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HOW WE CAPTURED A BLOCKHOUSE.

"During the nineteen days of active campaign on the island Rico a large portion of the island was captured by the United Sta and brought under our control. The Spaniards had been de captured in the six different engagements which took place, and position they had occupied up to that time."

General Miles closes the report with praise for the manner the army behaved and with a recommendation to Congress for an in the army.

Theodore Boosevelt

(Lieutenant-Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General.)

O enter at once upon a description of the most important about Santiago in which my regiment participated betw first and seventeenth of July, 1898, I will state that on th ing of the first my regiment was formed at the head of the Brigade by what is known as the El Paso sugar mill. When C batteries opened, the Spaniards replied to us sharply with shrapnel, killed and wounded several of the men of my regiment. We then m towards the right, and crossed the ford before the balloon came dow and attracted the fire of the enemy, so at that point we lost no on orders had been to march forward until I should join General Lawton wing, but after going about three-quarters of a mile, I was halted and remain in reserve near the creek by a deep lane.

The bullets dropped thick among us for the next hour while there, and many of my men were killed or wounded. Among the was Captain O'Neill, whose loss was a very heavy blow to the regime he was a singularly gallant and efficient officer. Acting Lieutenant H was also shot at this time. He showed the utmost courage and had b great use during the fighting and marching.

My men were very impatient while in an exposed position and u to engage the enemy, and when at last orders were received to move fo in support of the regular cavalry, there was a cheer of relief and de

that manifested the sincere relief and satisfaction that was felt. In executing the orders given I advanced the regiment in column of companies, each company being deployed as skirmishers, as the exact location of the enemy was not yet known, except that we knew they were in force in the intrenchments ahead. Accordingly we moved through several skirmish lines of the regiment ahead of us, as it seemed to me our only chance was in rushing the intrenchments in front instead of firing at them from a distance.

Charging the
Blockhouse.

Accordingly we charged the blockhouse and intrenchments on the hill to our right against a heavy fire. It was taken in good style, the men of my regiment thus being the first to capture any fortified position and to break through the Spanish lines. The guidons of G and E troop were first at this point, but some of the men of A and B troops, who were with me personally, got in ahead of them. At the last wire fence up this hill I was obliged to abandon my horse, and after that we went on foot.

After capturing this hill we first of all directed a heavy fire upon the San Juan hill to our left, which was at the time being assailed by the regular infantry and cavalry, supported by Captain Parker's Gatling guns. By the time San Juan was taken, a large force had assembled on the hill we had previously captured, consisting not only of my own regiment, but of the Ninth and portions of other cavalry regiments.

We then charged forward under a very heavy fire across the valley against the Spanish intrenchments on the hill in the rear of San Juan hill, which we also took, capturing several prisoners. We then formed in whatever order we could and moved forward, driving the Spanish before us to the crest of the hills in front, which were immediately opposite the city of Santiago itself. Here I received orders to halt and hold the line on the hill's crest. I had at the time fragments of the Sixth Cavalry Regiment and an occasional infantryman under me-three or four hundred men all told. As I was the highest officer there I took command of all of them, and so continued till next morning.

The Spaniards attempted a counter attack that afternoon, but were easily driven back, and then, until after dark, we remained under a heavy fire from their rifles and great guns, lying flat on our faces on a gentle slope just behind the crest.

Throwing Away

Packs to Permit
Free Action.

Captain Parker's Gatling battery was run up to the right of my regiment and did most excellent and gallant service. In order to charge, the men had of course been obliged to throw away their packs, and we had nothing to sleep in and nothing to eat. We were lucky enough, however, to find in the last blockhouse captured the Spanish dinners, still cooking, which we ate with relish. They consisted chiefly of rice and peas, with a big pot containing a stew of fresh meat, probably for the officers. We also distributed the captured Spanish blankets as far as they would go among our men, and gathered a good deal of Mauser ammunition for use in the Colt rapid-fire guns, which were being brought up. That night we dug intrenchments across the front.

At three o'clock in the morning the Spaniards made another attack upon us, which was easily repelled, and at four they opened the day with a heavy rifle and shrapnel fire. All day long we remained under this, replying whenever we got the chance. In the evening, at about eight o'clock, the Spaniards fired three guns and then began a very heavy rifle attack, their skirmishers coming well forward.

I got all my men down into the trenches, as did the other command near me, and we opened a heavy return fire. The Spanish advance was at once stopped, and after an hour their fire died away. This night we completed most of our trenches and began to build bomb-proofs. The protection afforded our men was good, and the next morning I had but one man wounded from the rifle and shell fire until twelve o'clock, when the truce

came.

