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"I will now proceed to read the judgment of the court; but, before doing so, I would say that the question is inconveniently raised by demurrer, and would have been much better raised if the facts had first been determined.

"In this case, the plaintiff has brought an action for injury alleged to have been caused to his house, which abuts on the wall of the defendants, by certain acts done by the defendants on their own land. The question is raised on demurrer to the statement of claim; and the question, therefore, is whether that alleges a good cause of action. [The Lord Justice then read the first six paragraphs of the statement of claim.] It is unnecessary to read the seventh paragraph, because it is based on a supposed obligation of the railway company to make their wall water-tight; but in our opinion there is no such obligation; and if the statements contained in the preceding paragraphs do not show a cause of action, the statements of the paragraph which has not been read do not enable the plaintiff to sustain this action.

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For the purposes of our decision, we must assume that the plaintiff has sustained substantial damage; and we must construe the statement as alleging that the surface of the defendants' land has been raised by earth and rubbish placed thereon, and that the consequence of this is that rain-water, falling on the defendants' land, has made its way through the defendants' wall into the house of the plaintiff, and has caused the injury complained of.

"The question is, Are the defendants, admitting this statement to be true, liable to the plaintiff and we are of opinion that they are. The heap or mound on the defendants' land must, in our opinion, be considered as an artificial work. Every occupier of land is entitled to the reasonable enjoyment thereof. This is a natural right of property; and it is well established that an occupier of land may protect himself by action against any one who allows any filth, or any other noxious thing produced by him on his own land, to interfere with this enjoyment. We are further of opinion, that, subject to a qualification to be hereafter mentioned, if any one, by artificial erection on his own land, causes water, even though arising from natural rainfall only, to pass into his neighbor's land, and thus substantially to interfere with his enjoyment, he will be liable to an action at the suit of him who is so injured; and this view agrees with the opinion expressed by the Master of the Rolls in the late case of Broder v. Sailard. He there says: 'However it [the water] comes, if it comes through an artificial work which collects it, in the nature of a large artificial sponge, which absorbs it and keeps it together, until it oozes out by reason of the nature of the sponge, it appears to me I have to say that an artificial work, a work made by man, is a work that, if it causes a nuisance, is a thing for which the owner of the land is responsible.' I have limited this statement of liability to liability for allowing things, in themselves offensive, to pass into a neighbor's property, and for causing, by artificial means, things in themselves inoffensive to pass into a neighbor's property, to the prejudice of his enjoyment thereof; because there are many things which, when done on a man's own land (as building so as to interfere with their prospect, or so as to obstruct lights not ancient), are not actionable, even though they interfere with a neighbor's enjoyment of his property.

"But it is argued that this is at variance with the decision, that if, in consequence of a mine-owner on the rise working out his minerals, water comes by natural gravitation into mines of the owner on the deep, the latter mine-owner cannot maintain any action for the loss which he thereby sustains. But excavating and raising the minerals is considered the natural use of mineral land; and these decisions are referable to this principle, that the owner of land holds his right to the enjoyment thereof, subject to such annoyance as is the consequence of what is called the natural user by his neighbor of his land; and that, when an interference with this enjoyment by some thing in the nature of nuisance (as distinguished from an inter

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ruption or disturbance of an easement or right of property in ancient lights, or the support for the surface to which every owner of property is entitled) is the cause of complaint, no action can be maintained if this is the result of the natural user by a neighbor of his land. That this is the principle of these cases appears from the case of Wilson v. Waddell, and from what is said by the Lord Chancellor in Rylands v. Fletcher. Moreover, the case referred to has laid down that a mine-owner is exempt from liability for water, which, in consequence of his works, flows by gravitation into an adjoining mine, only if his works are carried on with skill, and in the usual manner; and in the present case, it is stated that the defendants have conducted this operation negligently and improperly. The decisions, therefore, as regards the rights of adjoining mine-owners do not enable the defendants to discharge themselves from liability.

"It was also argued that a land-owner who, by operations on his own land, drains the water percolating under ground in the property of his neighbor is not liable to an action by the man whose land is thus deprived of its natural moisture; and this, it was argued, was inconsistent with a judgment for the plaintiff on a statement alleging as a cause of action an alteration in the percolation of water. It is sufficient to say that no one can maintain an action, unless there is some injury to something to which the law recognizes his title; and the law does not recognize any title in a land-owner to water percolating through his property under ground, and in no definite channel.

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We are of opinion that the maxim, ' Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas,' applies to and governs the present case; and that as the plaintiff, by his statement of claim, alleges that the defendants have, by artificial erections on their land, caused water to flow into the plaintiff's land in a manner in which it would not but for such erection have done, the defendants are answerable for the injury caused thereby to the plaintiff. Appeal dismissed."

