necessary for pupils to travel from the town while now not infrequently conveyances in the regular order of business carry children both to and from school. That these advantages are appreciated is evidenced by the remonstrance signed by all but one of the present electors having children of school age, and presented to the board of directors of the Independent School District of Sanborn prior to its action on the eighteenth of June.

If pupils of the school township of Summit are not enjoying school facilities such as are most profitable and the board is desirous of securing increased advantages it may arrange with any person outside the board for their transportation to and from school in the same or in another corporation. Expense incurred for such services may be paid from the contingent fund.

Having carefully considered all of the facts and circumstances entering into the merits of the case, we can find no reason to warrant us in disturbing the decision of the county superintendent or setting aside the action of the board. AFFIRMED.

Des Moines, Iowa, February 8, 1899.

RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

E. F. BACON V. THE INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF WEST DES MOINES.

Appeal from Polk County.

EXPULSION OF PUPILS. Pupils may be expelled by the board for immorality, violation of the regulations and rules established by the board, or when their presence is detrimental to the best interests of the school.

JURISDICTION. The board of directors of a school corporation have no jurisdiction over children after the termination of the school year.

EXISTING SCHOOL. The order expelling a scholar must be from an existing school. The scholar's relationship with the school is severed when the school year has closed and vacation has begun.

The facts presented for consideration in this case show that on the third day of June, 1898, the superintendent of the West Des Moines city schools, in accordance with the provisions of section 2782 of the Code, notified the president of the board of directors of the suspension of certain pupils, among them Julius Bacon, son of the appellant, for acts of disorder, insubordination, and for conduct dertimental to the best interests of the school. On the sixth day of June the board of directors met in regular session and was addressed by the appellant in behalf of his son. Several of the suspended pupils present also spoke, acknowledged their wrong and asked for reinstatement. Julius Bacon acknowledged his error but pleaded extenuating circumstances. The board then adjourned without action until June 13th, a week after the close of the school year, at which time Bacon was expelled for one year from June 3, 1898, and the others from four to seven months. From the action of the board E. F. Bacon appealed to the county superintendent who heard the case in regular form and affirmed the action of the board. Appellant now appeals to the superintendent of public instruction.

The law provides that the board of directors may expel any scholar from school; first, for immorality; second, for violation of rules; third, when the presence of the scholar is detrimental to the best interests of the school,

To warrant the board in exercising its expulsive power it is not necessary that the scholar be a corrupter of youth, or a flagrant, or a persistent violator of the established rules. It may, if occasion requires, summarily expel a pupil whose presence is considered harmful to the best welfare of the school.

To deprive a pupil of school privileges however is an act of so much consequence that it should be decided upon only after all the circumstances entering into the case have been thoughtfully weighed.

The provision authorizing boards to expel when the presence of any scholar is harmful is a recent enactment. Formerly courts held that pupils could be expelled from school only as a punishment for breach of discipline or for offenses against good morals.

Instances have arisen where pupils intellectually the superior of their associates and possessed of high ideals in many respects have, without displaying a spirit of insubordination themselves or openly disregarding the expressed wishes of those placed over them, become leaders and incited others to open revolt against the school authorities. Recognizing the weakness of the former provisions of law to deal with such cases, the general assembly in revising the code inserted the third division above given in order that boards could protect the interests intrusted to them. While the provision is an excellent one, the power conferred by it should always be exercised with great care and within proper and legal limits.

Several questions are presented to us for consideration by counsel for appellant. In view of the construction we feel obliged to put upon section 2782 it is only necessary to determine the question: Has the board of directors of a school corporation jurisdiction over children after the termination of a school year as determined by the board of directors?

