the middle of a stream or in the roadbed of a highway, thus vesting the title in the grantee." In Hunt v. Brown (1892) 75 Md. 481, 23 Atl. 1029, it appeared that land was described as "beginning at a post standing at the end of the first line of lot No. 35, and running thence north 65 degrees, east 24 perches to another post, thence north 10 degrees, west 20 perches to a post standing on the south side of said Windsor mill road, thence bounding on this road north 87 degrees, west 24 perches to another post, and thence with a straight line to the beginning." It was held that the grantee took to the side line only. With respect to a call for a stake which conflicted with the presumption from a description bounding the premises on a highway the court said, in Cox v. Freedley (1859) 33 Pa. 124, 75 Am. Dec. 584: "The only thing the learned judge found to control them was the word 'stakes.' At the northeast corner of Egypt and Race streets, and at the south corner of Penn and Race streets, stakes are mentioned. These the learned judge considered fixed monuments. If they were such, they could not be in the street, any more than, in some of the water cases referred to, the marked trees or stakes could have stood in the middle of the stream. Where surveys are bounded on streams or streets, the marks which denote them, if higher than the surface of the water or ground, must necessarily stand on the margin. Sometimes a stone and ring are planted beneath the surface, and they are expected to be at the very corner or line. But what sort of a monument is a stake? It is so unsubstantial that in country surveys it usually indicates a corner which the surveyor never visited, and which exists only on paper. Artificial boundaries which are meant to be fixed monuments are made with more care than merely sticking a stake, which the next wind may blow over, which one of a thousand accidents may destroy, and which must rapidly decay, if not otherwise obliterated. So frail a witness is scarcely worthy to be called a monument, or to control the construction of a deed in so important a particular as that under consideration." Where there is a call for a mon ument on the side line of a road, the grantee takes to the side line only. Peabody Heights Co. v. Sadtler (1885) 63 Md. 533, 52 Am. Rep. 519. A description beginning at the exterior corner of two streets has been construed as equivalent to a beginning at a point on the side of one of them, and to exclude the fee in the street. O'Leary v. Glens Falls (1908) 128 App. Div. 683, 112 N. Y. Supp. 932, affirmed in (1910) 200 N. Y. 218, 93 N. E. 513, 21 Ann. Cas. 633; Morison v. New York Elev. R. Co. (1893) 74 Hun, 398, 26 N. Y. Supp. 641; Kehres v. New York (1914) 162 App. Div. 349, 147 N. Y. Supp. 825; De Baun v. Pardee (1913) 139 N. Y. Supp. 1077, affirmed in (1915) 169 App. Div. 966, 153 N. Y. Supp. 1111; Re Tremont Ave. (1911) 71 Misc. 480, 130 N. Y. Supp. 510; Dexter v. Riverside & O. Mills (1891) 39 N. Y. S. R. 933, 15 N. Y. Supp. 374, affirmed in (1892) 133 N. Y. 684, 31 N. E. 627; Holloway v. Southmayd (1892) 45 N. Y. S. R. 895, 18 N. Y. Supp. 707; Buck v. Squiers (1850) 22 Vt. 484. Thus, in Tietjen v. Palmer (1907) 121 App. Div. 233, 105 N. Y. Supp. 790, a description "beginning at the southeast" corner of two streets, thence "along" one of them, was held to pass title to the side line only. But in Woolf v. Woolf (1909) 131 App. Div. 751, 116 N. Y. Supp. 104, it was held that similar words did not rebut the presumption arising from a previous description of the land by lot and block number. In Wegge v. Madler (1906) 129 Wis. 412, 116 Am. St. Rep. 953, 109 N. W. 223, it was held that the "northwest corner" of a lot as a place of beginning will be construed to mean the intersection of the side line with the center line of the street on which it abuts. Title to the center of the highway has been held to be given by a description, "beginning on the southerly side of" a road, and thence running "on said road." O'Connell v. Bryant (1877) 121 Mass. 557, wherein it was said: "By a general and now wellestablished rule of construction, the boundary 'on the county road' would include the fee in the land to the mid dle of the road, if owned by the grantor; and the first part of the description, 'beginning on the southerly side of' that road, being the only clause in the deed that raises any ambiguity, does not refer to any fixed monument at the edge of the road, and may have effect as indicating on which side of the road the land lay, and is not, in our opinion, sufficient to take the case out of the general rule." It has been held that the fact that a description by metes