STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

In 1812, land subject to a fee-farm rent was conveyed to the predecessor in title of the plaintiff; but, down to 1872, the grantor's successors continued to pay the fee-farm rent. In 1872, the grantor's successor refused to pay the rent, and the defendant, who was entitled to the rent, and who was before ignorant that the property had changed hands, demanded the rent of the plaintiff, and, on her refusal to pay, he distrained; and she then brought suit in replevin, and set up the Statute of Limitations, 3 & 4 of Will. IV., c. 27, §§ 2 & 3, since the payments had not been made by the terre-tenant for more than twenty years. Held, that the case did not come within the statute. Adnam v. The Earl of Sandwich, 2 Q. B. D. 485.

SUB-CONTRACTOR. - See MASTER AND Servant, 2; NEGLIGENCE, 1. SURRENDER. See LANDLORD AND TENANt, 1.

In 1862, S. C. got a patent for a filter, in the name of himself and his son G. C., the plaintiff, then a minor. S. C. died the same year, and G. C. carried on the business and sold filters with the label: "S. C.'s Improved Patent Gold Medal Self-cleansing Rapid Water-Filters." In 1865 the patent ran out, and in 1867 the plaintiff, then of age, altered his label by inserting in it in place of "S. C.'s," "G. C.'s," and placing over it a medallion with the words, "By Her Majesty's Royal Letters Patent." In 1876, the defendants' relatives and former employees of the plaintiff, began in the same town making filters very much like plaintiff's, but with a label thus: "S. C.'s Patent Prize Medal Self-cleansing Rapid Water-Filters, Improved and Manufactured by W. & Co." Held, dissolving an injunction granted by Bacon, V. C., that the label was not a trademark, but a description only, that the defendants' label was not a fraudulent imitation of plaintiff's, designed to cheat the public, and that the plaintiff could have no standing in court by reason of the fraudulent representation on his label that the patent was still subsisting. Cheavin v. Walker, 5 Ch. D. 850.

TRUST.

1. Testator appointed real estate to N. subject to a term of years, vested in trustees, who were directed to raise a sum of money therefrom and to pay the income of it to certain life-tenants. This was done, and on the death of the life-tenants, who all survived N., held, that the personal representative of N. was entitled to the principal of the fund. - In re Newberry's Trust, 5 Ch. D. 746.

2. The principle enunciated and applied that all benefits derived by trustees from the trust-property accrue to the cestuis que trust, even though the benefit was secured by the trustees appearing as actual owners; and that, in case of breach of trust by trustees for their own benefit, no lapse of time can validate the transaction. — Aberdeen Town Council v. Aberdeen University, 2 App. Cas. 544.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

Trustees for sale of a freehold stipulated that "the property is sold and will be conveyed subject to all free rents, quit-rents, and incidents of tenure and to all rights of way, . . and all rights and claims of what kind and nature soever (if any) of the tenants, without any obligation on the part of the vendors to define any such rights or claims." Held, that they were entitled to have these words inserted in the habendum of the deed, although they had not shown that any liability of the sort existed. - Gale v. Squier, 5 Ch. 625.

See STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 2, 3.

VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE.

1. A testator, after directing his trustees to convert his estate into money and pay his debts and legacies, proceeded: "And I declare that the said trustees may vary the said . . . funds . . . at their discretion, and shall pay the moneys and the investment for the time being representing the same, to my said wife during her life upon trust for all my children or any child who being sons or a son shall attain the age of twenty-one years; or, being daughters or a daughter, shall attain that age or marry, and if more than one, in equal shares. Provided, also, that the said trustees may after the death of my said wife or previously thereto, if she shall so direct in writing, raise any part not exceeding one-half part of the then expectant presumptive or vested share" of any child for his or her advancement. The trustees were empowered to use the income "after the death of " the wife for the maintenance of the children. If no child survived him, and, being a son, attained the age of twenty-one years or married, then the trust-fund should go to testator's brothers and sisters. Held, that the widow took a life-interest in the fund. - - Greenwood v. Greenwood, 5 Ch. D. 954.

