1 This and other statistical information has been taken from the records of the United States Geological Survey, Department of Commerce, Engineering and Mining Journal, and the Frankfurter Metallgesellschaft. Excludes lead in manufactures exported with benefit of drawback amounting to about 10,500 tons annually prior to the war; 5,000 tons annually during the war, and about 2,000 tons in 1919. compete in other markets, is protected under the Underwood tariff by a 25 per cent duty upon the metal in various semi-finished and finished forms and three-fourths of a cent per pound on lead contained in imported ores. This is greater protection than that enjoyed by the copper and zinc industries; in fact, greater than that accorde any other important metal. Australia, Spain, Germany and Mexico furnish strong competition for export trade in lead, and have been able to produce the metal at a cost equal to if not lower than that in the United States. Now they, with the exception of Mexico, can also benefit by exchange rates. SITUATION IN ZINC EXPORTS NOT ENCOURAGING The zinc trade of the United States closely parallels that of lead. In prewar years exports of zinc from domestic ores were small; from 1910 to 1913 inclusive they averaged about 6,300 tons annually, or little over 2 per cent of the domestic production, as the following table illustrates. The war demands for zinc, however, were so insistent upon a large supply of this useful metal that domestic exports increased to 163,100 tons in 1916 and to 153,800 tons in 1917, and although there was a sharp drop to 80,200 tons in 1918, a rise took place the following year to 129,500 tons, chiefly on account of the idleness of one of the world's great zinc producers in Australia. The record for 1920 appears well in the aggregate, 86,000 tons, but when it is considered that during the last five months of 1920 exports had tapered off to a rate of about 500 tons monthly, it is likely that a reversion to a pre-war scale will take place quickly. As in the lead industry, much zinc From Domes-From Foreign and Sheets) From Domes- From Foreign 1 There were also imports of zinc in ore, which is sufficiently accounted for under production from foreign ores. 2 Includes zinc in manufactures exported with benefit of drawback amounting to about 4,100 tons annually prior to the war, 3,900 tons annually during the war and 4,500 tons in 1919. material is imported to be manufactured and later exported, the net result of the operation being to avoid the payment of duty. Similarly, the domestic zinc consumption is normally a little below domestic production, and the industry is quite flexible and able to meet sudden demands put upon it. The zinc trade in the United States enjoyed unprecedented prosperity during the war, when remarkably high prices were reached and unusually large exports were made, but it is doubtful if a considerable proportion of this foreign trade can be held and highly probable that the 'condition of the industry will revert closely to the pre-war status, not only because of the difficulties that beset export trade in general-chiefly financial considerations--but owing to the lower costs of other zinc-producing countries. Australia, Germany and Belgium are rapidly regaining their strength, eager to furnish competition in international markets. The paralysis of the Australian zinc industry, due to prolonged labor troubles, has passed, and already this strong competitor is influencing the international market. Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, France and Australia have well-established zincsmelting industries, and they will do everything to facilitate a return to former conditions. The zinc trade in the United States has a slightly better opportunity than the lead trade to expand its exports, judging from past records, but it faces a difficult problem -one that can be solved only as the general solution to the problem of export trade is found and domestic costs are lowered. Competition was at a minimum during the war, and its full force has not been felt by the American industry for many years. The tariff on zinc is 15 per cent on ores, slabs, blocks and pigs-less protection than the lead industry enjoys, and yet not sufficient to prevent the frequent talk of and actual importation of zinc for consumption in the United States. Germany, by the terms of the peace treaty and the probable loss of Silesian deposits and smelting plants, will not be able to hold second place in the zinc industry. The supply of German ore will be cut down two-thirds, and considering that Australian concentrates formerly shipped to Germany are being diverted elsewhere, the most logical source of importation of concentrates is the United States or Mexico. At all events, the best opportunity facing the American zinc export trade lies in supplying the Central Powers, but what measure of success will reward attempts to enter this field-Germany was formerly the second largest consumer of zinc in the world-will depend almost entirely on the attitude that the Germans adopt to the restoration of their industry and the facilities granted that almost bankrupt country by financial interests. No concerted attempt is being made by the zinc trade to attack the problem systematically through an export association similar to that of the copper producers, and the industry is not any too well organized to know how it stands with other countries, particularly in respect to costs and the technology of production. It has been frequently pointed out that there is an unhealthy secretiveness in the industry and an unwillingness individually to coöperate in lowering costs. Such an attitude will not help the industry in expanding its foreign trade, thereby benefiting itself and country. Perhaps also, because no organized attempt has been made by the American zinc trade to develop foreign markets, export trade in normal years was relatively unimportant. The obstacles to foreign zinc trade loom large, but would undoubtedly repay study in the endeavor to surmount them. EXPORT TRADE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE COPPER INDUSTRY There remains for discussion one other metal of the group, the most important from the standpoint of production, utility and export trade of all of the non-ferrous metals— copper. Its position has grown stronger and more important with the development of the world's electrical industry, concurrently with the giant strides that have been made in the progress of using years before the war accounted for well over 60 per cent of the world's refinedcopper production. This, however, includes the imports of crude copper from Canada, Mexico and South American countries, shipped to this country to be refined. However, the copper production of the United States itself has for many years been the largest in the world, and there is little probability of this leadership being lost. Compared with the relatively stationary production of other countries, the growth of United States copper production has been phenomenal. It is striking that the nation's agricultural and mineral wealth in each of four important commodities, corn, cotton, petroleum and copper, is greater than that of any other country and that in each product foreign trade developed through the superabundance of our own natural resources and an effectiveness of labor which resulted in trade with other countries willing and anxious to consume this American produce. As copper is an indispensable metal in modern life, our export trade in that metal has been a natural development of the effort of other countries to procure an adequate supply. With the vast resources available, it has been easy for the American copper industry to respond to any demand put upon it, whether a normal yearly growth in consumption or an acute war appeal. Furthermore, the heavy investment of American capital in South American copper mines, and the concentration of the refining of South American, Canadian and Mexican copper on the Atlantic seaboard, have helped to bring the world's copper market into the hands of the United States producers, whereas during the greater part of the nineteenth century the world's copper market was controlled by Great Britain. The set of curves on page 71 indicates the world's production of refined cop Production of Refined Copper in the World and in the United States and the Exports of Refined Copper from the United States, 1880-1920 per and the production of refined copper and the copper exports of the United States. In pre-war years, as the curves show, well over half the refined copper produced in the United States was exported. In 1917, an important war year in which every effort was being made to speed production, the ratio of exports was lower-about 45 per cent; in 1919, 29.1, and in 1920, about 34 per cent. The decline was sufficiently pronounced to disturb the industry seriously, as the domestic consumption was in no condition to take up production on a war scale. This is well illustrated by the troubles of the largest copper mines in the United States-the "porphyries" which are essentially large-scale producers and have lowest costs when producing at maximum capacity. The success of their operation hinges largely on a tremendous daily output of ore, so that a difficult problem is presented in obtaining the proper flexibility of production required to meet conditions. Immediately after the armistice, November 11, 1918, the copper producers were advised by the Government to maintain production at the war rate on the ground that an armistice did not imply a complete and ultimate cessation of hostilities. Acting upon this advice, production was maintained at 100 per cent of capacity to the end of the year-a short period after the Government had relinquished its interest in the copper industry's activities. It was virtually impossible to curtail output as quickly as might have been desired. A lessening of demand ensued, which, coupled with the reduc |