ber 25, 1910, plaintiff consented that a saloon for the purpose of selling alcoholic and other liquors might be conducted upon the sold premises; that upon the faith of that consent the defendant Woods had expended a large sum of money; and that therefore the plaintiff should be estopped from enforcing the anti-saloon condition of the contract. There was a total failure to prove consent so alleged to have been given by the plaintiff, and there is no evidence that the defendant Blaisdell, or any one claiming under him, has ever demanded or offered to receive from the plaintiff any money on account of this contract.

If the deed had been executed, and then the grantor had sought to obtain a reconveyance because of a subsequently discovered breach of the condition stated in the deed, such action. could have been maintained without returning to grantee the consideration paid for the property. We perceive no reason why the purchaser has any better right to claim return of money which he has paid on his contract, where no deed has been made, and where he is guilty of breach of a like condition and is made defendant in an action to have it declared that, by reason of such breach, his rights under the contract are at an end.

The judgment is affirmed.

James, J., and Shaw, J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on May 10, 1917.

[Civ. No. 2208. Second Appellate District.-March 17, 1917.]

CAROL CROUSE-PROUTY, Respondent, v. JULIA A. N. ROGERS et al., Appellants.

QUIETING TITLE-PURCHASE OF PROPERTY-NOTICE OF TRUST-TITLE ACQUIRED. Where in an action to quiet title it is shown that the defendant when she received her deed to the property had notice that her grantor, if he had any title whatever to the property, had nothing more than the bare legal title, which was necessarily a title held in trust for plaintiff, who then owned the entire beneficial interest, the defendant, if the title vested in her at all, received it upon the same trust and subject to the same unconditional obligation to convey to the plaintiff.

OF

ID.-DECREE Quieting Title—Ordering of CoNVEYANCE.-Where in such an action it is determined that the legal title to the property is vested in the defendant subject to an unconditional obligation to convey to the plaintiff, it is not prejudicial error to decree a quieting of the plaintiff's title without ordering the execution of a conveyance. ID.-PURCHASE OF LOT FROM CORPORATION REPRESENTATIONS Officer as to TITLE-ESTOPPEL.-Where a lot was purchased from a corporation, and its president and secretary represented to the purchaser that the deed to be delivered to her by the corporation would convey to her a good and perfect title to the lot, and she believed those representations and relied upon them without making inquiry, making payments partly in cash and partly by note secured by mortgage on the lot, the corporation is estopped from denying her ownership, notwithstanding such officer acted in good faith, and made no misrepresentations as to the title, and the purchaser had constructive notice of the condition thereof.

ID.-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-An action to quiet title is not barred by the provisions of section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides a five-year limitation for the recovery of real property, where the plaintiff was seised of the property at all times down to the time when the action was begun and defendant held the legal title in trust for plaintiff, and there had not been any repudiation of the trust.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and from an order denying a new trial. Lewis R. Works, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Haas & Dunnigan, for Appellants.

Carter, Kirby & Henderson, and Schweitzer & Hutton, for Respondent.

CONREY, P. J.-This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment quieting plaintiff's title to the lot described in the complaint, and from an order denying the motion of defendants for a new trial. There was a former trial of the action and a decision by this court affirming an order granting a new trial. In that decision there is a statement of facts, and we will repeat here that portion thereof which is identical with the facts proved at the second trial (13 Cal. App. 561, [110 Pac. 142]):

"On December 26, 1885, Andrew Glassell, who was the common source of title, entered into a contract with Ralph and W. E. Rogers, whereby he agreed to sell and convey to them a large tract of land, which included the lot in controversy. On March 24, 1886, Ralph and W. E. Rogers transferred this agreement for purchase to a corporation known as the Garvanza Land Company, which, under the terms of the agreement, caused a portion of the land to be subdivided into lots and blocks and designated it as 'Garvanza Addition No. 1,' map of which was duly recorded. On June 19, 1886, the corporation, for a valuable consideration, executed a deed, which was duly recorded, to plaintiff Carol Crouse-Prouty, whereby it conveyed to her the lot in question. After the execution of this deed by the corporation, and on December 15, 1886, the corporation transferred the Glassell contract to W. F. McClure, who, on the day following, assigned it to Ralph Rogers. On July 12, 1888, Glassell executed a grant deed to Ralph Rogers of the lands described in the said contract, excepting therefrom certain tracts, which excepted lands did not, however, include the lot involved in this action. W. E. Rogers joined Glassell in the execution of this conveyance. This deed recited payment of the consideration mentioned in the contract, and that 'this deed is delivered and accepted in satisfaction of the existing obligations of the party of the first part (Glassell), by reason of said contract of December 26, 1885.' On January 2, 1892, Ralph Rogers conveyed the lot in question, together with other lands, to one Conway, from whom, by mesne conveyance, defendants acquired what