and bounds calls for a line beginning at the "corner" of two streets, thence running "along" one of them, does not prevent the grantee from taking to the center. Moody v. Palmer (1875) 50 Cal. 31, wherein the court said: "It is well settled that land described in a deed as bounded by a public highway or street will be considered as extending to the center of the street or highway, unless it clearly appears that it was intended to make a side line instead of the center line the boundary. The highway is a monument, and in legal contemplation the thread of the highway is the monument, unless a contrary intention clearly appears. That this is the rule is established by a multitude of authorities." Where property is described as bounded by a road, the fact that a point on the side of the road is named as the place of beginning does not prevent the grantee from taking to the center of the road. Low v. Tibbetts (1880) 72 Me. 92, 39 Am. Rep. 303. See to the same effect, Cottle v. Young (1871) 59 Me. 105, wherein the court said: "The termination of the last line, 'at the southerly post in the pair of bars in the southeasterly corner of the piece hereby conveyed; this pair of bars being on the road first named,' does not change the eastern boundary before given. It merely designates the course and place of the line running to the road, but does not limit or restrict it from extending to the center of the road. It runs to a monument on the road, and that is all. It could not well run to one in the road." In Pell v. Pell (1901) 35 Misc. 472, 71 N. Y. Supp. 1092, affirmed in (1901) 65 App. Div. 388, 73 N. Y. Supp. 81, which is affirmed in (1902) 169 N. Y. 607, 62 N. E. 1099, the presumption of an intent to give title to the side line only from a description of the place of beginning at the "side” of a road was held to be overcome by a further description of the property as "bounded by" the road. In Everett v. Fall River (1905) 189 Mass. 513, 75 N. E. 946, the fee to the center was held to be conveyed by a deed describing land as beginning "at a point in the line of" a street, the final line running "by" the street to the place of beginning. Where the place of beginning is in the center of the highway, the grantee takes to the center. Gove v. White (1866) 20 Wis. 426. And a beginning at a monument in the center has been held to prevail over a bound "on the side" of the highway. Putzel v. Van Brunt (1876) 8 Jones & S. (N. Y.) 501; Dodd v. Witt (1885) 139 Mass. 63, 52 Am. Rep. 700, 29 N. E. 475. In Marsh v. Burt (1861) 34 Vt. 289, the fee to the center was held to be conveyed by the following description: "Beginning on the west side of the road at the end of a wall, running westerly on said wall, and in a straight line therewith to the west line of lot No. 3, thence on said west line to the center of the line of said lot No. 3, thence on said center line to the road, thence on said road to the place of beginning." The court said: "In this description there are three references to the highway. Two of them by the well-established and universally recognized rules of construction apply to the center or thread of the road; the third speaks of the west side of the road as the place of beginning at the end of the wall. By this the party has fixed a definite, tangible, and permanent northern boundary to this piece, such a boundary as he could not have in the center of the road; and we think it was more for this purpose than with any reference to an intention to exclude the highway that this point was fixed, especially as, in terminating the southerly line, he carries it to the center of the highway, and lays the easterly line upon the center line of the road. The fixing of this boundary in the west line of Illinois. La Salle Varnish Co. v. Maryland.-Gump v. Sibley (1894) Massachusetts.-Hollenbeck v. Row- ley (1864) 8 Allen, 473. Compare Alden v. Murdock (1816) 13 Mass. 256 (overruled by later cases); Van New York. People v. Law (1860) 34 Barb. 494; Greer v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (1885) 37 Hun, 346; Tinker v. Metropolitan Elev. R. Co. (1894) 81 Hun, 591, 30 N. Y. Supp. 1014; Gorham v. Eastchester Electric Co. (1894) 80 Hun, 290, 30 N. Y. Supp. firmed in (1907) 188 N. Y. 407, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 551, 81 N. E. 161; Van Winkle v. Van Winkle (1903) 39 Misc. 593, 80 N. Y. Supp. 612, affirmed in (1904) 95 App. Div. 605, 89 N. Y. Supp. 26, which is affirmed in (1906) 184 N. Y. 193, 77 N. E. 33; Hennessy v. Mur- dock (1893) 137 N. Y. 317, 33 N. E. · (1898) 98 Wis. 273, 74 N. W. 223; Wegge v. Madler (1906) 129 Wis. 412, 116 Am. St. Rep. 953, 109 N. W. 223; Cronin