sent the certificate of the officers of the subdistrict meeting, or any other evidence of his election except his own verbal statement. It was alleged in the board that he was not legally elected. Under these circumstances the board refused him a seat and recognized his predecessor as holding over. From this order the said Miner appealed to the county superintendent, who, after a full hearing of the manner in which the election was conducted, reversed the order of the board and directed that the said Miner should be recognized as subdirector of subdistrict number three and as a member of the board of directors. From this decision an appeal is taken by A. J. Sweet, president of the board. The above are but a small portion of the facts presented in the well arranged transcript of the county superintendent, but yet all that are material to the issues involved. The case presented by these facts is similar to that of Ockerman v. District Township of Hamilton, page 77, School Law Decisions of 1868, and must be governed by the same principles. It was there held that the only proper way of determining a contested election or the right of exercising any public office or franchise is by an action in the nature of quo warranto brought in the district court. It seems unnecessary to repeat the arguments there used. Reference is made to that case, as well as to the 19 Iowa, 199; 18 Iowa, 59; 16 Iowa, 369; 17 Iowa, 365; and the other cases there cited. The principle involved in the preceding references was recognized by the county superintendent, when he said in his decision that "the board of directors has no jurisdiction to inquire into the legality of the election of its members." When this just conclusion was reached the case should have been dismissed, for the county superintendent can do on appeal only what the board itself might legally have done. The county superintendent held that as the president of the subdistrict meeting refused to sign a certificate of election for the said Miner, the board might receive other evidence of his election. In this the county super⚫intendent departed from well established legal principles. The school law provides that at the meeting of the electors of the subdistrict on the first Monday in March "a chairman and secretary shall be appointed, who shall act as judges of the election and give a certificate of election to the subdirector elect." It is a well-settled rule that where the law requires the evidence of a transaction to be in writing, oral evidence can not be substituted when the writing can be produced; this rule applies alike to transactions of public bodies, officers and individuals. There can be no doubt that the law contemplates that the certificate of the officers of the subdistrict meeting shall be the legal passport to a seat in the board, and that, as a general rule, a board of directors is justified in declining to recognize a person as a member of the board until such certificate is produced. If the certificate has been given and lost, the accident may be remedied by other testimony. If illegally withheld, the officer may be coerced by mandamus to furnish it. If it has been fraudulently given, the law still provides a remedy. By the light of the previous principles it is evident that when, under the circumstances, the county superintendent proceeded to investigate the rights of the plaintiff as a school director, he exceeded his jurisdiction, and that his decision must therefore be overruled. The law requires that the plaintiff, The decision of the county super- Miner, shall seek his remedy in the courts. July 29, 1868. D. FRANKLIN WELLS, Superintendent of Public Instruction. N. R. HOOK V. INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF FREMONT. Appeal from Mahaska County. SCHOOL PRIVILEGES. Are not acquired by temporary removal into a district for the purpose of attending school. At a meeting of the board an order was made excluding one George Check from school. From this order Dr. N. R. Hook, with whom the boy was at the time living, appealed to the county superintendent, who affirmed the order of the board, and Hook again appealed. The ground upon which the boy was debarred from school was that he was not a bona fide resident of the district, and this is fully sustained by the circumstances of the case as shown by the weight of the evidence as adduced before the county superintendent. The apparent primary purpose of George Check in going to live with Dr. Hook was that he might attend the school at Fremont, and after the term of school should expire his further continuance at Hook's would be uncertain. He did not go there with the intention of remaining, but the intention to return to his father's house seems to have been manifested in the contract or agreement made with Hook. Counsel for appellant argues that the law should not be technically construed, but that it should receive a liberal construction, and in this he is correct. It should receive such a construction as that all the youth of the state, without regard to race or condition in life, can with equal facility participate in the benefits of our free schools. There is evidence that the schools in Fremont are so crowded that many of the youth of the district are unable to gain admission, and the law gives to them the prior claim. The board should see that the children of the district are first accommodated, and then, if not detrimental to the interests of the school, it may admit, in its discretion, those from outside districts upon such terms as it may agree. Believing that the county superintendent properly sustained the board of directors, his decision is hereby AFFIRMED. May 1, 1870. A. S. KISSELL, Superintendent of Public Instruction. JURISDICTION. Z. W. REMINGTON V. DISTRICT TOWNSHIP OF BOOMER. Appeal from Pottawattamie County. The county superintendent does not have jurisdiction of cases involving a money demand. SCHOOL ORDERS. When improperly issued, a proper remedy is injunction, On the 12th day of October the board met in special session and made a settlement with one L. S. Axtell, who was the contractor for the erection of certain schoolhouses in said district township. From the action of the board Z. W. Remington appealed to the county superintendent, who dismissed the appeal upon the ground that the settlement with Axtell was for a money demand, and therefore involved a question over which he could exercise no jurisdiction. Remington again appeals. If there was anything wrong in the action of the board issuing orders in favor of Axtell for the payment of his claim for building the schoolhouses that would render them invalid, his remedy, if any, would have been by injunction to restrain the payment of such orders, or by some other proper action in the civil courts, and not by appeal to the county superintendent, as, the latter tribunal is not clothed by the statute with the authority to inquire into or determine the validity of school orders. The county superintendent, therefore, very properly decided to dismiss the appeal, and his order in the case is hereby AFFIRMED. A. S. KISSELL, Superintendent of Public Instruction. May 17, 1870. W. D. PECK et al. v. DISTRICT TOWNSHIP OF POLK. Appeal from Jefferson County. SUBDISTRICTS. Should be, if possible, compact and regular in form. In well populated district townships two miles square is considered a desirable area. SCHOOLHOUSE SITES. It is important that a schoolhouse site be located on a public road, and as