the Spanish nation did not provoke the war. And even if the fortune of war has been against this nation, I understand that our territory other than Cuba is not to be considered as the spoils of the victor. I will be very grateful to you if you inquire into the probable attitude of the President on he question of Porto Rico and the Philippines. If the ideas of the President are in conformity with those of this government, we beg you to hasten the demand for the suspension of hostilities, which this government desires to obtain for the sake of alleviating hunger in the West Indies and to prevent further massacres in the Philippines. If you and the President can put yourselves in accord the armistice can be immediately proclaimed. Try to avoid anything which would produce any unpleasant feeling should the matter have to be considered by an international congress. The most rapid plan would be that each government should nominate a commission to confer in some neutral city, and the most eligible place I believe, would be Paris. I congratulate you on the skill, industry and intelligence you have thus far shown in the conduct of the negotiations, and I promise you that the gratitude of this nation will be in just proportion to your ability and merit. ALMODOVAR DEL RIO. The next note from the Spanish Ambassador to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Madrid had this gloomy forecast: Ambassador Cambon states that he has understood from authentic sources that the hostilities will continue with vigor till peace is a reality, as the American Government and the people are afraid of the diplomatic delays which may be practiced on them by Spain. They fear that Spain may take advantage of these delays to recover some of her lost force and recover some of her lost ground. Following is a translation of the message sent to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs by Ambassador Cambon : WASHINGTON, July 31. SENOR DUKE :-As I announced to you in my previous telegram, the President invited me to make observations on the petition formulated by the United States. I insisted on the distinction which should be made between the question of Cuba, initial Only Through His cause of the Spanish-American conflict, and the new question which has Emotions Was resulted from the operations of the war. In reference to Cuba, I answered McKinley Moved. that Spain is disposed to make all the necessary concessions to bring about peace; Spain persists in feeling for the island the dangers of a premature independence. The Americans recognize this, because the general commanding the American army of invasion would not permit his Cuban allies to enter the city of Santiago. Passing to Article No. 3, I said that this was put forth for the especial purpose of endangering in Spain the success of the peace negotiations, and this would be especially true if between the words intervention and government of the Philippines the word "possession" be inserted, which would put in doubt from the instant of its introduction into the document the sovereignty of Spain. "You will observe," said the President, "that my petitions in referring to the first two articles do not admit of discussion. I leave to future negotiations the care and consideration of the Philippine question. If the American forces retain their position it is because of the obligation I owe to the residents and the foreign population." Seeing that the President was firm in his determination not to modify the third article, I made a play upon his emotions, and he was visibly moved, and disregarding the opposition of Secretary Day, the President ordered that the word "possession" should be stricken out and replaced by the word "disposition." This does not prejudice the result of the negotiations. When the President had made the desired change in the article, he spoke very familiarly with me, and expressed much sorrow that Spain had not sued immediately for peace after the battle of Cavite. The conditions, the President said, would be different, and the war could have been brought to a close without the very great loss which Spain must now suffer. The President told me that if Spain declined to agree to Article 3 she would have to submit to still greater loss, and he begged of me to make this clearly understood at Madrid. Obeying your instructions, I made the attempt to secure the immediate suspension of hostilities. The best that I could do was to secure from the President the promise that hostilities would be suspended as soon as the Government at Madrid should make known its willingness to accept the American terms. He desired to know if I had authority to act for Spain in the matter of suspension of hostilities, and I answered yes. The conference lasted for two and one-half hours. I have done my best to deserve your confidence, and have done my utmost to defend the interests of Spain. With sorrow that I could not obtain greater concessions, but fearing that the determination of the American Government to humble Spain cannot be swerved, I am, your obedient servant, JULES CAMBON. Up to this time Cambon represented the Government of Spain through the French Government, but from this date on he was the direct representative at Washington of the Government of Spain. Ambassador Cambon tried to do as Duke Almodovar del Rio cabled him, and this is his report of what happened : I have informed the President that the Spanish Government considers the demands of the American Government as excessively rigorous. They consider the necessity of ceding Porto Rico as a war indemnity a very great hardship. I told him that this island had never been in dispute between Spain and the United States and had not been an element in the conflict. I asked him to accept other territory as compensation. President and Secretary Day Seemed Disappointed That Spain Accepted Terms. As I expected, Mr. McKinley showed inflexibility, and repeated that the Philippine question was the only one which had not been already settled in his mind. I took up this point and begged the President to state to me his intentions as far as possible concerning the Philippines. On this point I said that the terms of the United States as written might be construed to mean that Spanish sovereignty in the Philippine archipelago was at an end. Mr. McKinley answered: "I will not leave you in error on this subject. The commissioners of the two countries will determine the Philippine question-will settle the question as to which shall be the governing nation there." He said "that the Government of Spain could rest assured that up to the present time I have formed no conclusion on this matter and have formed no resolve against Spain." This cablegram concluded with this sizing up of the situation by the Ambassador : I have said before that the President of the United States will remain firm in his position, and taking into consideration that Your Excellency asks my personal opinion, I cannot do less than persist in the assertion that each new symptom of vacillation or delay will bring about a more serious condition and bring more rigorous terms. JULES CAMBON. The birth of the protocol is described in a message from Cambon to the Duke under date of August 10: The President and his Secretary of State appeared to be much disappointed that Spain accepted the terms, it seeming to be apparent that they thought that Spain would reject the terms that America might have greater excuse for forcing the war to the Rejection of Spain's