V. Janesville Traction Co. (1916) 163 Wis. 436, 158 N. W. 254. Thus, a description of land as "bounded easterly in front by Green- In Re Ladue (1890) 118 N. Y. 213, A boundary being described as "by the highway and by the land of" the proprietor on the opposite side, the grantee takes the fee to the highway. Thompson v. Major (1878) 58 N. H. A conveyance of two tracts of land designating a road as the dividing line gives to each grantee title to the cen- ter of the road on the side on which his land lies. Witter v. Harvey (1821) 1 M'Cord, L. (S. C.) 67, 10 Am. Dec. In Leader Realty Co. v. Lakeview Land Co. (1913) 133 La. 646, 63 So. 2. "Fronting” or “abutting" on high way. Where property is described in a conveyance thereof as "fronting on" a highway, the presumption is that the fee to the center of the highway is conveyed. Wallace v. Fee (1872) 50 N. Y. 694; Spaine v. Tennessee & A. R. Co. (1865) Thomp. Tenn. Cas. 253, 1 Shannon, Cas. 181; Hamilton County v. Rape (1898) 101 Tenn. 222, 47 S. W. 416; Reeves v. Allen (1898) 101 Tenn. 412, 47 S. W. 495. A description of property as “abutting on" a highway gives title to the center of the highway. Simpson v. Dendy (1860) 8 C. B. N. S. 433, 141 Eng. Reprint, 1233, 6 Jur. N. S. 1197; Cheney v. Syracuse, O. & N. Y. R. Co. (1896) 8 App. Div. 620, 40 N. Y. Supp. 1103, affirmed in (1899) 158 N. Y. 739, 53 N. E. 1123; Paige v. Schenectady R. Co. (1902) 77 App. Div. 571, 79 N. Y. Supp. 266. In Reg. v. Board of Works (1863) 4 Best & S. 526, 122 Eng. Reprint, 556, a parish charter describing the parish as "abutting upon" a highway was held to extend its bounds ad medium filum viæ. In Mappin Bros v. Liberty [1903] 1 Ch. (Eng.) 118, 72 L. J. Ch. N. S. 63, 67 J. P. 91, 51 Week. Rep. 264, 87 L. T. N. S. 523, 19 Times L. R. 51, 1 L. G. R. 167, commissioners who laid out a scheme of street improvements in London, and leased property described as "abutting" on the streets, were held not to intend to give any leasehold in the streets. In Williams v. Johnson (1912) 149 Ky. 409, 149 S. W. 821, a conveyance of property "fronting and abutting" on a highway was held to give title to the middle line of the highway. In Phelps v. Webster (1883) 134 Mass. 17, a description of land as "against" and "butting upon" a street was held to carry title only to the side line. 3. "To" and "along" highway. Where a boundary line is described as running "to" and thence "along" a highway, the grantee takes the fee to the middle of the highway. Silvey v. McCool (1890) 86 Ga. 1, 12 S. E. 175; Freeman v. Sayre (1886) 48 N. J. L. 37, 2 Atl. 650; Child v. Starr (1842) 4 Hill (N. Y.) 369; Re Cathedral Parkway (1897) 20 App. Div. 404, 46 N. Y. Supp. 832, affirmed in (1898) 155 N. Y. 638, 49 N. E. 1100; Transue v. Sell (1884) 105 Pa. 604; Gamble v. Philadelphia (1894) 162 Pa. 413, 29 Atl. 739; Sweatman v. Bathrick (1903) 17 S. D. 138, 95 N. W. 422. In Greer v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. (1885) 37 Hun (N. Y.) 346, the court said: ""To the street' goes to the center because the street, as before shown, is a monument. 'Along the cellar wall to the street' does not necessarily mean that the course ends with the wall; therefore we are at liberty to follow that course "to the street;' i. e., to its center. The courses and distances yield to the monuments, unless the contrary intention is made to appear, and it is not in this case. 'Along the street' means along the center line. If it was intended to exclude the street, it would have been easy to have employed words clearly indicating that intent, as 'along the west side of the street,' 'to the west side,' 'bounded against,' or 'butting upon' (Phelps v. Webster (1883) 134 Mass. 17), or some words showing that the entire corpus of the street was excluded." So, a bound "along" a highway has been held to show an intention to give title to the center. Pratt v. Quirk (1912) 119 Minn. 316, 130 N. W. 38; Haberman v. Baker (1891) 128 N. Y. 253, 13 L.R.A. 611, 28 N. E. 370; Herring v. Fisher (1848) 1 Sandf. (N. Y.) 344; Bird v. New York (1910) 141 App. Div. 155, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1028; Flick's Estate (1891) 6 Kulp (Pa.) 329. A call for a line running "thence westerly along the line of said road" means the center line of the road. Helmer v. Castle (1884) 109 Ill. 664, wherein the court said: "There is no other line of the road. The sides of the road are quite different, and if the south side of the road had been intended, it is fair to presume the language would have been to that effect." A description of property as bounded "upon or along" a street gives the grantee title to the center of the |