It appearing, however, that the intervening strip would have afforded, if left in its natural state, a sufficient support to the plaintiff's land, the court said:

"The plaintiffs have no right as against the landowners on the other side of that intervening space, and they acquire no right, whatever the owner of the intervening land may have done. If the act of the intervening owner has been such as to take away the support to which the first landowner who complains is entitled, then, for whatever damage occurs from the act which he has done, the first owner may have an action; but an action against the intervening owner, not an action against the owner on the other side; and it appears to me that it would be really a most extraordinary result that the man upon whom no responsibility whatever originally rested, who was under no liability whatever to support the plaintiff's land, should have that liability thrown upon him without any default of his own, without any misconduct or any misfeasance on his part. I cannot believe that any such law exists, or ever will exist."

The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the Master of the Rolls, BRETT, L. J., saying, –

Although, therefore, this is a case of first impression, that is to say, a case in which we have, after the Master of the Rolls, for the first time, to decide what is the proper definition of 'adjacent lands,' — I think the Master of the Rolls has given a very happy definition of them, and one which we ought to accept."

COURT OF APPEAL. The continued ill-health of Lord Justice AMPHLETT has compelled him to retire from the bench. The Hon. ALFRED HENRY THESIGER, Q. C., has been appointed to fill the vacancy. Mr. THESIGER, who is the fourth son of Lord Chelmsford, was born in 1838, and was called to the bar in 1862. He was educated at Christ Church, Oxford.

The appointment occasioned much surprise, and has been warmly attacked in the newspapers on the score of Mr. THESIGER's age. The Pall Mall Gazette finds it inexplicable; considering that "a Queen's Counsel, whose silk gown is four years old, and its wearer only thirty-nine, and who has never in any way distinguished himself above his fellows, has been passed over the heads of twenty judges into one of the most important judicial offices in the State." The Law Times says:

"Instead of the change in the constitution of the bench which experience taught the profession to expect, a surprise has been prepared by the Lord Chancellor, and a Queen's Counsel who was not born when some of our judges took their silk gowns has been promoted to the high office of an appellate judge. This sounds very extraordinary; and, if age and judicial experience are to be regarded as necessary qualifications for this appointment, the new Lord Justice is wholly unfit for it. If, on the other hand, a large and varied experience at the bar, a judicial mind, a calm, clear, and vigorous intellect, a wide (if not profound) knowledge of law, are sufficient to qualify a barrister for promotion to the Court of Appeal, then the appointment is one which must commend itself to the profession. We have very little sympathy with those who lament that very excellent judges are passed over when vacancies occur in the Court of Appeal. One of the best judges of the Court of Appeal in recent

years

- Lord Justice Mellish

had not previously occupied a seat on the bench, and the same may be said of Lords Justices Baggallay and Cotton; and it is by no

means certain that work as a judge of first instance is the best preparation for work in the Court of Appeal. Be this, however, as it may, the simple question now is, whether so exceptional a promotion is not justified by the exceptional merit of the new judge. We think it is."

THE PENGE MURDER. - Probably no case of murder in the present generation has excited public attention in England to a greater degree than this. It will be remembered that Mr. and Mrs. Patrick Staunton, Lewis Staunton, and Alice Rhodes (said to be the mistress of Lewis Staunton), were put on trial for the murder of the wife of Lewis Staunton. It appeared that the deceased, who was a person of weak mind, was an invalid, and unable to take care of herself. And the crime was said to have been committed by neglecting to provide her with food, and to care for her properly; the supposed motive being to enable Lewis Staunton to marry his mistress. The crime was a difficult one to prove, from the fact that it was committed by acts of omission, so to speak. It was not easy to say to what extent the wasting away was due to disease and to the general infirmity of the deceased, and how far it might have been prevented by proper attention; and, of course, to infer the intention of the criminals from such uncertain premises was more difficult still.

Touching the duty of the prisoners to the deceased, Mr. Justice HAWKINS, before whom the case was tried, said, in his charge to the jury:

"Generally, I may state the law to be this, that every person who is under a legal duty whether such duty be imposed by law or imposed by contract, or by the act of taking charge, wrongfully or otherwise, of another person, to provide the necessaries of life for such other person - every person who takes charge, and has that legal duty imposed on him, is criminally responsible for the culpable neglect of that duty, if, by reason of that neglect, death ensues to the person so neglected; and if the person so neglected, and to whom that duty is owing, is, from age, health, insanity, or any other cause, unable to take care of himself, and death ensues, the crime will be murder."

The jury found all the prisoners guilty, with a recommendation of Alice Rhodes to mercy.

The case was then brought before the Home Secretary, with the result of securing a pardon for Alice Rhodes, and a commutation of the sentence of the Stauntons to penal servitude for life.

