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existing traffic routes. But they are precisely the ends which in the same asserted interest this acquisition of control purports to achieve.

The above-cited provision of § 5 (4) stands in apparent opposition to that of paragraph (8), which relieves the carriers affected by orders under earlier provisions of the section "from the operation of the ' antitrust laws.'" In the face of this dilemma, which looks to both the preserving and the relinquishing of competition, the only escape from repugnancy fatal to the whole section (Rice v. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co., 1 Black 358, 378-379) lies in so restricting the scope of the latter paragraph that if any valid order of the Commission under a preceding provision of § 5 interrupts competition in minor particulars that cannot be obviated-which is the most that any such order can lawfully do in view of the limitation in paragraph (4)-then paragraph (8) will operate to relieve the carriers concerned from the resulting incidental or technical breaches of the antitrust laws.

Accruing thus automatically, such immunity may be conceived to proceed directly from the will of Congress. But without such restriction of the scope of paragraph (8), it must proceed from the Commission's discretionunder an inadmissible, as well as a repugnant, delegation by Congress of its legislative power.

As exertions of corporate power by the carriers concerned, the proposed leases are not within the sanction of the controlling statute of Ohio; and as combinations of competing lines, they contravene constitutional or statutory limitations of corporate power to enter into such leases, in every State they touch; so that on either ground the Commission was without power to approve and authorize them. The carriers still derive from the States their corporate power, and the mode prescribed for exercising it, to enter into leases; and in Ohio the

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Argument for Appellant.

287 U.S.

limitations of such power are inseparable from the grant. Section 5 (2) prescribes no internal corporate proceedings for the making of such demise, but leaves the carriers in this respect where it finds them, namely, subject to the corporation codes of the States where they are chartered to do business.

The orders herein complained of contravene the Ohio statute and under the first of the following specifications the cited laws of other States as well-in approving and authorizing the New York Central's acquisition of control, ultra vires, (a) by leases of competing lines, (b) for a rental less in each case than the net earnings of the leased road for the fiscal year next preceding, and (c) without security for payment of the rental and preservation of the property.

The attack based upon the state law limitations of the corporate power has place in the suit to annul the order. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 22 F. (2d) 509, 511; Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 479; Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258; Interstate Commerce Commn. v. Union Pac. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541; Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U. S. 249; Venner v. Michigan Central R. Co., 271 U. S. 127. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Willow Glen, 49 F. (2d) 1005, 1008.

The conclusion is inevitable that in a minority stockholders' suit begun in the District Court under the Urgent Deficiencies Act to set aside an order of the Commission under § 5 (2) upon the ground that such order denies him equal treatment or will unlawfully injure his pecuniary interest as an investor, the plaintiff may litigate every question pertinent to such claim as in a plenary suit in equity; for otherwise he would no longer have a remedy to prevent threatened damage to himself from unconscionable or ultra vires acts by his own corporation in the carrying out of permissive orders of the Commission; or

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else such orders would be subject to defeat in suits for injunction to which the Commission is not made a party.

The Commission was without power to condition its authorization upon the acquisition of the burdensome short lines.

Mr. Daniel W. Knowlton, with whom Solicitor General Thacher and Assistant to the Attorney General O'Brian were on the brief, for the United States and Interstate Commerce Commission, appellees.

Mr. Jacob Aronson, with whom Mr. Charles C. Paulding was on the brief, for the New York Central Railroad Company et al., appellees.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

On July 2, 1929, the Interstate Commerce Commission made an order authorizing the New York Central Railroad Company to acquire control, by lease, of the railroad systems of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company (known as the 'Big Four ') and of the Michigan Central Railroad Company. By order of December 2, 1929, the Commission permitted the assumption by the lessee of obligation and liability in respect of certain securities of the lessors. In this suit, a minority stockholder of each of the lessors, and of the lessee, sought to set aside these orders upon the ground that the Commission had exceeded its authority. The District Court, of three judges, upon pleadings and proofs, and having filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, denied the motion for injunction and dismissed the petition upon the merits. 54 F. (2d) 122. The petitioner appeals. U. S. C., Tit. 28, §§ 47, 345.

