We sustain the protest. Since the contract was expected to exceed $100,000, the IFB contained the certif icate of procurement integrity clause set forth at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 52.203-8. The clause serves to implement the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Act, 41 U.S.C. § 423(e) (1988 and Supp. III 1991), which precludes federal agencies from making award to a competing contractor unless the officer or employee of the contractor responsible for submitting the offer or bid certifies in writing that neither he nor those employees who participated in preparing the bid have any information concerning violations or possible violations of the OFPP Act. See Holly's Inc., B-246444, Mar. 4, 1992, 92-1 CPD ¶ 261. The activities prohibited by the OFPP Act involve soliciting or discussing postgovernment employment, offering or accepting a gratuity, and soliciting or disclosing proprietary or source selection information. Id. The certification requirement obligates the officer or employee responsible for the bid or offer to become familiar with the OFPP Act prohibitions, and imposes a requirement to fully disclose any possible OFPP Act violations, and to certify to the veracity of the disclosure. Mid-East Contractors, Inc., 70 Comp. Gen. 383 (1991), 91-1 CPD 1 342. In addition, the signer of the certificate is required to collect similar certifications from all other individuals involved in the preparation of the bid or offer. 41 U.S.C. § 423(e)(1)(B). The IFB advised that the failure to submit a signed certificate with a bid would render the bid nonresponsive. At bid opening, C.B.C. was the apparent low bidder. C.B.C.'s bid documents included the standard form (SF) 33, the representations and certifications forms, and a certificate of procurement integrity. C.B.C. had submitted photocopies of a completed certificate which had been manually signed by the president of the firm, the individual who signed and was responsible for the preparation of C.B.C.'s bid. The agency questioned whether the submission of a photocopy of the signature on the certificate was sufficient to establish that the bidder was bound with respect to this particular procurement; the agency was concerned that C.B.C. may have photocopied signed certificates in bulk, with solicitationspecific information left blank for subsequent entry. In this regard, while the signature on the certificate was a photocopy, it appeared to the agency that solicitation-specific information (such as the solicitation number and dates) was printed in original type, suggesting that it may have been after-added.1 By letter dated February 22, 1993, the agency rejected C.B.C.'s bid as nonresponsive on the ground that it failed to include a properly signed certificate. Award was made to Virtexco, the second low responsive bidder. Performance has been suspended pending resolution of this protest. C.B.C. argues that its certificate is valid because the photocopy of the certificate submitted with its bid is binding as a duplicate of the complete, manually signed original certificate. We agree. 1 In affidavits submitted in conjunction with its protest, C.B.C. explains that the typed, solicitation-specific entries were made with an electronic typewriter before the certificate was signed. ned sition! f Fede The agency argues that the photocopied signature on the certificates is analogous to the use of a rubber stamp bid signature which, under FAR § 14.405(c)(2), is only permitted if the firm has formally authorized the use of such a stamp prior to bid opening and submits evidence of the authorization with its bid. See 11 Stafford Grading and Paving Co., Inc., B-245907, Jan. 14, 1992, 92–1 CPD ¶ 66; Hugo Key & Son, Inc., B-245227, Aug. 22, 1991, 91-2 CPD ¶ 189. tracu gth The agency's analogy was rejected in Cambridge Marine Indus., Inc., 61 Comp. arti Gen. 187 (1981), 81–2 CPD ¶ 517, in which a photocopy of a manually signed proposal was held to constitute a binding offer. We reasoned that a photocopied sig10 nature was different in kind from a rubber-stamped signature, which could be Caffixed by anyone having access to the stamp without necessarily having authority to bind the offeror. Id. In our view, unlike a document with a rubberstamped signature, a photocopy of a signed bid document is a valid duplicate original; the photocopy signature is sufficient to bind the bidder to its obligations under the original signed document. International Shelter Sys., Inc., 71 Comp. Gen. 142 (1992), 92-1 CPD ¶ 38. Spors andi nd rea the p the Drey tions tocop para bide Here, C.B.C.'s bid contained a photocopy of the completed certificate signed by the president of the company, the same individual who signed the bid for C.B.C., and whose authority to bind the company is not questioned. As noted above, the fact that the signature is a photocopy is, by itself, unexceptionable. We disagree with the argument that the appearance of C.B.C.'s certificate raised the possibility that the company had used a bulk signed certificate which called into question the signatory's commitment to the particular procurement. The representa tions and certifications portion of the IFB consisted of 19 number pages. The protester's completed certificate of procurement integrity with the photocopied ide signature began several lines from the top of page 3 and continued onto page 4 in the same place as that in the IFB. This certificate appears to be the one included in the IFB since it is on the same page, in the same place, and evidently part of the same form. It does not resemble a reproduction of a signed, generic certificate photocopied in bulk with solicitation-specific information left blank. We conclude that the photocopied certificate submitted by C.B.C. was sufficient to bind C.B.C. to the appropriate obligations and the agency, therefore, improperly rejected C.B.C.'s bid. We