Pending the action of the Home Secretary, however, the whole case was retried "by newspaper." The morning papers were overwhelmed with correspondence on the subject. Physicians, not too busy with their own affairs, discussed the case from a medical point of view. The chief witness for the prosecution was "interviewed," and her statement published. Works of fiction were examined to find similar cases. In short, there was a carnival of mischievous silliness. Whether all this had any influence on the Secretary, of course cannot be said. Senseless as it all was, however, it can hardly be said that newspaper trial is more unsatisfactory than the "regular" way of proceeding by the Home Secretary. Indeed, so unsatisfactory has the " regular" way shown itself, that the result is likely to be the establishment of a Court of Criminal Appeal. It is said that a bill is to be introduced into Parliament providing for the creation of such a court, to consist of certain of the judges and of the Home Secretary, before which any case where there has

been a capital conviction may be taken; both sides to be represented by counsel, and the expenses of the appeal to be borne by the Crown.

LENGTH OF TRIALS. A solicitor, says the Solicitors' Journal, moved by the recollection of the Tichborne trial, and the seven days' trial of the Penge case, has been at the pains to give, in a letter to a daily journal, an interesting analysis of the principal criminal trials which have taken place during the last fifty years, with a view to ascertain how far they differ, in intricacy, and in the number of witnesses examined, from the trials of the present day. The result of his investigation, as to the earlier trials, says the Journal, may be summed up as follows:

"At Patch's trial, in 1806, for the murder of his partner, - a very intricate case, - there were thirty-three witnesses, and the trial lasted one day. Bellingham's trial, for the murder of Spencer Perceval, in which there were sixteen witnesses and a long defence, lasted only one day. Thistlewood's trial, for the Cato-street conspiracy, with forty witnesses, lasted two days. In 1824 occurred Thurtell's trial, at which there were forty-six witnesses,—including one who was an accomplice, and who was examined at considerable length, and another who was called in the course of the summing-up. The trial lasted two days. In 1828, Corder was tried, a long indictment read, twenty-six witnesses; and the trial lasted one day and a half. In 1828, Burke's trial took place; a long argument as to the indictment, sixteen witnesses (one of them being an accomplice), and the trial lasted one day. In 1831, Bishop, Williams, and May were tried for the murder of the Italian boy; there were forty-one witnesses, and the trial lasted one day. In 1837, Greenacre's case: thirtyfive witnesses, two days. In 1839, Frost for high treason; there were sixty-nine witnesses, one whole day taken up with legal arguments, and the trial lasted seven days. In 1840, Courvoisier: forty-four witnesses, three days; and, in the same year, Gould's case: forty witnesses, one day. In 1843, McNaghten's case: several scientific witnesses, forty-seven witnesses in all; two days. In 1845, Tawell: twenty-one witnesses, exclusive of those called to character, two days.

Comparing these trials with our modern 'great cases,' Mr. Woodall asks why the Wainwright case, with sixty-nine witnesses, should last nine days, whilst Greenacre's, with thirty-five witnesses, lasted only two days; and Bishop, Williams, and May, with thirty-seven witnesses, lasted only one day? Or, why should the Penge case, with its thirty-eight witnesses, or thereabouts, require seven days, when Thurtell's, with forty-six witnesses, or Mannings's, with forty-seven, only required two? He observes, that the mere circumstances that the court formerly sat earlier in the day, and that counsel for the prisoners were not formerly allowed to address the jury for their clients, go but a little way in accounting for the difference; for, in many of the earlier trials, speeches of considerable length were read, either by the prisoner, or by an officer of the court. And, we may add, the fact, on which he is disposed to lay considerable stress, that the judge has now, as he had previously, to take full notes of the evidence, will not explain the enormous increase in the length of the trials. Of course, the more evidence there is, the more will the slowness of the judge in taking it down lengthen the trial; but the question is, Why is there now-a-days so much more evidence for the judge to take down? And this Mr. Woodall does not attempt to explain. Without pretending to furnish an answer to the question, which would involve the consideration of a large variety of reasons, we may refer to one, which appears to be very much overlooked; viz., the decline of what we may term self-reliant discrimination on the part of the persons whose duty it is to get up and

deal with the evidence for the prosecution or defence. The preliminary inquiry before the magistrates is lengthened, from anxiety that nothing which may turn out to be of any importance shall be omitted; the depositions are swollen to an enor mous bulk, and the result is that opportunities for the practice of cross-examination (generally discouraged, it is true, by the judge), as to variances between the evidence of the witness on the depositions and in court, are greatly increased. Cross-examination at the trial is extended because counsel does not like, on his own responsibility, to omit a question which may possibly benefit his client. Re-examination is extended because the cross-examination may possibly have damaged the effect of the evidence. And it can hardly be denied that the professional opinion which in former days would have curbed these excesses is diminishing in influence. There is less opportunity for association between members of the bar than formerly; and, as a consequence, counsel, in conducting a case, are less controlled by the apprehension of professional criticism. And it may, perhaps, be thought that learned judges, who have just left off sinning in tlie way of prolixity at the bar, are not very likely to reprove this fault in others."