We are unable to find that this question has ever been determined by the supreme court of our state; hence to a certain extent reliance is placed upon the holdings of the judicial tribunals in other states. In a Nebraska case given in 48 Northwestern Reporter we find that an attempt was made to show that the board was justified in expelling a pupil because of an alleged insubordination. In answer to the allegation the court said: "But the charge even if true relates to her conduct during a former term of school. We need not determine therefore whether the testimony sustains that charge or not." Here the court declined to consider alleged charges of insubordination because they were committed at a term of school having previously closed.

The statute says that the board of directors have power to "expel any scholar from school." This language evidently means that before a board of directors may issue a valid order expelling a scholar from school, there must be an existing school and also a scholar to be expelled therefrom.

The transcript shows that all school exercises for the year had closed, contracts had expired and teachers were released.

While boards of directors are charged with the making of rules for the government of schools, we are not disposed to hold that the law authorizes them to exercise control over teachers and pupils during vacation. Notwithstanding the fact that the board in this case ordered one pupil expelled for four months, three of which are for the vacation months of June, July and August, we are not fully satisfied that the board claims such authority or wishes to be charged with the responsibility. If such is the view taken, however, it can not be sustained.

'Julius Bacon had been a scholar the past year but the relationship was severed at the time of the board's action. There is nothing to indicate that he would present himself and claim school privileges at the opening of the next year.

We are always gratified when we can affirm the decision of a county superintendent who has sustained a discretionary act of a board. A statement of fact such as was in this case presented to the county superintendent for his consideration would warrant an affirmance of a board's action in expelling a pupil for a reasonable time, if jurisdiction were not questioned.

Inasmuch as there was no school and consequently no scholars we can only find that Julius Bacon was not subject to the authority of the board of directors of the school corporation of West Des Moines and could not therefore be expelled. The decision of the county superintendent is REVERSED.

Des Moines, Ia., March 18, 1899.

RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

E. F. BACON V. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT OF WEST DES MOINES.

Appeal from Polk County.

APPLICATION FOR REHEARING.

ORAL ARGUMENT. The failure of counsel for appellee to present oral argument, after being informed of the hearing, will not justify a reopening of the case. REHEARING. To warrant the superintendent of public instruction in granting a rehearing it must be shown that some very serious error has been made.

The attorney for the appellee comes now and asks for a rehearing in the above cause for the reason "that the sole question considered by the state superintendent was one upon which this appellee was not heard in oral argument before him."

For many years it has been the custom of the department of public instruction in hearing appeal cases to notify interested parties. The office record shows that both appellant and counsel for appellee were notified of the time set for final hearing. The failure of counsel for appellee to present oral argument after being duly informed of the hearing will not justify the department in reopening the case.

It is somewhat doubtful whether under the law a rehearing is contemplated or possible. An examination of the statute fails to reveal any direct provision authorizing the same, while section 2820 relating to appeals to the superintendent of public instruction says: "The decision when made shall be final." Doubtless, upon being convinced that a decision rendered was erroneous, either the county superintendent or superintendent of public instruction might recall the same and reverse or modify former holdings. To warrant either of these officers in reopening a case, it must be shown that some very serious error has been made, or that some additional testimony has been discovered which could not have been presented at the former hearing by using reasonable diligence. See case of Mary Grey v. Independent District of Boyle, S. L. 1897.

In response to the application for a rehearing a willingness to receive and consider a written argument which counsel for appellee might submit touching

the point determined in our former decision was expressed by the superintendent of public instruction. Before rendering our decision of March 18, 1899, all of the material points suggested were fully and carefully considered. Since the receipt of counsel's argument we have reviewed the case and read with care the cases cited, and believe that nothing would be accomplished by a rehearing. The application is DENIED.

Des Moines, Iowa, June 1, 1899.

RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

W. H. MESSNER AND FOSTER RIGLER V. THE SCHOOL TOWNSHIP OF BEAR GROVE.

Appeal from Guthrie County.

BOND FOR COSTS The law does not require the filing of a bond for costs or the giving of security therefor as a condition necessary to perfect an appeal.

