were pending at the time the present District Attorney entered upon his duties, promptly and diligently prosecuted, as the law requires, in connection with the handling of the current business of the County; that it will be necessary for the District Attorney to incur expense in the employment of special prosecutors or counsel, and it further appearing from said communication and from facts within the knowledge of this board that action should be instituted for the recovery of penalty upon bonds given to the county on bail for present fugitives from justice and under liquor licenses revoked, and the board being of the opinion that it would be in the interest of the county to have this work done forthwith, and such expense incurred therefor; Be it Therefore Resolved that the necessity for incurring of said expense exists, and that the District Attorney be and he is hereby authorized to incur for the purpose of employing not exceeding three special prosecuting attorneys or counsel for a term or terms not to exceed three months, not to exceed $125.00 per month for each of such prosecutors or counsel, such services to be rendered in the prosecution of criminal cases and prosecuting of suits upon said bonds."

Pursuant to the authority alleged to have been conferred by this resolution, the district attorney employed petitioner and he later filed his demand with the board of supervisors. The demand was itemized as required by law, the first item of which was for rental of an automobile in traveling from Bakersfield to Taft "in investigation and searching for evidence in criminal case of People v. Aden, $10.00." The second was of a like kind for automobile use to certain points in Kern County and itemized as being "in case of People v. Reigan, expense of District Attorney's office, $15.00." The last item was stated as follows: "To services as special prosecutor and counsel in prosecution of criminal cases and in prosecution of suits upon bonds, being bail bonds and liquor bonds, said claim being for services rendered for and during March, 1915, per resolution of the Board of Supervisors, $125.00." By this appeal two questions are made as against the judgment: (1) That the board of supervisors was without power to delegate to the district attorney the right to employ special counsel for any purpose in either civil or criminal cases; (2) That the board of supervisors was without power to make any employment of special counsel, except

for the purposes of suits to which the county was a party. Among the enumerated powers of boards of supervisors as contained in section 4041, subdivision 16 of the Political Code, such boards are authorized "to direct and control the prosecution and defense of all suits to which the county is a party and by a two-thirds vote of all the members, may employ counsel to assist the district attorney in conducting the same." A provision in like terms has been inserted in the various county government acts in force for many years. By this provision a board of supervisors is authorized to contract with outside counsel and employ such counsel for the purpose of assisting the district attorney in conducting "suits to which the county is a party." The authority is not given to the board to authorize some other person to make the employment. We apprehend that it would be essential, where such employment is made, that the board of supervisors pass a resolution declaring its determination so to do, and specifying the name of the person employed and the terms of the employment. The resolution first recited herein does not purport to make an employment of any person for any of the purposes specified. Therefore, we think that the claim as presented by petitioner was not one which the board was authorized to allow.

For the purpose of considering the second point made, we may assume (our conclusion being to the contrary, however), that the employment of petitioner by the district attorney was regular, and that the board of supervisors could in the manner attempted delegate its authority. There is the further limit placed upon the power of the board to be exercised in that direction, to wit, that it may only employ counsel to assist the district attorney in "suits to which the county is a party." (County of Modoc v. Spencer, 103 Cal. 498, [37 Pac. 483].) From the resolution as adopted by the board, it appears that the employment intended to be authorized was a general one, and that it was intended to give the district attorney the right to have assistance at the cost of the county for the prosecution of criminal cases, as well as in suits to recover the penalty upon various bonds. It was beyond the power of the board of supervisors to subject the county to any expense for the employment of counsel to act in criminal cases. Moreover, by so doing, the compensation of the district attorney would be increased, which is forbidden by the

constitution. The itemized claim filed by petitioner shows that the services for which he claimed compensation of $125 were services rendered in both criminal cases, and in the prosecution of suits upon bail and "liquor" bonds. It may have been that the expense incurred for auto hire could have been properly allowed as contingent expense of the district attorney authorized to be paid by section 4307 of the Political Code, but the board of supervisors was not advised by the statements contained in the demand of petitioner as to how much of the $125 claimed was for services in criminal cases for the allowance of which no authority of law existed. The judgment is reversed.

Conrey, P. J., and Works, J., pro tem., concurred.

[Civ. No. 1638. Third Appellate District.-April 30, 1917.] J. A. MANOR, Respondent, v. J. D. DUNFIELD, Appellant. CONDITIONAL SALE-PLEDGE-RIGHTS OF PLEDGEE.-Where the pledgee of an automobile purchased under a conditional contract of sale assumes the obligations of the purchaser under the contract and his assumption is recognized by the seller, he is entitled to all the rights and is subject to all the liabilities of the contract, and a wrongful taking of the possession of the machine by the purchaser, and assignment of his interest in the contract to a person who had sufficient notice to put him upon inquiry as to the wrongful taking, is illegal, as against the pledgee.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Colusa County. Ernest Weyand, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Millington & Millington, for Appellant.