end. After a long silence Mr. McKinley said: "I asked of Spain the immediate cession and evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico. Instead of sending to me a categoric reply I am given a general note. The Spanish Government declares that it cannot give the answer I desire until the Cortes has been consulted. I cannot consider such a proposition." All my observations were futile. The President was firm. Seeing that he was at the point of ending the interview and breaking off peace negotiations, I begged him to tell me what security he could offer Spain as to his sincerity. He replied: "There is only one way to conclude this series of errors and delays, and that was to draft a protocol which should include the conditions demanded by the United States and to which Spain must agree if she be sincere in her protestations of desire for peace." The protocol will be shown to me to-morrow, and there is no doubt that the terms will be strict and rigorous, and I am persuaded that the President cannot be induced to modify the American pretensions. I tell you frankly that if Spain does not accept the protocol promptly she need expect no lenity from the victors. They are determined upon the utter humiliation of Spain, and the success of their arms encourages them to believe that they can obliterate the kingdom. CAMBON. The protocol was signed immediately and Spain named her commissioners. Then follow in the Red Book the cablegrams which show the frantic efforts of Spain to hold the Philippines and its plea for permission to use the Spanish troops there against the Philippine rebels. The downfall of these hopes is chronicled in a cablegram from Cambon. The Red Book contains the full text of the protest which the Spanish Government made in which Spain seeks to prove that Admiral Dewey's communications to the War Department concerning the condition of the families of Spanish prisoners were false. An attack is made against Admiral Dewey in the allegation Spanish Protests and Charges Against Dewey. that his conduct proves him to be an accomplice of the Tagals. Spain insists that it is in possession of authentic reports which contradict those received from Admiral Dewey. These prisoners held by the Tagals are subjected to barbarous and cruel treatment by the natives and their condition becomes each day more pitiable. Spain cites news received by American newspapers which corroborate its own reports. The protest recites that the official relations existing between the American admiral and Aguinaldo, chief of the Tagal insurgents, are suspiciously close. It maintains that most of the Spanish prisoners are held in territory over which American troops exercise authority. The charge is made that Admiral Dewey himself turned over to the Tagals certain Spaniards taken prisoners of war. The note begs that in the name of humanity the American Government cause the liberation of the prisoners. Secret telegram No. 133, on page 175 of the Red Book, is an interesting one from Blanco, Governor-General of Cuba. The dispatch was sent to the Minister of the Colonies on October 7. It follows: The president of our commission informs me that he fears the Americans do not quite correctly understand the meaning of the word evacuation. It is the opinion of the Americans that evacuation means that not only the military and naval forces in Cuba, but the civil functionaries as well, shall divorce themselves from Blanco's Struggle the island. Our commissioners have sought to enlighten the.Americans with the Evacuation as to the true definition of the word evacuation, but without success. Commission. I asked your opinion as to the best plan to enlighten the Americans. The Americans make the following statement: "The word evacuation as used in the protocol means that not only the military officers, but that the government officials employed in the civil administration shall leave this island." The Americans are very stubborn on this point. They also make the violent pretension that they shall keep all the artillery and particularly that mounted in the forts. They are distressingly firm in the pretension. We are at a loss as to how to influence them. There is no limit to their avarice. BLANCO. Those chosen officials of Spain whose privilege it has been to inspect this royal publication, have privately expressed the opinion that much of the important correspondence carried on by Spain with other governments during the war was not incorporated in the book. During the war the government gave out suggestions of intrigues with other governments with the aim of curbing the imperialism of the United States. It was suggested that a defensive and offensive alliance had been considered between Spain and Austria. This correspondence does not appear in the Red Book. This has awakened comment in Madrid, that the Spanish Minister either deluded the people with the glittering idea of a foreign alliance, or purposely suppressed correspondence of vital importance to the people of Spain. THE COURAGEOUS ACT OF ENSIGN GILLIS. And Also Some of the Gayeties of War When Danger is Greatest. HE amazing deeds of valor and execution by Dewey, Hobson, Schley and the army heroes at Santiago and Manila, are well preserved in permanent pages of history, but there was another whose deed was no less courageous but who has failed to receive the large measure of recognition that he deserves. Ensign Gillis was executive officer of the torpedo boat "Porter," which performed many daring exploits in Cuban waters, but the greatest was that which may be thus described : One dark night Admiral Cervera sent a destroyer out from Santiago harbor, and, whatever happened to the destroyer, the next morning some German torpedoes were floating around. "One," said Captain Fremont, of the "Porter," ," "was coming straight for my little boat. Do you know Gillis? Has nothing in his composition but plain nerve. I have to watch him all the time; but this time he was too quick for me. The torpedo was coming slowly; if it touched our side there would be nothing more for any of us except a bed under water. He had his shoes off and his coat before I knew it. 'Don't do it, Gillis; she's got her war nose on.' 'I'll unscrew it, sir,' said the boy, and over the side he went, threw his arms around the torpedo, headed it away from us, and then began feeling for its business end. Well, the air-cock opening, the torpedo dived from the ensign's arms to the bottom." It was a consoling as well as encouraging feature of our war with Spain that our soldiers and sailors, while doing their grim duty in the face of the most serious obstacles, yet retained all the native Yankee humor for which our race is justly famous. When the North Atlantic squadron was still stationed at Key West, the resourceful blue-jackets of our monitors found diversion in organizing a unique series of bicycle races, held upon the cleared decks of those deadliest of naval fighting monsters. Later, when the blockade was established and one Spanish prize after another was caught in the meshes of Admiral Sampson's drag-net, the mirth of the whole fleet was aroused by the amusing capture of the Spanish auxiliary cruiser "Panama " by the light-house tender "Mangrove," the homeliest and most insignificant vessel of the fleet, and by the ludicrous capitulation of the Spanish captain and his crew to a single American ensign armed with a chaplain's revolver. Another similar contribution to the gayety of nations was when the British |