rendered by Lieutenant John H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry, and the Gatling gun detachment under his command. The fighting continued at intervals until nightfall, but our men held resolutely to the positions gained at the cost of so much blood and toil.

I am greatly indebted to General Wheeler, who, as previously stated, returned from the sick list to duty during the period. His cheerfulness and aggressiveness were efficiently felt on this occasion, and the assistance he furnished at various stages of the battle proved to be the most useful.

My own health was impaired by over-exertion in the sun ard intense heat of the day before, which prevented me from participating as actively in the battle as I desired, but from a hill near my headquarters I had a general view of the battlefield, extending from El Caney on the right to the left of our

His Health
Impaired.

lines on San Juan hill.

General Duffield, with the Thirty-third Michigan, attacked Aguadores, as ordered, but was unable to accomplish more than to detain the Spaniards in that vicinity.

On the night of July 1, I ordered General Duffield, at Siboney, to send forward the Thirty-fourth Michigan and the Ninth Massachusetts, both of which had just arrived from the United States. These regiments reached the front the next morning.

All day on the second the battle raged with more or less fury, but such of our troops as were in a position at daylight held their ground, and Lawton gained a strong and commanding position on the right.

About 10 p. m. the enemy made a vigorous assault to break through our lines, but he was repulsed at all points.

The Battle
Renewed.

On the morning of the third the battle was renewed, but the enemy seemed to have expended his energy in the assault of the previous night, and the firing along the lines was desultory, until stopped by my sending the following letter within the Spanish lines.

If desired by you, this may be confirmed by your Excellency sending an officer under a flag of truce to Admiral Sampson and he can arrange a visit to the "Harvard," which will not sail until to-morrow, and obtain the details from Spanish officers and men aboard that ship.

3. Our fleet is now perfectly free to act, and I have the honor to state that unless a surrender be arranged by noon of the ninth instant, a bombardment of the city will be begun and continued with the heavy guns of our ships. The city is within easy range of these guns, the 8-inch being capable of firing 9,500 yards, the 13-inch of course much further. The ships can so lie that with a range of 8,000 yards they can reach the centre of the city.

4. I make this suggestion of a surrender purely in a humanitarian spirit. I do not wish to cause the slaughter of any more men either of your Excellency's forces or our own; the final result under circumstances so disadvantageous to your Excellency being a foregone conclusion.

5. As your Excellency may wish to make reference of so momentous a question to your Excellency's home government, it is for this purpose that I have placed the time of the resumption of hostilities sufficiently far in the future to allow a reply being received.

6. I beg an early answer from your Excellency.

I have the honor to be,

Your Excellency's obedient servant,

W. R. SHAFTER,

Major-General.

I was of the opinion that the Spaniards would surrender if given a little time, and I thought this result would be hastened if the men of their army could be made to understand they would be well treated as prisoners of war. Acting upon this presumption I determined to offer to return all the wounded Spanish officers at El Caney who were able to bear transportation and who were willing to give their paroles not to serve against the forces of the United States until regularly exchanged. This offer was made and accepted. These officers, as well as several of the wounded Spanish privates, twenty-seven in all, were sent to their lines under the escort of some of our mounted cavalry. Our troops were received with honors, and I have every reason to believe the return of the Spanish prisoners produced a good impression on their comrades.

A Lull in the Fighting.

The cessation of firing about noon on the third practically terminated the battle of Santiago; all that occurred after this time may properly be treated under the head of the siege that followed. After deducting the detachments retained at Siboney and Baiquiri to render those depots secure from attack, organizations held to protect our flanks, others acting as escorts and guards to light batteries, the members of the hospital corps, guards left in charge of blanket rolls, which the intense heat caused the men to cast aside before entering battle, orderlies, etc., it is doubtful if we had more than twelve thousand men on the firing line on July 1, when the battle was fiercest and when the important and strong positions of El Caney and San Juan were captured.

A few Cubans assisted in the attack at El Caney and fought valiantly, but their numbers were too small to materially change the strength, as indicated above. The enemy confronted us with numbers about equal to our own; they fought obstinately in strong and intrenched positions, and the results obtained clearly indicate the intrepid gallantry of the company, officers and men, and the benefits derived from the careful training and instruction given in the company in recent years in rifle practice and other battle exercises. Our losses in these battles were twenty-two officers and 208 men killed, and eighty-one officers and 1,203 men wounded; missing, seventy-nine. The missing, with few exceptions, reported later.

The arrival of General Escario at Santiago was not anticipated. General Garcia, with between four and five thousand Cubans, was entrusted with the duty of watching for and intercepting the reinforcements expected. This, however, he failed to do, and Escario passed into the city along on my extreme right, near the bay.