U. W. Brown, and Harmon Albery, for Respondent.

BURNETT, J.-One F. E. Partain entered into a contract with one C. L. Sanders for the purchase of a Ford automobile. Afterward by agreement a Rambler machine was substituted

for the Ford. There is no doubt that the said Sanders was the owner of the Ford, and there is sufficient circumstantial evidence that he was also the owner of the Rambler, although the direct evidence is to the effect that the latter belonged to the Sanders Brothers. This is of no importance, however, as it is indisputable that both G. L. Sanders and the Sanders Brothers agreed to the substitution of one machine for the other. The Ford machine was delivered to Partain, but, on account of his failure to meet the payments called for by the contract of sale, G. L. Sanders again took possession of it. Partain and plaintiff then entered into an agreement whereby the latter was to pay Sanders what was due, and the machine was to be turned over to plaintiff and used by him on his auto-stage line. It was further agreed that the machine was to be restored to Partain whenever he repaid plaintiff the amount of money so advanced to Sanders. Plaintiff then made arrangements with G. L. Sanders to pay him the amount due, the sum of $108.40, Sanders understanding that the machine was to be turned over to plaintiff. There was some question as to the form of the receipt offered by Sanders, so he was informed that the money was in the bank and he could get it when he gave a proper receipt. Before the payment was made plaintiff was injured and was thereafter in a sanatorium for some time. While there he had his brother pay Sanders $133.40, the amount due at that time on the machine. This payment was made on September 11th. On September 15th Partain, who was working for plaintiff, driving his automobiles on his stage line, traded said Ford machine for the Rambler. Plaintiff knew nothing of this until the 1st of October, when Partain brought it to plaintiff's house and turned it over to him. From the time of the trade or substitution of one machine for the other, the Rambler was used on plaintiff's auto-stage line, driven by plaintiff's drivers, and had on it his stage sign and license number. Furthermore, it was stored in a garage in Colusa in the name of and by plaintiff, and bills against the same were charged to him and he had possession of the machine until November 13, 1916. On November 1st Partain quit working for plaintiff, and the Rambler remained in possession of the latter. November 11th plaintiff met G. L. Sanders and said to him that he had the money for the November payment on the machine, but that he had some money coming in the following

week and he could make the whole payment on Wednesday, to which Sanders consented, telling plaintiff that the Rambler was his and for him to take it, the car standing near at that time. However, before the following Wednesday, namely, on November 13th, Partain went to the garage, took possession of the machine, drove it away, and thereafter assigned all his interest under the contract with Sanders to Dunfield, and directed the bill of sale to be made to him. The bill of sale was so executed by Sanders Brothers and G. L. Sanders, but, before its execution, one Jake Whalen, manager of plaintiff's stage line, in the presence of defendant, his attorney, and Partain, demanded possession of the machine, showing the attorney an order for its possession he had from G. L. Sanders. Defendant heard the order read over the phone to Sanders. Whalen stated the reason he obtained the order was on account of the fact that Partain had run off with the car to Arbuckle. Said order was dated November 5th, and prior to the said agreement between plaintiff and G. L. Sanders as to the final payment, and defendant knew that Whalen was in the employ of plaintiff. Partain did not repay to plaintiff any portion of the money the latter had paid to Sanders, nor did he offer to do so. On November 15th plaintiff demanded of defendant the possession of the machine, but it was refused and the suit followed. The foregoing statement embodies a fair inference from the evidence, and the facts thus appearing justified the findings of the court that plaintiff was in the possession and entitled to the possession of the machine at the time it was delivered to defendant, that it was illegally taken from him, and that defendant had knowledge or the means of acquiring knowledge of plaintiff's claim to the possession of it.

No extended consideration of the situation seems necessary. The facts are not complicated and the legal principles involved are rudimentary and familiar. As between plaintiff and Partain there was a pledge of the machine which was to continue until plaintiff was repaid the amount of money that he advanced to Sanders. In that respect the case falls within the provisions of section 2986 of the Civil Code. There was the necessary agreement between the parties, an actual delivery of the property and a visible, unequivocal, and continued change of possession. By nothing said or done had plaintiff forfeited or yielded his right to said possession.