THE CLEOPATRA OBELISK. SALVAGE. It will be remembered that the vessel containing the Cleopatra obelisk had to be abandoned at sea. It was afterwards picked up by the Fitzmaurice, and is now held to answer a claim for salvage; and the question has arisen how the amount of salvage earned is to be estimated. The Solicitors' Journal says:

"The value of the property saved is but one of the ingredients of salvage service, and it is only as to this ingredient that the case is a peculiar one; but it must be admitted that it is a difficult question to say in what manner the obelisk is to be valued. On the one hand, it would be unfair to value it simply as a block of granite, and, on the other, it seems almost impossible to put a value upon it as a work of art, or upon its historical associations. We are not aware of any reported salvage case in which the property saved has had what might be called a fancy value. There is high authority for saying that the valuation in a policy of insurance on the ship or goods saved is prima facie a mode of ascertaining the value for salvage (1 Park on Insurance, 327); but it is understood that, while Mr. Dixon's interest in his contract was insured to some extent, no insurance was effected on the obelisk. As regards the proportion of value awarded by the English Court of Admiralty, there is no fixed rule of amount. In the recent case of The Amérique (L. R. 6 P. C. 468), the rule of the court was in the judgment stated to be that, though the value of the property saved is to be considered in the estimate of the remuneration, it must not be allowed to raise the quantum to an amount altogether out of proportion to the services actually rendered; and a judgment of Lord Stowell's was cited, in which he says that, 'in fixing the proportion of the value, the court is in the habit of giving a smaller proportion where the value is large, and a higher proportion where the value is small; and for this obvious reason, that in property of small value a small proportion would not hold out a sufficient consideration, whereas in cases of considcrable value a smaller proportion would afford no inadequate compensation.' In the recent case, the derelict vessel and her cargo were together valued at £190,000. Sir R. Phillimore awarded £30,000 salvage, which was on appeal reduced by the Privy Council to £18,000. In the case of The Rasche (22 W. R. 240, L. R. 4 A. & E. 127), where there were circumstances of great difficulty and gallantry in the salvors, the sum of £3,290 was awarded on a value of £6,294. Generally, one-half the value may be stated as the outside limit awarded."

CORRESPONDENCE.

"TO THE EDITORS OF THE AMERICAN LAW REVIEW:

"NEW YORK CITY, Dec. 11, 1877. "Gentlemen,- In the October number (Vol. xii. No. 1) of your valuable Review, I find, in the notice of Heron's Jurisprudence, the expression of a sentiment which I have noticed several times on previous occasions. You say: 'It presents . . . a string of generalities about the nature and grounds of positive law and the general development of society, such as were in fashion in the time of Kent and Story, but which are now a little out of date.' Will you not be kind enough, in the next number of the American Law Review, to give a list of modern authorities on these subjects which are not 'out of fashion;' a list of books giving the new ideas and the results of modern research? This is exactly what students and young lawyers need, and have been looking for; and I am sure older lawyers will profit by it, also. Be kind enough to answer this in your next number, and greatly oblige

46 'CAUSIDICUS."

The question is so broad that it is a little hard to know where to begin. And we should suppose that the books which will carry students far enough along to enable them to direct their own inquiries were well known. Thus, popular presentations of a good many of the new ideas in question will be found in Sir Henry Maine's works (Ancient Law, Village Communities and Essays, Early History of Institutions). His predecessor, Austin, represents the confluence of the Benthamite Utilitarian school with the first-fruits of German research. If the student is curious in sociological questions, he may compare Mr. M'Lennan on Primitive Marriage, and Mr. H. Spencer's work on Sociology, with that of our more learned countryman, Mr. Morgan, on Ancient Society. If he comes down to a little more civilized times, he will read Mr. Stubbs's dull book of Constitutional History. M. Fustel de Coulanges' Cité Antique, translated in this country, is valuable as a stimulant, like Sir H. Maine, provided it is not relied on for solid food. A very convenient statement of recent investigations into the first forms of ownership in land will be found in Lavelaye, De la Propriété; and some special subjects have been dealt with, from time to time, in this Review. But, more especially, the modern German literature is so rich in every department of historical investigation, and is so pregnant with suggestion, if not with results, in a philosophical direction, that we should be puzzled where to begin or to leave off. Every one naturally wants to know what Kant has to say on the philosophy of the law; and going back to English, Bentham's Fragment on Government, Theory of Legislation, and so forth, are not yet so old that the wise cannot learn from them. They had not got into the air when Kent and Story wrote, although Kent cites Bentham once or twice. Ahrens' book on Natural Law (which was published by the author, we believe, both in French and German) is very instructive, little as one may agree with its philosophy. The list of writers who show Hegel's influence for good or bad is long, and includes some able men, as, for example, Ihering (Geist des Römischen Rechts). The more important late writers on the historical development of German and English law will be found quoted in the "Essays on Anglo Saxon Law," recently noticed in this Review.