issue. Two survived A., the tenant for life of the real estate. Held, that the fund should be divided into six parts; the two children surviving A. taking each one, and the several sets of issue of the four children dying before the date of the will each taking one. - In re Sibley's Trusts, 5 Ch. D. 494.

2. Testator directed his trustees that his daughter M. should have the income of all his property after attaining 21, for her separate use for her life; and that if she lived to become marriageable, and die leaving a "child or children," said income should be applied "to the support and maintenance of such child," if only one, or, if more, to such children, for life," and in like manner to their children and children's children;" and, if the said M. died without being married, or left no child or children, or leaving children, "upon them or their families becoming extinct," then over. M. attained 21 without being married, and brought suit for immediate possession of the property on the ground that the limitations, except to her for life, were void for remoteHeld, that she took an estate for life, and not an estate tail in possession. The court would not say what would become of the property on the death of her children, if she had any. Hampton v. Holman, 5 Ch. D. 183. 3. Cutting cocks' combs to fit them for cock-fighting, or for winning prizes at exhibitions, held, to maintain an information that respondent did "cruelly ill-treat, abuse, or torture the birds," within 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, § 2, as the operation caused great pain. — Murphy v. Manning et al., 2 Ex. D. 307. See BONDS; CHARTER-PARTy, 1.

ness.

CONTRACT.

Contract to build school buildings to be finished by Dec. 25, in default of which the builders to forfeit £10 a week until the buildings were finished and delivered up. If the builders were prevented by bankruptcy, or any cause whatever, from completing the contract, the owners could terminate the contract, employ others to complete the work, and what had been paid the contractors should be held the full value of the buildings; and the material on the premises should be the property of the owners; and, finally, it was provided that," in case this contract be not in all things duly performed by the said contractors, they shall pay to" the owners "the sum of £1,000, as and for liquidated damages." Before Dec. 25 the builders went into bankruptcy; the trustees in bankruptcy for a time carried on the work, and finally threw up the contract; and the owners had the work finished by another builder, but not till after Dec. 25. Held, that the £1,000 was in the nature of a penalty, and the owners could only prove for the actual damage they had sustained from the non-performance of the contract. In re Newman. Ex parte Capper, 4 Ch. D. 724.

See COMPANY, 7; SALE, 3.

CONTRIBUTORY.

-See COMPANY, 3, 4.

COPYRIGHT.

If a dramatic piece has been first represented in a foreign country, the author has no exclusive right over the piece in England. Representation is

Covenant by M., the lessee of a lot of land, in 1853, that he, his executors, administrators, or assigns, would not do any thing upon the premises which might be an annoyance to the neighborhood or to the lessees or tenants of the lessor, their heirs or assigns, or diminish the value of the adjacent property; nor erect, or permit to be erected, on the lot any building nearer than twenty feet to the road; nor erect any building, messuage, or erection whatsoever, without first obtaining the consent thereto of the lessors, their heirs or assigns. Subsequently, in 1858, H. took a lease of an adjoining lot by indenture containing similar covenants. In 1876, the assigns of M. began, with the approval of the lessor, to put up a building which would obstruct the windows of H.'s assigns. On bill by H. to enjoin A. from erecting the building, and the lessor from allowing it, held, that B. was without remedy. - - Master v. Hansard, 4 Ch. D. 718.

See LEASE, 2.

See PARTNERSHIP, 3.

CREDITOR.
CUSTODY OF Deeds.

See TENANT FOR LIFE.

See COMPANY, 2; CONTRACT; MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

1. Testator devised his freehold property at M., in trust for his two children. He never had any freehold property at M., but had some in R., to which M. adjoined, and in the parish of which M. was, but no mention of any property in R. was made in the will. Held, that the freehold in R. descended to the heir-at-law, as being undisposed of. - Barber v. Wood, 4 Ch. D. 885.

2. Under a general devise charged with debts or legacies, estates held in fee by the testator as trustee do not pass. In re Bellis's Trusts, 5 Ch. D. 504. DIRECTORS. See COMPANY, 1, 6; ULTRA VIRES.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS.

- See HUSBAND AND WIFE. EASEMENT. See COVENANT.