ever title they have to the lot. It thus appears that plaintiff's claim of title to the lot, is by virtue of the deed from the Garvanza Land Company, whose only interest in the lot was by virtue of the Glassell contract, while defendants claim under a subsequent deed made by Ralph Rogers after he had acquired title to the property by a deed executed pursuant to the Glassell contract. The record contains evidence which tends to prove . . . that Julia Nolan Rogers at the time she claims to have acquired the lot by purchase for a valuable consideration had actual notice of the conveyance of the lot to plaintiff Carol Crouse-Prouty, and of the fact that she claimed ownership under the deed from the corporation. Moreover, under the facts presented, the court might be justified in holding the record of plaintiff's deed sufficient to impart constructive notice. (Rogers v. McCartney, 3 Cal. App. 34, [84 Pac. 215].)”

It will be noted that in its former decision this court assumed that the deed of Garvanza Land Company to the plaintiff contained a sufficient description to identify the land described in the complaint, and that the record thereof was sufficient to impart constructive notice. Nevertheless, the defendants continue to insist that the description in that deed was not sufficient for the purpose of passing title. That description, so far as the name of the tract was concerned, did not name the tract as "Garvanza Addition No. 1," but located the tract "at Garvanza." Also the deed referred to a map made by W. F. McClure in April and May, 1886, as a map recorded in Miscellaneous Records, book 9, at pages 85, 86, and 87. There was no such map recorded at those pages. The evidence shows that there was a map of "Garvanza Addition No. 1" recorded in said book 9, at pages 45 and 46. The evidence shows that the map recorded at pages 45 and 46 is the only map of record in Los Angeles County of the property situated in the territory or district known as Garvanza, on which there is shown a block "P," or which bears the inscription or indorsement, "Survey, April and May, 1886, W. F. McClure, C. E."; that there is only one lot 6 in said block "P," and there is no other lot 6 in block "P" in said territory commonly known as Garvanza; also, that Garvanza Land Company never sold or subdivided any lots in any block "P," except block "P" of Garvanza Addition No. 1; that there was not at the time of the sale and conveyance of lots

6 and 7 to the plaintiff, or since that time, any tract or subdivision at or in Garvanza, or in the vicinity thereof, that contained a block "P," except Garvanza Addition No. 1. On these facts we hold that the description in the deed was sufficient. See, also, Leonard v. Osburn, 169 Cal. 157, [146 Pac. 530], which approves the decision in Rogers v. McCartney, 3 Cal. App. 34, [84 Pac. 215].

Plaintiff's deed when recorded gave constructive notice that Garvanza Land Company had granted the lot in question to her, and there was then on record a contract which gave notice that Garvanza Land Company had acquired the right to obtain the legal title upon payment of the consideration agreed to be paid to Glassell. The deed from Glassell to Ralph Rogers, which also was of record prior to any conveyance of lot 6 by Ralph Rogers, showed that the consideration for all of the described lands, including the lot in question, had been paid to Glassell. Defendant Rogers before receiving her deed, also had actual notice that the plaintiff claimed ownership under her deed from Garvanza Land Company. Defendant Rogers therefore had notice that her grantor, successor by mesne conveyance from Ralph Rogers, if he had any title whatever to this lot, had nothing more than the bare legal title, which necessarily would be a title held in trust for the plaintiff who then owned the entire beneficial interest. Therefore, the defendant Rogers, if the title vested in her at all, received it upon the same trust and subject to the same unconditional obligation to convey to the plaintiff. This conclusion is strengthened, if it needs any further support, by the fact, which the court found upon sufficient evidence, that the grantee to whom Ralph Rogers conveyed this lot, and the succeeding grantees to and including Julia N. Rogers, paid no consideration whatever for their said conveyances.

If under the facts above stated it should be determined that the legal title to the lot is now vested in the defendant, subject to an unconditional obligation to convey to the plaintiff, there would be no prejudicial error in the court's decree which quieted title in the plaintiff as owner of the lot and did not order the execution of any deed of conveyance. In any event, the result of the decree would be to establish ownership in the plaintiff and put an end to the claims of the defendant. (Jones v. Jones, 140 Cal. 587, [74 Pac. 143].)