There were numerous Red Cross flags flying in various parts of the city, two of them so arranged that they directly covered batteries in our front and for some time were the cause of our not firing at them. The Spanish guerrillas were very active, especially in our rear, where they seemed by preference to attack the wounded men who were being carried on litters, the doctors and medical attendants with Red Cross flags on their arms, and the burial parties.

Shooting Our Men
After the Truce.

I organized a detail of sharpshooters and sent them out after the guerrillas, of whom they killed thirteen. Two of the men thus killed were shot several hours after the truce had been in operation, because, in spite of this fact, they kept firing upon our men as they went to draw water. They were stationed in the trees, as the guerrillas were generally, and, owing to the density of the foliage and to the use of smokeless powder, it was an exceedingly difficult matter to locate them.

For the next seven days, until the tenth, we lay in our line while the truce continued. We had continually to work at additional bomb-proofs and at the trenches, and as we had no proper supply of food and utterly inadequate medical facilities, the men suffered a good deal. The officers chipped together, purchased beans, tomatoes and sugar for the men, so that they

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might have some relief from the bacon and hard-tack. With a great deal of difficulty we got them coffee.

As for the sick and wounded, they suffered so in the hospitals when sent to the rear, for lack of food and attention, that we found it best to keep them at the front and give them such care as our own doctors could, but thirteen of our wounded men continued to fight through the battle, notwithstanding their injuries. In spite of their wounds also those sent to the rear, many of whom were both sick and wounded, came up to rejoin us as soon as their condition allowed them to walk.

On the tenth the truce was at an end and the bombardment reopened. As far as our lines were concerned, it was on the Spanish part very feeble. We suffered no losses, and speedily got the fire from their trenches in our front completely under control. On the eleventh we moved three-quarters of a mile to the right, the truce again being on. Nothing happened there, except we continued to watch and do our best to get the men, especially the sick, properly fed. Having no transportation, and being able to secure very little through the regular channels, we used anything we could find-captured Spanish cavalry horses, abandoned mules, some of which had been injured, but which our men took and cured; diminutive, skinny ponies purchased from the Cubans, etc. By these means and by the exertions of the officers we were able from time to time to get supplies of beans, sugar, tomatoes and even oatmeal, while from the Red Cross people we got an invaluable load of rice, cornmeal, etc. All of this was of the utmost consequence, not only for the sick, but for those nominally well, as the lack of proper food was telling terribly on the men. It was utterly impossible to get them clothes and shoes. Those they had were in many cases literally dropping to pieces.

On the seventeenth the city surrendered. On the eighteenth we shifted our location to the best camp we had had, but the march thither under the noonday sun told very heavily on our men, weakened by underfeeding and overwork, and the next morning 123 cases were reported to the doctor, and but half of the 600 men with which I landed four weeks before, were fit for duty, and these not fit to do anything like the work they could do then.

As we had but one wagon, the change necessitated leaving much of my stuff behind, with a night of discomfort, with scanty shelter and scanty food for the most of the officers and many of the men. Only the possession of the improvised pack train alluded to above, saved us from being worse.

HOW CERVERA'S SQUADRON WAS ANNIHILATED.

Story of the Bloody Sea Fight Before Santiago that Destroyed the Pride of the Spanish Navy.

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T is curious how little things often determine mighty results. After a patient and weary watch for many days under a tropic sun, surrounded by the most exhausting influences of climate, imperfectly fed, vigilant day and night, when the enemy moved it is a high tribute to my profession that it was simultaneously discovered by every ship that had been set to watch his pent up squadron.

Curiously enough, after the army had invested Santiago and the battle of July I had taken place, I was personally impressed with the idea that a critical stage in the proceedings had been reached, and on Saturday night, which preceded the Sunday of July 3, now so famous in our history, I felt sure that the enemy contemplated an immediate movement of some kind. This impression proved to be correct, and the only thing that prevented the movement was that the Spaniards, who had occupied the hill westward of Santiago, in order to lose no time in retiring upon the main column, had abandoned their blockhouses, six in number, which were immediately seized by American troops and burned. At that very moment, at 9.30 o'clock at night, the Spanish squadron was ready to get under way; but perceiving these blockhouses burning, they concluded that it was a signal to us, as there were six vessels in their squadron, and decided that they would defer their movement until morning. That was the critical moment in Admiral Cervera's life. It was a fatal decision. If he had attempted to come out at night he might have saved one vessel, but, making his exit in the daytime, that was utterly out of the question.

A Fatal
Mistake.

In one minute and thirty seconds after Cervera's four cruisers and two torpedo-boat destroyers appeared we opened fire upon them. It was the

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