ELECTION.

In 1848, P. & Son by deed covenanted to pay to trustees named therein a sum not exceeding £15,000 advanced and to be advanced to them by P.'s wife, in trust for such persons as she should by will or deed appoint, and, in default thereof, for her separate use for life. In 1851, by deed containing no power of revocation, she appointed that, after her and her husband's deaths,

the funds should be held for the benefit of her two sons and her two daughters, in equal fourths; the daughters for life, remainder to their "children." In 1863, the advances had been more than £15,000; and the wife undertook by a third deed, also containing no power of revocation, to revoke the appointment of 1851, appointed the trust fund of 1848, and £20,000 more advanced to the firm by her, after the death of herself and her husband, to her children as before. The husband died in 1865. Subsequently, in 1865 and 1866, the wife undertook to make alterations in the appointments of 1843, also by deeds without power of revocation. In 1867, she made a will, undertaking to revoke all her appointments; gave her real estate to her son J., subject to a payment of £10,000 to her son W. She gave and appointed all her interest as it stood on the books of the firm of P. & Son, and certain railroad stock specified, and all the residue of her personal estate, in trust to her two daughters for life, remainder to their "children or remoter issue." She had at this time a balance on the firm books in her favor; and the railroad stock, amounting to £10,000, had been purchased by the firm, by her direction, from a portion of the balance to her credit on said books. In 1873, the son J. died, leaving children and a will dated 1867, by which he left all the real estate to which he was or should be in any way entitled at his death to his oldest son. In 1874, the wife died, possessed of real estate of greater value than the amount she had appointed to her son J., in 1851, and of personal estate exceeding the £35,000 appointed in 1848 and 1863, as aforesaid; but she had only £10,000 in railroad stock. After her death, the £10,000 mentioned in her will was paid to W. The two daughters above named both had children. The action was begun to obtain a declaration of the rights of the various parties under the deeds and the will. Held, that all persons claiming under the will were bound to elect between the benefits conferred by the deeds and those conferred by the will; that J.'s estate must elect and make good to the disappointed legatees what was meant for them in the will; and that the real estate left to J. by his mother was liable for this amount, exclusively. As to the rights created under the deed of 1863, if any, no decision would be made, as it might prejudice the interests of the children of the daughters thereunder. — Pickersgill v. Rodgers, 5 Ch. D. 163.

the pur

1. Action for possession of real estate. Plaintiff proved that W., chaser, died in 1868 seised in fee, without issue and intestate; that the descendants of W.'s paternal grandfather were all dead, and that plaintiff was heir-at-law of W.'s paternal grandmother. He put in evidence wills and other documents, in which no mention was made of anybody of nearer kin than plaintiff, except those proved to be dead. On W.'s death, an advertisement was put in the newspapers for his heir-at-law; but nobody able to prove any thing came forward, except the coheiresses of the mother of W., to whom the defendants had attorned. The defendants showed, by wills and other documents, that the father of W.'s paternal grandfather was J. W.; that he

had another son, N., alive in 1755; and he had a sister, Mrs. M., a widow, and alive in 1755; and that the wife of J. W. was S. B. The defendants claimed that the plaintiff should give some evidence as to the extinction of these lines of descent which were preferable to his own. Held, that there was evidence for the jury to find for the plaintiff. - Greaves v. Greenwood et al., 2 Ex. D. 289.

2. By 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, § 2, the parties to a suit for breach of promise of marriage may give evidence; but no plaintiff shall recover, "unless his or her testimony shall be corroborated by some other material evidence in support of such promise." Plaintiff swore that the defendant, by whom she was with child, had promised to marry her, and he denied it. Her sister testified that she upbraided him for his conduct; and he said he would marry her, and give her any thing," but he must not be exposed. After plaintiff was brought to bed, the sister said she overheard him offer her money to go away, and the plaintiff said to him, "You always promised to marry me, and you don't keep your word." The jury found for the plaintiff for £100. Held, that there was not sufficient evidence, according to the statute, to support the plaintiff's case. Bessela v. Stern, 2 C. P. D. 265.

