The Attorney-General in this Government (the Honourable F. W. Eggleston, M.L.A.), is preparing a memorandum in which the reasons for opposition to the proposed change will be set out in fuller detail. This has been delayed by his illness, but a copy will be forwarded to His Excellency at an early date.

The Premier asks that His Excellency will be pleased to transmit this memorandum to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs.

J. ALLAN,

Premier.

No. 7.

The Governor of Victoria to the Secretary of State for Dominion

Affairs.

(Received 14th December, 1925.)

[Acknowledged by despatch dated 23rd January, 1926.]

State Government House, Melbourne, 10th November, 1925. SIR,

In continuation of my despatch of the 30th September last,* I have the honour, at the instance of my Premier, to transmit to you a copy of a memorandum by the Attorney-General (the Honourable F. W. Eggleston) giving in fuller detail the reasons. why my Ministers are opposed to the proposed change in the method of appointing State Governors.

I have, &c.,

STADBROKE.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 7.

MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL SETTING OUT IN DETAIL THE REASONS OF THE VICTORIAN GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE PROPOSAL TO DISCONTINUE THe present PRACTICE OF APPOINTING STATE GOVERNORS.

1. The practice of appointing distinguished British citizens as State Governors would justify itself, apart from its political value. Intercommunication of ideas, personal touch, and study by members of one part of the Empire of the others are integrating factors of the highest importance in the development of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

* No. 6.

There is no one in whom these factors can operate more successfully than in an occupant of this office. State Governors have opportunities of seeing the varied conditions of the life of the people, especially in the rural districts, to a greater extent even than most of the citizens of the State. When they return to Great Britain they are well-informed on Australian questions, and are able to explain the local point of view.

2. State Governors constitute a formal link in the system of the British Empire. They represent the King in a more intimate manner than the Governor-General; except in the State in which the Governor-General resides, it is the Governor rather than the Governor-General who, in the minds of the people, is the representative of the Crown. For most purposes the GovernorGeneral is as remote from the course of government with which the people are familiar as is the King himself. This link is the more appropriate to Australia because, under the Federal Constitution, the States within the ambit of their authority are sovereign; and the reserve powers are retained by them.

3. The most important advantage of the present system of appointing State Governors is its unique value for political purposes. It enables responsible government as developed in the British Parliamentary system to be operated with the same ease and efficiency as in Great Britain. In Great Britain the King is in a position sanctioned by descent and centuries of historical tradition as representative of the British people; and thus, placed above party, he performs a most important and a unique function. as Head of the State.

The object of responsible government is to secure government according to the will of the people. The will of the people is expressed by the choice of representatives in Parliament who not only legislate, but control the Executive. When Ministers forfeit the confidence of Parliament they resign and others are appointed. Such changes, however, would involve discontinuity amounting almost to revolution unless there were a non-changing factor in the constitution. This permanent element in Great Britain is the King, and, in an Australian State, the Governor. The King or the Governor has to act in the appointment of new ministers on any change of government. It is precisely because the King or the Governor is not affected by any such change and can perform these functions, that the British system permits the adjustment of executive power so readily to the will of the people, and promotes and facilitates self-government in a way that no other system does.

4. The position of the Sovereign in our system of responsible government is possibly the most successful phase of that system. It is a subtle adjustment of a number of factors the success of which is a most conspicuous expression of the political sense of the British nation. Because the legal power is in the King, the actual power of the Government can be the greater. Because there is continuity and permanence in the King, the composition of Governments is flexible and can be accommodated to the will

of the people. Because the King presides over any change of government and performs the necessary acts to effectuate any such change, the people through Parliament can make and change Governments with facility. In effect, the system satisfies every demand of democracy, and promotes self-government.

5. The purposes for which the constitutional head of a State exists can be fully attained only where he comes to his office by some legal means outside those political forces and attachments that agitate the community over which he presides. This is effected, in the case of the King himself, and for the purposes of government in Great Britain, by descent. In the case of other Governments under the Crown, it can be effected by appointment of his representative by the King, on the advice of an outside Government. Appointment of the Head of the State on the recommendation of the Government actually in power in a State is not a mere change in form, but the substitution of a totally different system. Appointment of the Head of the State by the Government in power can never be effective, because while that Government remains in power he is identified with it. If a claim is made that there should be a change of government, he cannot properly function, because, even if he were sufficiently disinterested to make the proper decision, yet he would not get credit for that judicial impartiality, and the authority of the Government installed or maintained in office would be impaired.

