Arrangements between Great Britain, France, Italy and Bulgaria for Reparation Payments by Bulgaria under Articles 121 and 122 of the Treaty of Neuilly of November 27, 1919. Sofia, July 1923. By an agreement between the Inter-Allied Commission for Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Governmont, concluded in July 1923, the schedule of payments appeaded to the protocol signed on the 21st March, 1923, by the Inter-Allied Commission for Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Government was amended and completed as follows: Note. The provisions of paragraph 7 of article 121 of the Treaty of Neuilly shall apply to the annuities or annuity instalments provided for in the present schedule of payments. These annuities may, in case of necessity, be proposed and accepted in kind. Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs LONDON: PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses: Adastral House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 120, George Street, Edinburgh; York Street, Manchester; 1, St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; 15, Donegall Square West, Belfast; or through any Bookseller. 1928 Price Is. od. Net Cmd. 3050 2 Memorandum addressed to the Foreign Office by the Private 3 Counter-draft approved by His Majesty's Government on July 28, 4 Memorandum addressed to the Foreign Office by the Private 5 Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Henderson, November 9, 1927, enclosing copy of a draft note to the Egyptian Government regarding Irrigation in Egypt and the Sudan 3 Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Lloyd, November 24, 1927, 8 Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Lloyd, February 5, 1928, summarising the course of the negotiations since November 24, 10 Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Lloyd, March 1, 1928. In the event of the rejection of the Treaty, His Majesty's Govern- ment must reconsider the action to be taken in present circumstances for the discharge of their obligations under the Papers regarding Negotiations for a Treaty of Alliance with Egypt. No. 1. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I MET Sarwat Pasha on several occasions last week, but these were not occasions convenient for any serious conversation. This afternoon he called upon me by appointment, and I had a conversation with him which lasted nearly two hours. He began by expressing King Fuad's and his own appreciation of the reception which had been accorded to King Fuad by His Majesty, and I on my side expressed the hope that his Excellency realised the real goodwill and friendship of the British Government and people towards Egypt which lay behind the welcome accorded to King Fuad. Sarwat Pasha replied that he fully recognised this and could assure me that it was recognised in Egypt, where the same desire for a cordial understanding prevailed. Not, therefore, in order to argue on past differences, still less to bring any accusations against anyone, but to defend the Egyptian Government from the charge of entertaining anything but such friendly feelings, he would like to give me his account of recent events. The conversation then turned to various incidents which during the preceding months had threatened to impair Anglo-Egyptian relations. If it had been necessary or desirable to follow his Excellency in detail there would have been much which I might have said, even without any great study of the questions involved. I preferred to take the discussion on to broader lines. In reply, therefore, to the explanations which he had offered and after thanking him for them, I said that I did not propose to enter into the details of the past, but his Excellency would, I thought, recollect that I had last year drawn his attention to the reservations which we had attached to the grant of Egyptian independence and to the obligations no less than the rights which those reservations imposed upon us. The rights were vital to us. No British Government could afford to ignore them. My predecessor had asserted them as plainly as I could do. They were, in fact, so essential to the existence of the British Empire that every British Government in the future, as in the past, whatever its complexion, would be obliged to insist upon them. I was old enough to remember the circumstances of our intervention in Egypt in the early eighties. My father was a Minister at that time. I could recall the sincerity with which the Ministers of that day had declared that cur occupation was only temporary and that it would be withdrawn 4322 Wt. 2250 3/28 F.O.P. 17246 B 2 at the earliest possible moment. But circumstances had been too strong for us. The moment of withdrawal had never come and the events of the intervening forty or fifty years had shown that neither of us could escape from the situation in which God had placed us or evade the mutual relations which that situation imposed upon us. But if this was the position in regard to our rights and interests, the obligations imposed by the declaration to foreign Powers with which we had accompanied the announcement of Egyptian independence were not less imperative. We had warned foreign Powers that we should treat as an unfriendly act any attack by them on the integrity of Egypt or any intervention on Egyptian soil. But it was the corollary of the defence and protection which we thus afforded to Egyptian independence and integrity that we should in the last resort be in a position to secure protection for the nationals of those foreign countries in Egypt and the due observance of their rights by the Egyptian Government. I was much more interested in the future than in the past. The real question was whether the Egyptian Government, recognising the conditions in which we were both placed and the necessities which they created for us both, were going to collaborate heartily with the British Government or not. The fundamental requirements of British policy were common to all parties in this State and a change of Government made no alteration in them. We could not change our policy if we would; the conditions were such that, whatever difficulties we met, we must insist upon those things which I had defined as essential. Would the Egyptian people recognise the conditions which Providence had imposed upon us, as upon them, and co-operate for the defence of our common interests and the prosperity of our peoples, or were our relations to be left at the mercy of every passing incident, developing perhaps into a crisis and calling, it might be, for the exercise of force in its solution? Three years ago, when Zaghlul Pasha was in London, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had earnestly sought the basis of such a friendly co-operation. No man could have more sincerely desired to respect the feelings of the Egyptians and to give full weight to Egyptian aspirations. Yet he had found it impossible to lay the foundations for any agreement; he had then solemnly warned Zaghlul of the dangers of following the course which he was pursuing and of the consequences which must inevitably follow. Unfortunately, that warning had at the time fallen on deaf ears, and Sarwat Pasha knew what the result had been. Could we learn nothing from experience? Were we no wiser now? Could not the Egyptian Government and Parliament frankly realise that Providence had decreed a marriage between our two nations, and that the ties which bound us were too strong for separation and imposed upon us the necessity of co-operation? Sarwat Pasha replied that he entirely shared my view of the necessary connexion between our two countries and of the true interests of Egypt. There had been a great change in Egyptian opinion. The Egyptian Parliament and public now recognised that |