Diagram XV.

(Approx.) Diagram XIV.

9.01 p.m. Divisions, separately, altered course in succession to 167° (South).

The Fifth Battle Squadron conformed generally to these movements.

The Battle Cruisers were gradually hauling round to the South Westward during their short action, after which their course was 216° (S. 49° W.) until after 9.00 p.m.

At 8.30 p.m. two torpedoes are reported to have passed through the Battle Fleet, one by BENBOW and one by AGINCOURT. These torpedoes were probably fired by the enemy destroyers which were 16 repulsed by the Eleventh Flotilla and Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron (see page line ).

At this time the 6th Division had dropped considerably astern of station owing to MARLBOROUGH's damage. Although going revolutions for 17 knots, MARLBOROUGH's speed through the water was only approximately 16 knots.

At 8.40 p.m. all our Battle Cruisers and some of the ships of the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons felt a heavy shock as if struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage (see page line ). No explanation of the cause of a shock of this magni- 20 tude can be given. The only evidence of any explosion at this time being the reported torpedoing of an enemy battleship by CALLIOPE at 8.38 p.m. (see page line ).

At about this time the following information in regard to the position of the enemy was received by the Commander-in-Chief. At 8.38 p.m. in reply to a signal :—

Who are you firing at?

COMUS reported :

Enemy's Battle Fleet bearing West.

At this time COMUS was about 2 miles to the Westward 30 of the Battle Fleet.

At 8.46 p.m. FALMOUTH reported:

Battle cruisers unknown, bearing of enemy North.

Course of enemy

W.S.W. My position Lat. 56° 42′ N., Long. 5° 37′ E. (2045.)

At 8.57 p.m. SOUTHAMPTON reported :

Am engaging enemy destroyers. Enemy ships bearing West from me, number unknown. My position Lat. 56° 38′ N., Long. 6° 09′ E. (2055.)

At 8.59 p.m. LION reported :

Enemy Battle Cruisers and pre-Dreadnought battleships bear from 40 me N. 34° W., distant 10 to 11 miles, steering S.W. My position Lat. 56° 40′ N., Long. 5° 50′ E., course S.W. Speed 17 knots. (2040.)

At the time of origin (8.40 p.m.) of this message, the enemy was just going out of sight from LION (see page line ).

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PROCEEDINGS DURING THE NIGHT.

At 9.01 pm. the Battle Fleet was turned by divisions to 167° (South) (speed, Diagram XV. 17 knots), and at

9.05 p.m. our Battle Cruisers were

reported to the Commander-in-Chief to be bearing W.N.W. from the Second Battle Squadron and to be steering S.W. The ships seen were evidently the enemy.

), and

At 9.17 p.m. the Battle Fleet assumed the 2nd Organisation (see page subsequently formed divisions in line ahead, columns disposed abeam to port, 1 mile apart-less MARLBOROUGH's subdivision and Fifth Battle Squadron.

At 9.27 p.m. the Destroyer Flotillas received orders to take station 5 miles astern of the Battle Fleet.

The Commander-in-Chief in his report states:

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Darkness was now rapidly setting in, the mist was increasing, and it became necessary to decide on the future course of the action. The British fleet was between the enemy and his base. Each side possessed a considerable number of Destroyers, it being most probable that the enemy was largely superior in this respect, in numbers, as it was logical to assume that every available Torpedoboat destroyer and Torpedoboat had been ordered out as soon as contact between the Fleets became 20 probable.

I rejected at once the idea of a night action between the heavy ships as leading to possible disaster owing, first, to the presence of torpedo craft in such large numbers, and, secondly, to the impossibility of distinguishing between our own and enemy vessels. Further, the result of a night action under modern conditions must always be very largely a matter of pure chance. I was loth to forego the advantage of position which would have resulted from an Easterly or Westerly course, and I therefore decided to steer to the Southward, where I should be in a position to renew the engagement at daylight, and should also be favourably 30 placed to intercept the enemy should he make for his base by steering for Heligoland or towards the Ems and thence along the North German coast.

Further, such a course enabled me to drop my Destroyer Flotillas astern, thus at one and the same time providing the Battle Fleet with a screen against attack by torpedo craft at night, and also giving our Flotillas an opportunity for attacking the enemy's heavy ships should they also be proceeding to the Southward with the object of regaining their bases.

