promise to investigate and make due reparation. As an earnest of the purpose to make amends the Spanish authorities ordered the release of the surviving passengers, but no apology or indemnity was paid until several months later. The affair thus became a long and tedious process of diplomatic negotiation which finally resulted in Spain making a conditional apology and in paying an indemnity of the small sum of $80,000. The "Virginius" was also surrendered, but while on the voyage north she encountered a storm off Hatteras and was wrecked, many persons declaring, however, that she had been made unseaworthy by the Spaniards with a view to her destruction. The $80,000 which Spain paid was for seizure and detention of the "Virginius," no part of which went to the relatives of those who were murdered, so the crime was in no sense avenged until Cervera's ships were destroyed and Santiago fell twenty-five years later. DIFFICULTIES AND PERILS OF THE HAVANA By J. & Charwick (Captain of the Cruiser "New York.") HE Havana blockade was a more anxious one than that of any of the neighboring ports, as there were two large, swift torpedo-boat destroyers in the harbor, and we naturally expected an attack by these. During the day we were in easy and plain sight, and we ourselves could distinguish the guns in the batteries, the men at work and, frequently, standing closer in, could look up the streets and somewhat into the harbor. At the first go-off the batteries were not so powerful but that we could have silenced them and kept them silenced with the ships we had, could the risk of injury to our heavier ships have been undergone. The fleet at Spain's disposal was too great a menace for this to be approved by the government, so that the batteries were left to grow and strengthen. Those on the lower ground to the west of the city, the last of which was some three miles distant from the harbor entrance, had but little westerly command, and at this time we could have parried both these and the city from the somewhat extensive bay at the head of which is the seaside resort of Marianao, formed by the sweep of the shore to the southward a mile or so west of the last battery. This southerly trend is sufficient to have enabled our ships to lie in comparative, if not absolute, safety and take the whole series of these batteries as far as Santa Clara (the first west of the entrance and the most powerful) with a flanking fire at from three to five miles. But this fire would have been a worriment rather than an injury to the A Temptation to Throw Heavy Shot. batteries, though immense destruction might have been dealt the city. The military effect might have not been commensurate with the expenditure of ammunition which, in the earlier stages of the war, it was important to economize. Besides, the ships most fitted for the service could have ill been spared from the blockading duty. Changes from the monotony of the first established blockade came quickly. It was but a fortnight from our starting from Key West that the larger part of our heavy ships was on its way to San Juan. By this time we had been numerously reinforced by revenue vessels, lighthouse tenders, yachts and tugs-excellent material for the duty on which all had been, which did not require battleships. A commodore (Watson) had been appointed afloat, and another (Remey) was in command of our base at Key West. Cervera was due on this side of the Atlantic, and the great question was to meet and bring him to action. To Commodore Watson was left the covering of the Havana blockade, while Sampson went eastward in search of the Spanish fleet. San Juan was locked in and bombarded. Cervera not being there, Sampson at once returned on his tracks, arriving at Key West to find the flying squadron, which went on to Cienfuegos, reinforced by the "Iowa." The commander-in-chief, with all the rest of his force, once again joined the Havana blockading force, but moved the greater part of it eastward to oppose Cervera's advance from that direction, the latter having already been heard of as being finally in Santiago de Cuba. The flying squadron had been ordered there from Cienfuegos, but on hearing that the commodore in command proposed returning to Key West for coal, the commander-in-chief was directed to go to Santiago, where he arrived June I with the "New York," "Oregon," " Mayflower" and the torpedo boat "Porter." This sudden transferrence of interest from Havana to Santiago brought an entirely new phase to the blockade. The heavy fighting ships, with few exceptions, and these chiefly the monitors, were before the latter port, and there then ensued a month of wearisome and toilsome watching . against the escape of the caged squadron. As this was the blockading of a hostile squadron and not of a port particularly, for which, in fact, we had no uses and which was of no military importance, it differed widely in its methods from what had gone before. The commander-in-chief immediately upon his arrival tested the strength of the batteries, with a view to sending in close the battleships with their searchlights at night. The ships were drawn round the narrow entrance with their heads toward it, ready to assault at once the enemy should he appear. Watch Dogs Before Santiago's Gateway. At nightfall a battleship moved in to between one and two miles and fixed a searchlight up the narrow cañon which serves as a channel to the deep inner bay, which is invisible from outside. On her port hand was another battleship ready to fire in case anything appeared. The one showing the searchlight was relieved every two and a-half hours, so that as there were usually but three the duty fell very heavily, and was one of much anxiety to the captains. The crews had chiefly to sleep in the superstructure on account of the great heat, and though no serious injuries to the ship were apprehended from gun fire the men were practically unprotected. Fortunately, they were not fired upon, and the month passed without the loss of a life from the carrying out of this duty. The remaining vessels of the squadron drew close in to the searchlight ship, and inside this latter were stationed three small vessels of the "Gloucester" class, and within these again and close under the Morro three steam launches as pickets. These last were frequently subjected to musketry fire, but no one was injured. The attempted closing of the entrance by the sinking of the "Merrimac" was at once seen to be a failure, on account of her getting too far in, and the persistent searchlight was the only thing which prevented the sortie of Cervera at night. They found it impossible to come out in face of the blinding glare which made it impossible to navigate the narrow channel, which was so lighted that the smallest boat could not cross without our knowledge. This use of the searchlight was certainly one of the basic elements of our success. Had the Spanish Admiral succeeded in coming out at night, the chances of at least some of his ships escaping would have been immensely greater than during the day, and that the war might end quickly it was necessary that none should get away. In the meantime, so many ships had been drawn to the vicinity of Santiago that blockade running became very active on the south coast west of Santa Cruz. Small vessels from Mexico and from other Spanish-American ports in the Gulf and from Jamaica were constantly increasing in number, using Batabano particularly as a point of delivery. This, however, was soon blocked, and the entire length of some 500 miles was patrolled by a number of our lighter ships, making communication so hazardous that all attempts had practically ceased by the end of hostilities. One of the last ships making the effort was the fine transatlantic steamer "Santo Domingo," which was driven ashore and burned by the "Eagle" near Cape Frances. Her destruction practically ended the blockade running of this section. Further east the inner waters of this great stretch of reefs were harried by a detail of vessels, some five or six of which were constantly on the station, and which, in addition to ordinary blockade duty, did most effective and gallant service in the bombardinent of Manzanillo and the sinking there of the Spanish gunboats on that station by the "Wilmington," "Helena," "Manning," "Hist" and "Hornet." The occupation of Guantanamo Bay was an easement to the southern blockade, the benefit of which can scarcely be measured. It at once became our coaling and repair station for the entire southern coast. Coaling at sea is at best but a difficult makeshift. It can be done, but, as a rule, it was wearisomely slow and was dangerous to both collier and cruiser. Guantanamo gave opportunity to coal and overhaul at the same time, and this, for the smaller ships especially, was of the utmost importance. Had hostilities continued, a coaling station would have also been established further west, and we should thus have had Key West, Guantanamo Bay, and a third (probably the Isle of Pines) in the 2,000 miles ellipse of the blockade. T PEACE. BY FRANKLIN TRUSDELL. HE Pride of the Antilles bowed her head, 'Twas then that a greater power arose, A voice called "Halt" to Cuba's foes, |