3. Indictment for obtaining money under false pretences. The prisoner was time-keeper, and C. was paying clerk, to a colliery company. Every fortnight the prisoner gave C. a list of the days worked by each man; and C. entered them in a time-book, together with the amount due each one. On pay-day, the prisoner had to read from the time-book the number of days so entered, and C. paid them off. While the prisoner read, C. looked on the book also. Held, that C. might refresh his memory as to the sums paid by him to the workmen, by referring to the entries in the time-book. — The Queen v. Langton, 2 Q. B. D. 296.

4. Gift of residue in trust to A. for life, remainder for all or any of her children who should attain twenty-one or marry. A. died in 1876, having had four children. One child, a minor, petitioned to have herself declared the only person entitled, on the ground that the other children of A. were illegitimate. The evidence of A.'s husband that, after the birth of the petitioner, A. left him, and that they had never since been or lived together as husband and wife, but that A. had lived with another man, was admitted; and the petitioner was declared solely entitled. In re Yearwood's Trusts, 5 Ch. D. 545.

See NEGLIGENCE, 2; WILL, 5, 7.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. See WILL, 1.

FACTOR.

H., a commission merchant and tobacco dealer, sold, through his agent K., to the plaintiff, a lot of tobacco lying in bond at the dock. The tobacco, according to the usage practised between the parties, remained at the dock uncleared in the name of H.; but the transaction was entered in H.'s books as a sale; and Dec. 3, 1875, an invoice of sale by H. to the plaintiff was sent to the latter, and, Dec. 31, he paid for the tobacco in full. The usage had been in such cases for the plaintiff to receive the tobacco in instalments, as he wished it to manufacture, in which case he would send dock dues and charges for the

portion he wanted, and that portion would be discharged and forwarded by H.; but in this case none of the lot had been sent, and March 9, 1876, H. absconded, and, March 15, was adjudged bankrupt. Meantime, Jan. 26, 1876, he had pledged the tobacco to the defendants, and given them the dock warrants, and transferred the tobacco into their name. He represented it to be his property, and they had no knowledge that the plaintiff claimed it. The court had power to draw inferences of fact. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the tobacco; and that H. had no authority to sell or pledge the tobacco while lying in the dock in his name, but only to clear and forward it to the plaintiff. — Johnson v. The Crédit Lyonnais, 2 C. P. D. 224.

FALSE PRETences.

Indictment for obtaining money under false pretences. Prisoner was a pedler, and induced a woman to buy some packages, which he called good tea, but which turned out to be three-quarters foreign and deleterious substances. The jury found that he knew the character of the stuff, and that he falsely pretended it was good, with intent to defraud. Held, that the conviction must stand. The Queen v. Foster, 2 Q. B. D. 301.

FERRY.

A ferry cannot maintain an action for damage to its traffic against a railroad or bridge company which has provided a foot or other bridge, and thus drawn off travel from the ferry. Reg. v. Cambrian Railway Co. (L. R. 6 Q. B. 422) overruled. - Hopkins et al. v. The Great Northern Railway Co., 2 Q. B. D. 224.

FIDUCIARY RELATION. See COMPANY, 8.

FRAUD. See COMPANY, 5, 7, 8.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

FREIGHT.

Charter-party by the defendants to convey a cargo of railway iron from England to Taganrog, Sea of Azof, or "so near thereto as the ship could safely get," consigned to a Russian railway company. The ship arrived, Dec. 17, at Kertch, a port three hundred miles by sea and seven hundred by land from Taganrog, where the captain, the plaintiff, found the sea blocked up with ice, and unnavigable till April. Against the orders of the charterers, who notified him that they would hold him responsible, he proceeded to unload the cargo; and, there being nobody to receive it, he put it in charge of the custom-house authorities there. The consignees claimed it; and, on their producing the bill of lading and charter-party, it was delivered to them, against the captain's claim that it should be retained for the freight. A receipt was given to the effect that the cargo was received" on the power of the charterparty and the bill of lading." Held, affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division, that the captain was entitled to no freight, not even pro rata. — Metcalfe v. The Britannia Iron Works Co., 2 Q. B. D. 423 ; s. c. 1 Q. B. D. 613; 11 Am. Law Rev. 282.

See MORTGAGE.