Accordingly at 9.00 p.m. the Fleet was turned by divisions to South (speed 17 knots), the 2nd organisation being assumed, and the Fleet formed in Divisions line-ahead disposed abeam to port, columns 40 1 mile apart, the object of the close formation being that the divisions should remain clearly in sight of each other during the night, in order to prevent ships mistaking each other for enemy vessels.

The Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle Cruiser Fleet in his report states :

I continued on a South-Westerly course with my Cruisers spread until 9.24 p.m. Nothing further being sighted, I assumed that the enemy were to the North-Westward, and that we had established ourselves between him and his base. MINOTAUR was at this time bearing North, 5 miles, and I asked her the position of the leading Battle Squadron 50 of the Grand Fleet. Her reply was that it was not in sight, but was last seen bearing N.N.E. at 8.10 p.m. My position, course, and speed had

been made to the Commander-in-Chief at 7.30 p.m., 8.40 p.m., and 9.00 p.m., the latter signal giving the bearing of the enemy as N. by W., steering S.W. by S., which as near as we could judge was correct. At 9.16 p.m. I received a signal from the Commander-in-Chief that the course of the Fleet was South.

In view of the gathering darkness and for other reasons, viz.: (a) Our distance from the Battle Fleet. (b) The damaged condition of the Battle Cruisers. (c) The enemy being concentrated. (d) The enemy being accompanied by numerous destroyers. (e) Our strategical position being such that it appeared certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight 10 under most favourable circumstances. I did not consider it proper or desirable to close the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours. I therefore concluded that I should be carrying out the Commander-in-Chief's wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet, reporting to the Commander-in-Chief that I had done so.

My duty in this situation was to ensure that the enemy Fleet could not regain its base by passing round the Southern flank of our forces. I therefore turned to the South at 9.24 p.m. at 17 knots and continued on this course until 2.30 a.m. with the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons spread to the Southward and Westward. My intention 20 was to ask permission to sweep to the South-West at daylight, but, on receiving a signal that the Commander-in-Chief was turning to the North and ordering me to conform and close, I proceeded accordingly, and rejoined Commander-in-Chief at 5.20 a.m.

The enemy Battle Fleet, which had altered course to the Southward at about 8.00 p.m., hauled over to the Westward at about 8.30 p.m. when attacked by Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, resuming their Southerly course at about 8.50 p.m. This general direction was maintained until about 10.40 p.m., except on two occasions once at 9.05 p.m., and again at 9.19 p.m.-when, 30 apparently owing to sighting our ships, they. hauled to the Westward for a few minutes.

At 10.40 p.m. they steered for a position about 9 miles S.W. of Horns Reef Light Vessel at a speed of approximately 16 knots.

From this position, which was reached at about 3.20 a.m., the enemy continued on a South Easterly course until the 8th meridian of East longitude was crossed, when course was altered to pass inside Amrum Banks, and thence to bases.

The Battle Squadrons apparently proceeded in the following 40 order-First Squadron, Fleet Flagship, Third Squadron, Second Squadron. The ships of the First and Third Squadrons being in inverse order, WESTFALEN leading the line.

At 9.30 p.m. the Battle Cruisers altered course in succession to 167° (South). At 9.40 p.m. CASTOR with Eleventh Flotilla was in action for a few minutes with the Second Scouting Croup (see page line ).

At 10.00 p.m. IRON DUKE's position was Lat. 56° 22′ N., Long. 5° 54′ E. Course 167° (South). Speed 17 knots.

The Battle Fleet was in divisions in line ahead, disposed abeam

to port (Organisation No. 2), columns 1 mile apart, the First 50 and Fifth Battle Squadrons being astern of station.

The Battle Cruisers bore 243° (S. 75° W.) 13 miles from IRON DUKE.

The Second Light Cruiser Squadron was astern of the Fifth Battle Squadron.

The Third Light Cruiser Squadron was on the starboard bow of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, distant 4 miles.

The First Light Cruiser Squadron (less GALATEA) was astern of the Third Light Cruiser Squadron.

The Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron (and GALATEA) was ahead of the Battle Fleet.

The Destroyer Flotillas were 5 miles astern of the Battle Fleet in the order, West to East, Eleventh, Fourth, Thirteenth, Ninth with Tenth, and Twelfth.

At 10.03 p.m. the Fifth Battle Squadron, having drawn a long way ahead of MARLBOROUGH, was turned in succession 16 points to starboard to regain station on her. Course was resumed at 10.12 p.m. by turning 16 points to port.