recommend that the agency terminate the award to Virtexco and award to C.B.C., if otherwise appropriate. C.B.C. is also entitled to recover the costs of filing and pursuing its protest, including reasonable attorneys' fees. 4 C.F.R. § 21.6(d)(2) (1993). In accordance with 4 C.F.R. § 21.6(f)(1), a certified claim for such costs, detailing the time expended and cost incurred, should be submitted directly to the agency within 60 days after receipt of this decision. A ber July 1993 B-251905, July 2, 1993 Accountable Officers ■Certifying officers ☐☐Liability Vouchers ☐☐☐☐ Emergencies A State Department certifying officer could have certified an emergency or extraordinary expense voucher, submitted by a Defense Attache, even though the certifying officer was not allowed to view the classified supporting documentation. Under 10 U.S.C. § 127, a certification by the Secretary of Defense or a designee as to the confidentiality of an emergency or extraordinary expense "is sufficient voucher for the expenditure of that amount." The certifying officer, as part of the later administrative processing of the voucher, is responsible only for errors made in his own processing of the voucher, and not for the Defense Attache's prior certification as to the propriety of the payment. Matter of: Certification of Defense Intelligence Agency Emergency and Extraordinary Expense Vouchers The principal certifying officer at the United States Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, questions whether he could have certified an emergency or extraordinary expense voucher that, because of security considerations, was not accompanied by supporting documentation. For the reasons indicated below, the certifying officer was responsible only for errors in his own processing of the voucher, not for the underlying propriety of the certification, and thus, could have certified the voucher in question. Background The Embassy in Port-au-Prince renders fiscal services to the Defense Intelligence Agency under the terms of a Foreign Affairs Administrative Service Agreement.1 On August 3, 1992, the Defense Attache submitted a voucher for unspecified emergency or extraordinary expenses in the amount of $239.10. The Defense Attache did not provide supporting documentation to the certifying officer, claiming that the security classification of the voucher attachments exceeded the security clearance of the certifying officer. The Defense Attache asserted 1 We have previously approved similar types of interagency servicing arrangements under the Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535. See, e.g., 55 Comp. Gen. 388 (1975); 59 Comp. Gen. 471 (1980); B-205616, July 16, 1982. Page 279 that the Department of State requires certification in these cases and that 10 U.S.C. § 140 allowed him to submit the voucher without supporting documentation. The Embassy's principal certifying officer refused to certify the voucher and forwarded through departmental channels a request to the Comptroller General for an advance decision.2 The Department of State declined to forward the certifying officer's request for an advance decision to us. Citing 55 Comp. Gen. 388 and B-142380, Mar. 30, 1960, the State Department maintains that its certifying officers may certify vouchers based on a Defense Attache's signature only. Furthermore, the State Department claims that a Defense Attache, acting under the authority of title 10 of the United States Code, can authorize the expenditure of funds for any emergency and extraordinary expense purpose he or she determines to be proper and such a determination is final and conclusive upon the accounting officer. Accordingly, the State Department takes the position that a certifying officer is not certifying that the payment is legal, proper and correct; rather, he or she is certifying only that the expense is being charged to the emergency and extraordinary expense appropriation and that funds for such purpose are available to the Defense Attache for that fiscal year. The certifying officer in the present case questions whether State Department certifying officers are relieved of certifying the legality and correctness of emergency and extraordinary expense vouchers and, as is his statutory right, 31 U.S.C. § 3529(a) (1988), requests our decision. Although the submission indicates that an alternate certifying officer eventually certified the voucher at issue, we will nonetheless render a decision because of the potentially wide applicability of this question. Analysis Generally, a certifying official is responsible for the existence and correctness of the facts cited in the certificate, voucher, or supporting papers and the legality of the proposed payment, and is liable for the amount of any illegal, improper, or incorrect payment resulting from any false, inaccurate, or misleading certificate made by him, as well as for any payment prohibited by law or which does not represent a legal obligation. 31 U.S.C. § 3528 (1988). In those cases where there is more than one certification,3 we have observed that: Where the certifying officer who certifies the voucher and schedule of payments is different from the certifying officer who certifies the basic vouchers, we have consistently applied the principle that the certifying officer who certifies the basic vouchers is responsible for the correctness of such vouchers and the certifying officer who certifies the voucher-schedule is responsible only for errors made in the preparation of the voucher-schedule... 2 An alternate certifying officer at the Embassy certified the voucher in mid-September 1992. 3 Where an authorized certifying officer certifies a voucher, later administrative processing of vouchers does not constitute certification for purposes of liability under 31 U.S.C. § 3528. 23 Comp. Gen. 953 (1944); 21 Comp. Gen. 841 (1942), cited in 67 Comp. Gen. 457, 466 (1988). |