Nor is election by the people a satisfactory substitute. For example, in the United States of America, where there is election of a President, the system of government differs radically from that of responsible government as we know it in British countries. The President is the real as well as the legal head of the Executive. The most important limitation of his power is the term of his office, and until that term expires there cannot be a change of Government. Beside, the election of a President stamps the successful candidate as a party man. He can never dissociate himself from the passions and prejudices of the election, and in the minds of a considerable section of the people his authority is weakened and his acts are tinged with their feeling as to his bias. Moreover, in the case of an elective president, rivalry may arise between the President and the Prime Minister, as has happened in France. Such a contingency is the more likely to occur if the President may return to active political life when his term of office expires. It may be assumed that, if a Governor were chosen by election, it is unlikely that he would be elected for more than a limited term. It is probable, therefore, that he would be a politician looking 'to his future political career; and it is quite conceivable that the exigencies of party may call on him to resign the Governorship in order to lead his party.

6. In the case of a State Governor appointed from Great Britain, there is an additional advantage that he has no association with local politics and is completely neutral. He comes with a fresh mind, unaffected by current feeling. This neutrality is a most significant advantage, for it takes away the likelihood of

effective criticism of his acts; and his actions and decisions as Governor are accepted by the community. The succession of Governments is effected without any undue disturbance.

This could not be the case if a local citizen were appointed. His political affiliations would be known. He could not have reached a place in public esteem sufficient to entitle him to be appointed if he had not expressed views on matters of public importance. When he acted as Governor, the reception of his decisions would be coloured by public knowledge of his political ideas and associations, and there would not be that easy acquiescence which is essential if his dispositions are to be effective. In saying this there is not the slightest reflection upon the ability or impartiality of local citizens, but only upon the likelihood of ready acceptance by the public of decisions they may make in circumstances in which party feeling is involved. There would be obvious opportunities for criticism; and, instead of political conflict concentrating upon the policy of a Government, there would be interminable wrangles as to the exercise by the Governor of his discretion.

In this connexion reference may be made to the following statement by the Premier of Queensland, Mr. Theodore, as quoted in the "Round Table," Vol. X, at p. 907:—

"If we are to have Lieutenant-Governors or Governors locally appointed, it may be a difficult matter to get a man who, because of his standing in the community, has some claim to the appointment, and who at the same time is dissociated from politics or political views. I go so far as to say that it would be impossible to get such a man.'

The position of State Governor is, therefore, one which gives an ideal opportunity for the exercise of some of the most delicate and important functions in the system of responsible government.

7. The particular request of the Premier of New South Wales is that the King should appoint a citizen of New South Wales as Governor. The present position is that the office of State Governor having been constituted by Letters Patent, each Governor is appointed by issuing to him a Commission under the King's sign manual and signet. The only alteration desired is that the person appointed should be a citizen of the State to which he is appointed. It is apparently suggested that, as the appointment will be by the King, the impartiality of the person appointed will be accepted. It is probable, however, that the result will be precisely the opposite. It might be assumed that the appointment would, in this case, be made by the King upon the advice of the British Government. This would probably be so, but it is by no means certain. It has been claimed that events surrounding the signing of the Treaty of Versailles recognise a right in a Dominion Government to advise the King apart from his British Cabinet; and, if a right were successfully asserted by an Australian State that the appointment of the Governor should be made on the advice of the State Government, it would simply be an appointment by the State of its Governor by ministerial act.

This would be clearly in contradiction to the system of responsible government, and it makes it almost impossible to work. If, however, the responsibility for the appointment were that of the Government of the United Kingdom, the position would not be much better. The Secretary of State has no first-hand knowledge of the affairs of the State or of the personnel available for the office. He could not take the responsibility of appointment on his own motion, without information. All the effects of a bad or distasteful appointment would be visited on the British Government. There is only one channel through which it could get that knowledge, and that is through the Government of the State for the time being. What would almost certainly happen would be that the Government would be called upon to submit recommendations. If it only submitted one name the British Government would find it very difficult not to act upon that recommendation. Even if it submitted a number of names the British Government would find the choice an invidious one. In any case, any appointment made in these circumstances would be regarded as a party appointment and subject to all the disadvantages already mentioned. The present practice under which the Government concerned is advised of a proposed appointment avoids the difficulties indicated.

8. Other suggestions have been made during debates in the Victorian Parliament which might be thought to be better than the suggestion of the Premier of New South Wales, and will therefore be examined.

One is that the interposition of the Federal Authority should be procured in the matter. As to this, two proposals have been put forward:

(a) That the appointment should be made either directly by the Federal Government or by the King on the advice of the Federal Government; or

(b) that the Governor-General should also act as Governor of the States.

The second proposal may be set aside as impracticable. would be impossible for the Governor-General to deal with the business of six States and of the Commonwealth as well. There may be crises in several States at the same time. The distances are too great. This proposal does not deserve serious consideration.

One preliminary objection to the first of these two proposals is that the States are Sovereign under the Federal Constitution, and have the reserve power. That is the existing constitutional settlement and the people have several times shown themselves determined to preserve the present arrangement. The vast areas and scattered population make them apprehensive of centralisation. The State Governor is a symbol of the separate sovereignty of the State. It is significant that the party that leans towards unification is anxious to do away with the office. The separate sovereignty is not merely an expression of local patriotism; it