weekly "Cabinet Dinners" were again resorted to for the discussion of certain affairs. If they concerned a wider circle of Ministers they also were invited.1 The correspondence of Fox shows that Lord North and many of his supporters were opposed to the splitting of the Cabinet into departments. The system was strongly denounced in both Houses, it being said that they led to dissension, weakness, and corruption.2

Considerable uncertainty existed at this time as to who were to be included in the Cabinet, and upon being included, what their position might be. Marlborough was a member of the first Cabinet of George I, being at that time also Commander-in-Chief, and yet he was scarcely ever invited to the Cabinet and was unable "to obtain even a lieutenancy for a friend." The Chancellor of the Exchequer was not at that time usually a member of the Cabinet. Upon Mr. Dowdeswell accepting the position of Chancellor in 1765, there was much doubt as to whether he was entitled to a seat in the Cabinet.1

There existed, particularly during the reign of George II, an outer circle of the Cabinet, composed mostly of those who had formerly held offices of State, but who had resigned. Instead of ceasing to belong to the Cabinet they rather remained within this outer circle as "non-efficient” members. Those who remained within the inner circle were described either as efficient members, or those forming the confidential Cabinet. It should be noted that statesmen who had once been Cabinet members considered themselves to remain. within the outer circle of the Cabinet, even although their political opponents held the great offices of State. This outer circle of the Cabinet, which must even at that time

1 Massey, Reign of Geo. III, Vol. I, pp. 277, 328,

2 Parliamentary History, Vol. XXII, p. 651.

8 Mahan's History of England, Vol. I, p. 153.

4 Memoir of Dowdeswell in Cavendish Debates, Vol. I, 576.

have been considered somewhat unusual and improper, disappeared gradually.1

One of the primary characteristics of the Cabinet is that of the ministry resigning simultaneously when it became unable to depend upon the Commons, which had yet to be established.

From the time of the Revolution until the reign of George I, there is no evidence of a ministry resigning en bloc. At the commencement of the reign of George I, the entire body of ministers was changed, not because the doctrine of dependence on the Commons had become constitutional, but mainly owing to a dislike which George had to the ministry of Queen Anne. Walpole alone had resigned upon losing the support of the Commons, his ministry had remained.

It is to Lord North's ministry that we look for this doctrine to be evidenced. Lord North, whose influence upon the Commons was doubtless the primary cause of his remarkable success, resigned office in 1782, taking with him all the members of the ministry. Recognising that the confidence of the Commons had been lost, they thought it fitting and proper to join North in his resignation. Henceforth the Cabinet must either conform to the will of the Commons as representing the people, or tender their resignations to the Crown.

The credit of finally establishing the controlling power of the Prime Minister over the whole of the legislature belongs to William Pitt. He it was who established finally the right of the Prime Minister to urge both upon the Crown and the Commons the course that ought to be taken. The progress that had been made during the last fifty years is at once perceived. We have thus followed the prominent vicissitudes of the system from the time of Charles II until the reign of

1 Coxe, Memoir of Pelham, I, 295; Parliamentary History, XVIII, 274; also Campbell, Chancellors, VI, p. 326.

2 Donne, Vol. II, pp. 399-450. Jesse, Life of Geo. III, Vol. 1, p. 487.

George III, when we may look upon the methods of present day Cabinet government as definitely established. During this period the alteration is practical not theoretical. The Cabinet owes its tremendous powers to the prerogative of the Crown. The Crown when it might have been subject to censure was glad to shelter itself behind the Ministers, the Ministers were glad to accept responsibility. In order that the Crown might be protected, the actual prerogative of the Crown was destroyed.

This survival of the prerogative leaves great and inconceivable power in the hands of the Cabinet. The executive acts which may be performed by the Cabinet without any restriction-except that which is afforded by the influence of a temporary majority in the House of Commons and the prospect of a speedy relegation to obscurity of its individual members are greater and more far reaching than any other.1 It should also be remembered that the Acts are irrevocable and subject to no authority. They are not subject to Parliamentary control or even to the courts of law. This is particularly noticeable in the case of foreign affairs.

As Mr. Dicey says: "A treaty made by the Crown, or in fact by the Cabinet, is valid without the authority or sanction of Parliament; and it is even open to question whether the treaty making power of the Executive might not in some cases override the law of the land." 2

It is not Parliament but the Ministry who direct the diplomacy of the nation and virtually decide all questions of peace or war.

Legislation which is revocable is under the control of the Parliament and the Courts, whilst great administrative affairs are merely under the control of the Cabinet. Severe restriction is imposed on the lesser, none on the greater.

1 For powers that can be exercised by the Cabinet uncontrolled, see Bagehot, Constitution, Vol. I, p. 14.

2 Dicey's Constitution, p. 460. See the Parlement Belge, 4 P. D. 129; Walker v. Baird, L. R. [1892], A. C. 491, 497.

Constitutional writers have frequently contended as to whether a Parliamentary or a non-Parliamentary Executive gives a greater security to the country. There is no doubt (there have been several instances in quite recent years) that the ministry is apt to be too much swayed by the trend of thought in the Parliamentary majority. Cabinet administration reflects the views, formed perhaps in moments of great popular passion or influenced by feelings of a sentimental nature of a transient majority in the Commons, or the view of the electorate who support the majority. It is of course essentially different in the case of legislation. Here the matter is debated by the leaders of the respective Houses over a prolonged period, and also in general the subject of the legislation will probably be supported by a mandate from the electorate. In the case of the acts of the Executive, however, the Cabinet merely construes (sometimes it does not even do this, it certainly need not) as best it can what it thinks to be the feelings of the majority in the Commons. In the case of a non-Parliamentary Executive its strongest attribute is its comparative independence. It is true that attempts have been made at various times to form a nonParliamentary Executive, and the results have not been encouraging, but they have been made at times distinctly unfavourable to their success and they have not given sufficient scope to the majority in the Commons.

Mr. Dicey suggests that the Cabinet may even now be imperceptibly evolving from a Parliamentary into a nonParliamentary executive. He says, "It is at any rate conceivable that the time may come when, though all the forms of the English Constitution remain unchanged, an English Prime Minister will. be as truly elected to office by a popular vote as is an American President." The power wielded by the electorate may become too great for security. The electorate has the power to choose its

Prime Minister, to settle all legislation, to mould all acts of executive administration. It can make treaties, provoke war, and invite peace.

In these days when the most unobservant may notice constituencies in the country one month electing a representative who is a member of one party, and three months later without any apparent reason reversing its decision in favour of a member of another party-swerving from one pole of political thought to another-it may well happen that the protectors of the Constitution may have to act on the aggressive and not on the defensive. They may have to insist, with some authority to support them, that at least the administration of the country upon which our national existence depends shall not be subject to the whims and impulses even of a well-meaning electorate.

W. F. WYNDHAM BROWN.

VII. THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

THE

HE right of the Crown to make peers, in order to meet a political crisis, having frequently been questioned in the recent Veto controversy, the right of the sovereign to withhold from a peer of the realm a writ of summons with the same object may fittingly be examined.

It may at once be stated that no one in strict law is entitled to be summoned to sit in the House of Lords at all, except a handful of personages under special statutes. But by custom, and by custom alone, certain persons, by virtue of their status, may be summoned to sit in Parliament if the King so wills. Who, then, are those persons? They are those who have already received writs of summons and who have taken their seats in the House of Lords and the heirs