near the center of a subdistrict as practicable. It appears from a transcript in this case that the board, on the presentation of a petition from the majority of the inhabitants of subdistrict number eight, issued an order attaching a strip on the northeast from subdistrict number seven to number eight, relocating the schoolhouse site, and arranging for the removal of the schoolhouse from the present site to said new location. From this action of the board an appeal was taken to the county superintendent, who sustained the action of the board, and from his decision an appeal is taken to this tribunal. The trial before the county superintendent developed that the board has in contemplation the redistricting of the entire township into subdistricts two miles square, and that the order providing for the change of boundaries in . subdistrict number eight is the initiatory step in that direction. The subdistrict in question, previous to the order, had very irregular boundaries; and except that the district is too large for convenience without further change in the boundaries there would seem to be every reason for attaching the strip from number seven. That being attached, the change of location and the removal of the schoolhouse to a site occupying the geographical center of the subdistrict with its changed boundaries must follow of course. Besides this, there seems to be the additional good reason for the change of location for the schoouhouse site: the present site is not on a public road; the one in prospect is, and as all the territory is in a condition to be easily and rapidly set tled, the new site will, with the additional change in contemplation, be the exact geographical center of the subdistrict. The action of the board in this case is manifestly of a discretionary character, and I can see nothing in the testimony that would induce the belief that it has in any way exceeded its prerogative or abused its discretion. The decision of the county superintendent is therefore AFFIRMED. February 4, 1871. A. S. KISSELL, Superintendent of Public Instruction. W. P. DAVIS V. DISTRICT TOWNSHIP OF MADISON. Appeal from Fremont County. CONTRACTS. Made by a committee, require the approval of the, board in session. SCHOOL FUNDS. The treasurer is the proper custodian of all funds, and may legally pay them out only upon orders specifying the fund upon which they are drawn and the specific use to which they are applied. SUBDIRECTOR. The subdirector may expend money in his subdistrict only in the manner authorized by the board. CLAIMS. Just claims against the district can be enforced only in the courts. MANDAMUS. Is a remedy if the board refuses to carry out a vote of the electors. SUBDISTRICT. A subdistrict is not a corporate body, and has no control of any public fund. The electors on the eleventh day of March, 1871, voted a tax of two and one-half mills on the taxable property of the district township for schoolhouse purposes, and directed that three hundred dollars of the amount thus raised should be used for the erection of a schoolhouse in subdistrict number nine. March 20, 1871, W. P. Davis, subdirector of subdistrict number nine, was appointed a committee to build a schoolhouse in said subdistrict. The house having been completed, at a special meeting of the board held June 1, 1872, it was moved that the report of the committee be received and the schoolhouse be accepted; also, that the secretary be instructed to draw an order on the treasurer for three hundred dollars for subdistrict number nine. Both motions were lost, from which action the said W. P. Davis appealed to the county superintendent, who on the ninth day of August, 1872, reversed the action of the board. The district township, through its president, W. H. Gandy, appeals. The history of this case very fully illustrates the loose and irregular manner in which school officers too frequently transact official business. Section 15 of the School Laws provides that the board "shall make all contracts, purchases, payments, and sales necessary to carry out any vote of the district, but before erecting any schoolhouse they shall consult with the county superintendent as to the most approved plan of such building." If the contract is made by a subdirector or committee of the board, it should in all cases be approved by the board before work is commenced. A misapprehension often exists as to the manner in which school funds should be disbursed. The treasurer is the proper custodian of all funds be longing to the district township and the law provides that he "shall pay no order which does not specify the fund on which it is drawn, and the specific use to which it is applied," that is, for work done, material furnished, or the like. The board is also required to "audit and allow all just claims against the district, and no order shall be drawn on the district treasury until the claim for which it is drawn has been so audited and allowed." This rule applies equally where funds are voted by the district township for the purpose of building schoolhouses in particular subdistricts, also where taxes have been raised on the property of subdistricts, in accordance with the proviso of section 28. Such funds, or so much of them as may be required to carry out the vote of the electors, should be devoted to the specific object for which they were voted, but the disbursement should, in all cases, be under the direction and authority of the board. Boards have no authority to give subdirectors money to use in their subdistricts for building schoolhouses or any other purpose, nor subdirectors to use money so received. A subdistrict is not a corporate body and has no control of any public fund. If Mr. Davis has a just claim against the district township of Madison which the board refuses to allow, or if the board refuses to apply the amount voted by the electors to the specific object for which it was designed, the erection of a schoolhouse in subdistrict number nine, the civil courts, only, can frunish a means of redress. October 30, 1872. REVERSED. ALONZO ABERNETHY, Superintendent of Public Instruction. W. J. MOODY V. H. H. BURRINGTON, COUNTY SUPERINTENDENT. Appeal from Bremer County. CERTIFICATE. The county superintendent may refuse to entertain a petition for the revocation of a teacher's certificate. APPEAL. An appeal may be taken from the refusal of the county superintendent to investigate charges brought against a teacher. DISCRETIONARY ACTS. The decision of the authority having original jurisdiction is entitled to much consideration. A petition containing charges against a teacher was presented to H. H. Burrington, county superintendent, asking an investigation of the charges, and the revocation of her certificate. The county superintendent refused to make the investigation as requested by the petitioners, and W. J. Moody appeals. The question whether an appeal will lie from the refusal of the county superintendent to investigate charges brought against a teacher, has not been to our knowledge before determined. Since it is held that an appeal may be taken from an action of the board refusing to perform a discretionary action, we see no reason why appeal will not lie from a similar action of the county superintendent. In the case before us, statements testifying to the moral character and good reputation of the teacher are made by reliable and disinterested parties, who have been intimately acquainted with her for several years past; and it is |