EXPENSE OF APPEALS. It is the evident intent of the law to make it possible for aggrieved parties to have a hearing with the least possible delay and annoyance, and at the lowest expense.

This case arises from the action of the board of directors of the school township of Bear Grove to redistrict the same.

From the board's action the appellants appealed to the county superintendent. In accordance with the statute the secretary of the board of directors filed a transcript of the board's proceedings March 15th. On the twenty-second of March the county superintendent notified appellants that the appeal was not perfected, and that unless bonds for the costs were executed, filed and approved within twenty days from the date of notice the appeal would be dismissed and the action of the board of directors affirmed. On the eleventh of April, the appellants having failed to comply with the order of the county superintendent the appeal was dismissed and the order of the board redistricting the township affirmed. From this order appeal is now taken to this department.

Appellants appeal from the ruling of the county superintendent in dismissing the appeal case, affirming the action of the board, and in requiring them to give bonds for costs:

1. Because the county superintendent erred in requiring appellants to give bond for costs.

2. Because said ruling and action is, in fact, a denial of justice, in that it prevents appellants from having a trial and hearing as provided by law.

An examination of the law relating to the taking of appeals from the action of a board of directors to the county superintendent fails to show any require. ment demanding a bond for costs from any of the parties in controversy. So far as we are able to learn, the only reference to costs in cases appealed to the county superintendent, is that contained in section 2821, which reads: "But if the superintendent, is of the opinion that the proceedings were instituted without reasonable cause therefor, or if, in case of an appeal, it shall not be sustained, he shall enter such findings in the record and tax all costs to the party responsible therefor."

The general provisions of law touching the question of costs are in no sense applicable to cases of appeal to the county superintendent or the department of public instruction. On the contrary, the law provides that any person aggrieved

by any order or decision of the board of directors may appeal therefrom to the county superintendent, and the basis of the proceedings shall be an affidavit filed with the county superintendent, within the time for taking the appeal. Nowhere can we find that the county superintendent is authorized to establish a different basis such as the giving of bonds for the security of costs. The evident intent of the law relating to appeals appears to be to make it possible for aggrieved parties to have a hearing with the least possible delay and annoyance and at the lowest expense.

Believing that the law does not require the filing of a bond for costs or the giving of security therefor as a condition necessary to perfect an appeal taken from the action of the board of directors, the decision of the county superintendent is reversed and the case is remanded with instructions to fix an early date for hearing the same upon merit. REVERSED AND REMANDED. RICHARD C. BARRETT, Superintendent of Public Instruction.

June 26, 1899.

NORA OELKE v. R. C. SPENCER, COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT.

Appeal from Audubon County.

GOOD MORAL CHARACTER. The county superintendent should require proof that the applicant for a certificate possesses good moral character, unless he has personal knowledge of the same.

REFUSAL OF CERTIFICATE. Good moral character being one of the essential qualifications of a teacher, the county superintendent is fully justified in refusing a certificate to an applicant who fails to furnish satisfactory evidence of such character.

NORMAL INSTITUTE. The county superintendent may refuse to enroll such persons members of the normal institute as he has reason to believe are morally deficient.

COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT. Has large discretionary power in the matter of issuing or withholding certificates, and his decision will not be reversed unless it is clearly shown that he was prompted by prejudice or ill-will, or acted with manifest injustice.

This case arises from the refusal of the county superintendent to grant Nora Oelke a certificate to teach in the public schools, and to enroll her as a member of the normal institute.

A hearing was had on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth days of August, 1899, before the superintendent, who affirmed his former decision. Nora Oelke appeals.

The law vests in the county superintendent large discretionary powers in the matter of issuing certificates. He must be fully satisfied that the applicant possesses scholarship, teaching ability, and good moral character. Of the last named qualification the law makes it his duty to require proof, unless he has personal knowledge of the same.

Too great stress can not be laid upon the value of character in the schoolThe teacher's character and public conduct should be without reproach.

room.