The District Court, against objection, sustained its jurisdiction. The court took the view that the petitioner,

Opinion of the Court.

287 U.S.

as a minority stockholder of the lessors, alleged an injury not merely derivative, but independent, being a member of a class created by the leasing agreements. 54 F. (2d) at p. 126; compare Pittsburgh & West Virginia Ry. Co. v. United States, 281 U. S. 479, 487. While appellees submit that there are certain contentions which appellant may not properly raise, the correctness of the decision as to jurisdiction is conceded.

The authority of the Commission to make the orders is rested upon § 5, subdivision 2, and § 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act. U. S. C., Tit. 49.1 After full hearing, and upon consideration of the purpose of the proposals, of the physical, traffic and intercorporate relationships, of investment, income and dividends, of the provisions of the proposed leases, of the benefits deemed to accrue to the public, of the particular situation of certain short lines, and of the objections raised by minority stockhold

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1 The pertinent provisions of these sections are as follows:

"Sec. 5 (2): Acquisition of control of one carrier by another.Whenever the commission is of opinion, after hearing, upon application of any carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property subject to this chapter, that the acquisition, to the extent indicated by the commission, by one of such carriers of the control of any other such carrier or carriers either under a lease or by the purchase of stock or in any other manner not involving the consolidation of such carriers into a single system for ownership and operation, will be in the public interest, the commission shall have authority by order to approve and authorize such acquisition, under such rules and regulations and for such consideration and on such terms and conditions as shall be found by the commission to be just and reasonable in the premises. . . ."

"Sec. 5 (8): Carriers affected relieved from operation of antitrust laws, etc.-The carriers affected by any order made under the foregoing provisions of this section and any corporation organized to effect a consolidation approved and authorized in such order are relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws,' as designated in section 12 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade, and of all other restraints or prohibitions by law, State or Federal, in so far as may be necessary to

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ers, the Commission found that the "considerations and terms and conditions" set forth in the proposed leases were "just and reasonable" and that the contemplated acquisition would be "in the public interest." The authorization was upon the express condition that before the leases became effective, the New York Central should offer to acquire specified short lines upon terms and conditions stated. Report, January 14, 1929, 150 I. C. C. 278, 321, 322. Upon proof of compliance with this condition, and upon further conditions, the acquisition was approved. Supplemental Report and Order of July 2, 1929, 154 I. C. C. 489, 494, 495. One of the conditions was that the New York Central and the 'Big Four' should not be relieved from compliance with provisions of law applicable to any assumption of obligations and liabilities by virtue of the execution of the leases. On later appli

enable them to do anything authorized or required by any order made under and pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section. . . "Sec. 20a (2): Issuance of securities; assumption of obligations; authorization.-It shall be unlawful for any carrier to issue any share of capital stock or any bond or other evidence of interest in or indebtedness of the carrier (hereinafter in this section collectively termed 'securities') or to assume any obligation or liability as lessor, lessee, guarantor, indorser, surety, or otherwise, in respect of the securities of any other person, natural or artificial, even though permitted by the authority creating the carrier corporation, unless and until, and then only to the extent that, upon application by the carrier, and after investigation by the commission of the purposes and uses of the proposed issue and the proceeds thereof, or of the proposed assumption of obligation or liability in respect of the securities of any other person, natural or artificial, the commission by order authorizes such issue or assumption. The commission shall make such order only if it finds that such issue or assumption: (a) is for some lawful object within its corporate purposes, and compatible with the public interest, which is necessary or appropriate for or consistent with the proper performance by the carrier of service to the public as a common carrier, and which will not impair its ability to perform that service, and (b) is reasonably necessary and appropriate for such purpose. . . .

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