a ward of such city or village to a township or village in the same county, or from a township or village to a ward of a city or village in the same county, or from one township to another in the same county, shall have the right to vote in such township, village or ward of a city or village without having resided therein the length of time so prescribed by such section."

It will be observed that there is in neither of the above sections reference to a precinct. In connection with the above provisions consideration must be given also to the provisions of Section 4906, G. C., in reference to entries required to be made in the registration of electors, that:

"In the column as to 'term of residence,' the periods of years and months of his residence in the precinct and state must both be stated."

This provision would indicate an intention on the part of the legislature that the length of time of residence in the precinct was an element to be considered in determining the qualifications of an elector. An opposite conclusion would, however, be suggested from a consideration of Section 4941 G. C., relative to registration of electors for special elections, wherein it is provided in subdivision 2 thereof, that:

"2. The registrars shall deliver certificates of cancellation to any registered elector who is not the head of a family and who may apply to them to cancel his registration on account of his removal from the precinct in which he was registered to another precinct, and they shall receive such certificate from any elector presenting it, and allow him to register, if he be otherwise qualified, in the precinct to which he has removed, if on the day of election he will have been an actual resident in such ward for twenty days immediately preceding such election."

Here it will be observed that the legislature clearly recognized the distinction between a precinct and ward and specifically declared that the registrars shall receive certificates of cancellation from any elector presenting it and allow him to register if he be otherwise qualified in the precinct to which he has removed, if on the day of election he will have been an actual resident in such ward for twenty days, thus making the determinating element for consideration the period of residence in the ward as distinguished from that of a residence in the precinct.

Section 5061 G. C., 106 O. L., 323, to which reference is made in the above inquiry, requires that when an elector is challenged

on the ground that he is not a resident of the county or precinct where he offers to vote, the judge, or one of them, shall put to him, among others, the following question:

(2) Have you resided in this precinct for twenty days last past?

The apparent conflict between the provisions of Sections 4863, 4864 and 4941 G. C., supra, and those of Sections 4906 and 5061 G. C., 106 O. L., 323, it is believed, may be reconciled without doing violence to the language or purpose of either. It will be borne in mind that there may be more than one voting precinct in a township, yet the only statutory provision relative to the qualifications of electors in townships as to residence is the requirement that the elector shall have been a resident of the township twenty days prior to the election.

Electors in registration cities may not vote unless duly registered in the precinct in which they reside. The requirement of Section 4916 G. C., supra, that the register show the term of residence in the precinct, serves to give notice that the elector has, within the period of twenty days, become a resident of the precinct, if such is the fact, and gives opportunity for investigation as to the length of residence in the ward. Likewise the answer to the second question in Section 5061 G. C., above quoted, serves to show whether the elector has come into the precinct in which he seeks to vote within the period of twenty days preceding the day of the election, and in connection with other facts may be of weight in determining whether the elector has been a resident of the ward for a period of twenty days next preceding the date of the election.

In view of the absence of reference to the period of residence in the precinct in Sections 4863 and 4864 G. C., supra, and the clear recognition of the distinction between wards and precincts in Section 4941 G. C., supra, and the explicit declaration therein that an elector shall be allowed to register if he will have been an actual resident of such ward for twenty days immediately preceding a special election, I am of opinion, in answer to your second question, that the qualification of an elector as to residence is required to be determined from the length of time he has resided in the ward of a city, as distinguished from the period of residence in the precinct in which he seeks to vote and that it was not the purpose of either Section 4906 or of Section 5061 to require that an elector should reside in a precinct the full period of twenty days next preceding the day of the election at which he seeks to vote in order that he may be qualified to vote in such precinct.

A Male Person Who Was Born on the 8th Day of November, 1895, and Who Is Possessed of all the Other Requisite Qualifications of an Elector Prescribed by Law, Will Be Entitled to Vote at the Election Which Will Be Held on the 7th Day of November, 1916.

No. 1988-(Opinion Dated October 20, 1916.) Hon. Charles Q. Hildebrant, Secretary of State, Columbus, Ohio. Dear Sir: Yours under date of October 16, 1916, is as follows: "We are herewith submitting to you for an opinion the following question, to-wit:

'A man was born on the 8th day of November, 1895. Is he entitled to vote on the 7th day of November, 1916?'"

The qualifications of electors are prescribed by Section 1 of Article V of the constitution of Ohio, as follows:

"Every white male citizen of the Urited States, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a resident of the state one year next preceding the election, and of the county, township or ward, in which he resides, such time as may be provided by law, shall have the qualifications of an elector, and be entitled to vote at all elections."

It should be here observed that the word "white" in the foregoing constitutional provision is rendered inoperative and of no effect by Section 1 of Article XV of the constitution of the United States.