At 10.05 p.m. ABDIEL received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to lay mines in accordance with instructions previously issued.

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ABDIEL proceeded to a position 15 miles 215° (S. 46° W.) 20 from VYL Light Vessel, and from that position 1an a line of eighty mines-ten to the mile-set for a depth of 15 feet at low water. The first forty were laid on a course 160° (S. 9° E.) and the remainder on a course 203° (S. 34° W.), zig-zagging on each course.

Mine laying was completed at 2.04 a.m. The visibility was very low owing to drizzling rain, it is therefore probable that ABDIEL's movements were unobserved by the enemy.

After laying mines, ABDIEL proceeded to Queensferry.

OSTFRIESLAND is reported to have been badly damaged 30 by striking a mine about 5.00 a.m., 1st June, in Lat. 55° 11' N., Long. 7° 46′ E., the existence of which was not previously known to the enemy.

If this position, and also the position given by ABDIEL are correct, it would appear that the enemy Battle Fleet passed to the Northward of the minefield laid by ABDIEL on this occasion, and struck a mine in the minefield laid by her on 4th May. OSTFRIESLAND was apparently the eighth ship in the line at this time.

HELGOLAND is also reported to have struck a mine, but 40 no time is given.

At 10.20 p.m. the Second Light-Cruiser Squadron was engaged at short range by five enemy ships. The action lasted about fifteen minutes, and FRAUENLOB was sunk (see page , line ).

At 10.41 p.m. the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that the enemy was believed to be returning to its base.

At 10.45 p.m. CASTOR with Eleventh Flotilla was again in action with the Second Scouting Group (see page line).

At 11.00 p.m. TIPPERARY with Fourth Flotilla was in action with the (Approx.) enemy's Second and Fourth Scouting Groups. ELBING was torpedoed, and TIPPERARY put out of action; SPITFIRE, after ramming NASSAU, returned to the Tyne.

The remainder of the Flotilla, after turning away and standing to the Eastward for a couple of miles, resumed their course (South), and fell in with the head of the enemy's Battle Fleet, Fourth Scouting Group, and ROSTOCK at 11.25 p.m. ROSTOCK was torpedoed; BROKE was damaged, and rammed SPARROWHAWK, disabling her. The remainder of the Flotilla, after again 10 turning away and standing to the Eastward for a couple of miles, resumed their course (South), and once more fell in with the head of the enemy's Battle Fleet and the Fourth Scouting Group, and was scattered, FORTUNE being sunk. It is possible that three ships of the WESTFALEN class: WESTFALEN, NASSAU, and RHEINLAND were torpedoed during these encounters (see page line ).

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At 11.50 p.m. the rear boats of the Twelfth Flotilla, who had been pressed to the Eastward by CHAMPION, were in touch with the Second Scouting Group steering to the Eastward.

At 0.10 a.m. BLACK PRINCE, attempting to take station on a battle squadron, 1st June. closed the rear of the enemy First Squadron, and was sunk at point blank range in Lat. 56° 02' N., Long. 6° 06′ E.

At 0.25 a.m. the head of the enemy Battle Flect cut through the tail of stragglers of the Thirteenth and Fourth Flotillas, which had attached themselves to the Ninth and Tenth Flotilla, sinking TURBULENT, the last of the line (see page line ).

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At 1.48 a.m. the Admiralty informed the Commander-in-Chief that enemy submarines were apparently coming out from German ports, and that a damaged enemy ship, probably LUTZOW, was in 30 Lat. 56° 26' N., Long. 5° 41' E., at midnight.

At 1.55 a.m. the Vice-Admiral Commanding First Battle Squadron reported to the Commander-in-Chief that his squadron was obliged to ease to 12 knots. At 2.00 a.m. MARLBOROUGH hauled out to starboard; REVENGE, with HERCULES and AGINCOURT, continued on her course until 2.53 a.m., when they altered course to 348° (North). At 2.21 a.m. FEARLESS was ordered to go alongside MARLBOROUGH to embark the Vice-Admiral and staff. After embarkation was completed, FEARLESS proceeded to the Southward to meet REVENGE.

At 2.00 a.m. SPARROWHAWK, while lying disabled, saw TIPPERARY heel over and sink (see page line ).

At 2.10 a.m. the Twelfth Flotilla was in action with enemy battleships of the Second Squadron steering to the South Eastward, several torpedoes were fired, and POMMERN was sunk. It is probable that one other enemy battleship was also hit by a torpedo.

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