LEGAL APPOINTMENTS.- Next to being the relative of a judge, the best thing is to bear the same name. I don't profess to understand the relationship subsisting in the following cases, but I was struck with the similarity of the names in looking over the legal appointments in Whitaker's Almanack, an almanac, I may incidentally say, which is infinitely better and more useful than any other that is published: Secretary of Presentations, the Hon. P. Thesiger, £400; Secretary of Commissions, Mr. W. M. Cairns, £300; Secretary of Causes, Mr. J. Romilly, £1,000; Clerk of Records and Writs, the Hon. E. Romilly, £1,200; Clerk of Enrolments, Lord Romilly, £1,200; Registrar in Lunacy, Mr. C. N. Wilde, £1,000; Queen's Coroner and Attorney, Mr. Fred. Cockburn, £1,200; Master at the Crown Office, Mr. J. R. Mellor, £1,200; Associate, Mr. T. W. Erle, £1,000; Associate Exchequer Division, Mr. H. Pollock, £1,000; Master, Sir F. Pollock, £1,500; ditto, Mr. G. F. Pollock, £1,500; Queen's Remembrancer, Sir F. Pollock, £2,000; Secretary to Sir J. Hannen, Mr. J. C. Hannen, £300; Secretary to Sir R. Phillimore, Mr. Walter Phillimore, £300; Registrar in Bankruptcy, Mr. J. R. Brougham, £1,300; Clerk of Assize for Home Circuit, the Hon. R. Denman, £953; Associate, Mr. R. Denman, Jr.; Clerk of Assize, Midland Circuit, Mr. Arthur Duke Coleridge (salary not mentioned); Clerk of Assize, Oxford Circuit, Mr. E. Archer Wilde, £1,000; and Clerk of Assize, Western Circuit, Mr. W. C. Bovill, £1,000. Some people call this sort of thing nepotism. I don't complain of it, so long as the men are fit for the post. It is a man's duty to look after his relations, when he can do so without injury to the public service; and no one can say that the judges have been unmindful of their duty in this respect. But still I may be allowed to express a regret that I have not an uncle a judge. Vanity Fair.

INDEX TO VOLUME XII.

[THE NUMBERS FOLLOWING THE LETTER D. UNDER EACH HEAD REFER TO THE DIGEST.]

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Abridgment of Revised Statutes of New Ambiguity, D. 85, 721.

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Agent, D. 111, 321, 515, 721, 743. See Arbitration, D. 322.

Principal and Agent.

Agreement, D. 491, 721.

Arizona Reports, 823.

Arraignment, D. 322.

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Bankruptcy, D. 344.
Bankruptcy Court, D. 766.
Bankruptcy Law, D. 136.
Bankruptcy Proceedings, D. 137.
Bills and Notes, D. 137.
Bill in Equity, D. 344.
Bill of Sale, D. 137.
Bond, D. 540, 766.

Books of Account, D. 344, 766.
Burden of Proof, D. 540.
Champerty, D. 137.
Check, D. 137.

Choses in Action, D. 344.
Claim, D. 344.

Cloud upon the Title, D. 540.
Composition, D. 138, 345, 540, 767.
Compulsory Proceedings, D. 541.
Computation, D. 541.

Concealment, D. 345.

Consideration, D. 345, 541.

Constitutionality, D. 768.

Contingent Debt, D. 768.
Contract, D. 138, 768.
Conversion, D. 769.

Corporation, D. 541.

Corporators, D. 541.

Costs, D. 345, 541, 768.
Court, D. 138, 345.
Creditor, D. 345, 768.

Curtesy, Estate by, D. 138.
Damages, D. 769.

Debt, D. 345, 541, 769.

Debt created by Fraud, D. 769.
Decree, D. 345.

Default, D. 542.

Demand and Notice, D. 542.

Discharge, D. 138, 345, 542, 769.

Distress, D. 139.

Docket, D. 346.

Drafts, D. 542.

Equitable Assignment, D. 542.

Equitable Estate, D. 346.

Equity, D. 346, 543, 770.
Estate, D. 543.

Estoppel, D. 543.

Evidence, D. 139, 346, 543, 770.

Examination, D. 543, 770.

Execution, D. 139, 346, 543, 770.

Executors, D. 543.

Exemption, D. 139, 346, 543, 770.

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Petition in Bankruptcy, D. 143, 351.
Pleading, D. 143, 351, 547, 776.
Pledge, D. 144, 776.

Practice, D. 144, 351, 548, 776.

Preference, D. 351, 548, 776.

Prescription, D. 777.

Presumption, D. 145, 777.

Principal and Agent, D. 549, 777.

Principal and Surety, D. 777.
Priority, D. 145, 351, 549, 777.
Privileged Debts, D. 549.
Promissory Notes, D. 549, 777.
Proof, D. 145, 351, 550, 777.
Protest, D. 551.

Provable Debt, D. 351, 551.

Reasonable Cause to Believe, D. 146,

551.

Reasonable Cause to Know, D. 146.

Receiver, D. 551, 778.

Record, D. 551, 778.

Redemption, D. 778.

Register, D. 352, 551.

Retrospective Laws, D. 146.
Review, D. 146, 778.

Sale, D. 146, 352, 551, 779.
Schedules, D. 352.

Secured Creditor, D. 779.
Secured Debt, D. 552, 779.
Security, D. 352, 779.
Service, D. 352.

Set-off, D. 352, 552, 779.

Specific Performance, D. 146.
State, D. 779.

State Law, D. 146.

Statute, D. 576.

Statute of Frauds, D. 146.

Statute of Limitations, D. 146, 353,

552.

Stock Exchange By-Laws, D. 146.
Stockholder, D. 552.

Subrogation, D. 146, 353.

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