After the destruction of Cervera's fleet I again called on the Spanish commander to surrender. On the same date I informed Admiral Sampson that if he would force his way into the harbor the city would surrender without any further sacrifice of life. Commodore Watson replied that Admiral Sampson was temporarily absent, but that in his (Watson's) opinion the navy should not enter the harbor.

The strength of the enemy's position was such I did not wish to assault, if it could be avoided. An examination of the enemy's works, made after the surrender, fully justified the wisdom of the course adopted. The intrenchments could only have been carried with very great loss of life.

Suffering in the Trenches.

On the eleventh the surrender was again demanded. By this date the sickness in the army was increasing very rapidly, as a result of exposure in the trenches to the intense heat of the sun and the heavy rains. Moreover, the dews in Cuba are almost equal to rains. The weakness of the troops was becoming so apparent I was anxious to bring the siege to an end, but, in common with most of the officers of the army, I did not think an assault would be justifiable, especially as the enemy seemed to be acting in good faith in their preliminary propositions to surrender.

Arrival of General Miles.

July 12, I informed the Spanish Commander that Major-General Miles, commander-in-chief of the American Army, had just arrived in my camp, and requested him to grant us a personal interview on the following day. He replied he would be pleased to meet us. The interview took place on the thirteenth, and I in10imed him his surrender only could be considered, and that as he was withcut hope of escape he had no right to continue the fight. This hopeless condition was frankly admitted by General Toral, who after communicating to General Blanco his situation, surrendered his army, together with all the Spanish soldiers in the province of Santiago.

Before closing I wish to dwell upon the natural obstacles I had to encounter, and which no foresight could have overcome or obviated. The rocky and precipitous coast afforded no sheltered landing places, the roads were mere bridle paths, the effect of the tropical sun and rains upon unacclimated troops was deadly, and the dread of strange and unknown diseases had its effect on the army.

At Baiquiri the landing of the troops and stores was made at a small wooden wharf, which the Spaniards tried to burn, but unsuccessfully, and the animals were pushed into the water and guided to a sandy beach about two hundred yards in extent. At Siboney the landing was made on the beach, and a small wharf erected by the engineers.

Oh the Horrible Roads !

In spite of the fact that I had nearly one thousand men continuously at work on the roads, they were at times impassable for wagons. The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so as to prevent the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains with the command had to be depended upon for the victualing of my army, as well as the 20,000 refugees who could not, in the interests of humanity, be left to starve while we had rations. Often for days nothing could be moved except on pack trains.

The Sick and Wounded.

In reference to the sick and wounded, I have to say that they received every attention that it was possible to give them. The medical officers, without exception, worked night and day to alleviate the suffering, which was no greater than invariably accompanies a campaign. It would have been better if we had had more ambulances, but as many were taken as was thought were necessary, judging from previous campaigns.

GENERAL SHAFTER'S ADDRESS TO HIS ARMY.

W

HEN the perils were past, the victory won, and the graves were closed above the heroes who fell on bloody fields about Santiago, Major-General Shafter issued, under date of July 19, 1898, the following address to his victorious army:

"The successful accomplishment of the campaign against Santiago, resulting in its downfall and the surrender of the Spanish forces and the capture of large amounts of military stores, together with the destruction of the entire Spanish fleet in the harbor, which, upon the investment of the city, was forced to leave, is one of which this army can well be proud. This has been accomplished through the heroic deeds of the army, and to its officers and men the major-general commanding offers his sincere thanks, for their endurance of hardships heretofore unknown in the American army.

"The work you have accomplished may well appeal to the pride of your countrymen, and has been rivaled upon but few occasions in the world's history. Landing upon an unknown coast, you faced dangers in disembarking and overcame obstacles that, even in looking back, seem insurmountable.

"Seizing, with the assistance of the navy, the towns of Baiquiri and Siboney, you pushed boldly forth, gallantly driving back the enemy's outpost in the engagement of Las Quasima, and completed the concentration of the enemy near Sevilla, within sight of the Spanish stronghold at Santiago de Cuba. The outlook from Sevilla was one that might well have appalled the stoutest heart. Behind you ran a narrow road, made well nigh impassable by rains, while to the front you looked out upon high foothills covered with a dense tropical growth, which could only be traversed by bridle paths, terminating within range of the enemy's guns.

"Nothing deterred, you responded eagerly to the order to close upon the foe, and, attacking at Caney and San Juan, drove him from work to work until he took refuge within his last and strongest entrenchments, immediately surrounding the city.

"Despite the fierce glare of a Southern sun and rains that fell in torrents, you valiantly withstood his attempts to drive you from the position your valor had won. Holding in your vise-like grip the army opposed to you, after seventeen days of battle and siege, you were rewarded by the surrender of nearly 24,000 prisoners, 12,000 being those in your immediate