The question above submitted involves the calculation or determination of the age of a person who was born on the 8th day of November, 1895, on the 7th day of November, 1916.

From the above constitutional provision it is conclusive that if it be determined that the person in question has all the other requisite qualifications of an elector and is on the 7th day of November, 1916, twenty-one years of age, he shall be entitled to vote at any election held on such date.

The calculation of the age of persons is subject to the general common law rule that consideration will not be given to a fraction of a day and from the application of this rule if it be determined that a person otherwise qualified as an elector shall become twentyone years of age at any moment of a particular day, such person will, in legal contemplation, be for all purposes twenty-one years of age for and during the entire day. So that if the person in question shall be determined to attain the age of twenty-one years at any moment within the 7th day of November, 1916, such per

son will, in contemplation of law, be twenty-one years of age for all purposes during that entire day.

In 1 Am. & Eng. Ency., 927 (2nd Ed.), it is stated:

"By a large number of authorities it is said that an infant attains the age of twenty-one years on the first moment of the day next before the twenty-first anniversary of his birthday, and this doctrine has the support of the United States cases. On the contrary, it is strongly argued that the precise period when one attains the age of twenty-one years is on the first moment of the twenty-first anniversary of his birthday and not on the day preceding."

Cited in support of the first above stated rule are a number of cases, among which are those hereafter noted.

In the case of Ross vs. Morrow, 85 Tex., 172, it is stated in the syllabus:

"Edward Ross was born April 17, 1860. He became of age on April 16, 1881. Suit was filed for land adversely held in the interval April 16, 1886. Held, that the five years' adverse possession, and in which he had a right to recover, ended on the 15th of April, and that the action was barred."

In Erwin vs. Benton, 120 Ky., 536, it is held:

"One who was born on June 9, 1883, was entitled to vote at an election on June 8, 1904. In law a man is twenty-one years old on the day preceding his twenty-first birthday."

In Wells vs. Wells, 6 Ind., 447, the court held:

"A minor attains twenty-one years on the day preceding the twenty-first anniversary of his birth."

Similar holdings of the court will also be found in the case of State vs. Clarke, 3 Harr. (Del.), 557, and in the case of In re Griffiths, 1 Culp (Pa.), 157.

A different rule prevails in Louisiana, as shown by the case of State ex rel Flemming vs. Joyce, 123 La., 638, the court there following the civil law as distinguished from the common law rule adhered to in the above noted cases in the computation of the ages of persons.

I am not aware that the question submitted has been passed upon by any court in this state, but for the reasons above suggested and upon the authority cited I am of the opinion that a man born on the 8th day of November, 1895, will become twenty-one years of age on the 7th day of November, 1916. Whether he will

have arrived at such age on the first moment of that day or on the last moment of that day is not material here to consider.

I am therefore of opinion, in answer to your question, that a male person who was born on the 8th day of November, 1895, and who is possessed of all the other requisite qualifications of an elector prescribed by law, will be entitled to vote at the election which will be held on the 7th day of November, 1916.

After the Number of Constables Have Been Designated and Elected According to Law in Any Township and No Vacancy Has Occurred in That Office, There Is No Authority in the Township Trustees to Appoint an Additional Constable for Any Purpose. Township Trustees May Not Appoint Constables Except to Fill Vacancies as Provided in Sections 3329 and 12199, General Code, and Persons Whom the Trustees Have Attempted to Otherwise Appoint to Such Office Are Without Authority to Perform the Functions and Duties of the Same and Are Not Entitled to the Fees Allowed by Law for the Official Services of Regularly Elected or Appointed Constables. Where Upon an Examination, the Bureau of Inspection and Supervision of Public Offices Finds That Such Fees Have Been Illegally Collected, the Report of Such Examination Should Set Forth All Such Costs So Charged and Collected by or on Behalf of Such Constable, Together With All the Facts Relating to His Alleged Appointment. A Finding for Recovery Is, However, Unauthorized.

No. 1989-(Opinion Dated October 20, 1916.) The Bureau of Inspection and Supervision of Public Offices, Columbus, Ohio.

lows:

Gentlemen: Yours under date of October 13, 1916, is as fol

"Please let us have your written opinion on the following propositions at an early date:

"Statement of facts upon which the following questions are based: It is alleged that in July, 1915, the trustees of Marion township, Franklin county, Ohio, appointed one John F. Gilson as constable, to arrest violators of the motor vehicle speed laws, but the minutes of said board do not disclose any record of said action. Moreover, there was no vacancy existing in the office of constable.

"The bond of said appointee, which is on file with the township clerk, however, shows that it was approved by two of said trustees, evidenced by their names signed thereto, but said