2. Testator gave to his executors named all his property in trust to pay his debts, legacies, and bequests, with power to convert the whole or any part. He gave some legacies, and to his wife £1,500 and all his household goods. Then followed certain other bequests to be paid out of the personal, and certain others to be paid in certain circumstances out of the real, estate. He then directed that, in case he died without children (as he did), after the death of his wife the residue of the property should be divided into twelve parts and given to the "children and their descendants" of his aunts, the descendants to take the portion of their parents; and should there be no children or lawful descendants of any of his aunts remaining at the time these bequests became payable, then the portions so bestowed should be disposed of as part of the residuary fund. Then followed a direction that the trustees or executors need not convert or pay the legacies for two years after his death unless they thought best, and that the "division of the residuary property" need not be made till two years after the death of his wife. Then followed provision for payment of his wife's annuity of £700, payable to her under their marriage settlement. The testator died in 1837, and the wife in 1876.

Held, that only the children and grandchildren of the aunts took, and the wife had no life-estate by implication. — Ralph v. Carrick, 5 Ch. D. 984. See BEQUEST, 1, 2; CONSTRUCTION, 3; LEGACY, 1, 2, 3; Power; Set

"Damage done by any ship."— See JURISDICTION, 1.

"Descendants." See WILL, 2.

"Employed in and about the works." See CONSTRUCTION, 1.

66

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Foreign Government.” See CONSTRUCTION, 3.
"Never been heard of."- See EVIDENCE, 1.
"Not accountable." - See BILL OF LADING.

SELECTED DIGEST OF STATE REPORTS.

[FOR the present number of the Digest, selections have been made from the following volumes of State Reports: 31 Arkansas; 12 Bush (Kentucky); 57 Georgia; 73 Illinois; 54 Indiana; 66 Maine; 121 Massachusetts; 34 Michigan; 53 Mississippi; 64 Missouri; 65 New York; 81 and 82 Pennsylvania State; 6 South Carolina; 45 and 46 Texas, and the first volume of the new series of Texas Court of Appeals Reports (cited as 1 Tex. N. s.); also from 94 United States].

ABATEMENT.

The pendency of an action at common law to recover for damages suffered by a person deceased, and resulting in his death, is pleadable in abatement of a statutory action, grounded on the same tort, to recover damages for his death. · Conner v. Paul, 12 Bush, 144.

A conviction may be had on the evidence of an accomplice, corroborated only by that of his wife. — Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 12 Bush, 181.

1. A deputy clerk of court may certify acknowledgments of deeds in his principal's name, without signing his own. — Talbott v. Hooser, 12 Bush, 408. 2. Where the certificate of acknowledgment of a married woman's deed recites that she acknowledged it on being examined apart from her husband, as required by law, she may show that the certificate is wholly false, and that she never acknowledged the deed at all. Allen v. Lenoir, 53 Miss. 321. But she cannot, admitting the acknowledgment, show, contrary to the certificate, that it was in presence of her husband. —Johnston v. Wallace, ib. 331. But see Jett v. Rogers, 12 Bush, 564.

ACTION.

1. An action lies for suborning witnesses to testify falsely in defamation of the plaintiff's character, neither the plaintiff nor defendant having been party to the action in which such testimony was given. - Rice v. Coolidge, 121 Mass. 393.

2. A city established water-works, which any one might connect with his house and use, paying rates. The pipes in front of a house were so negligently laid, near the surface of the ground, that they froze and burst. In an action by the owner of the house against the city, held, that he could recover

the rates paid while deprived of the use of the water, but not for damage to the house or loss of tenants. Smith v. Philadelphia, 81 Penn. St. 38.

See ABATEMENT; Carrier, 1, 3; CONFLICT OF LAWS, 5; EMINENT DoMAIN, 1; LANDLORD AND TENANT; MALICIOUS PROSECUTION; MASTER and Servant, 1; PARTY WALL; RELEASE; SLANDER; TAX, 2.

ADJOURNMENT. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (STate), 5.

1. Possession by a corporation cannot be tacked to a previous possession by the individuals forming the corporation, organized as a voluntary society for the same purposes, so as to make a title by adverse possession. (DWIGHT, C. dissenting.) — Reformed Church v. Schoolcraft, 65 N. Y. 134.

2. If A. recover possession of land by execution on a judgment in ejectment against B., semble, that the judgment does not relate to the time of action brought, so as to give A., during the intervening time, an adverse possession as against C., an independent claimant. - Turner v. Baker, 64 Mo. 218. See PRESCRIPTION, 1, 2.

AGENT.

1. A promissory note was made to J. S., cashier, or order. Held, that the bank of which he was cashier might sue on the note in its own name, without an indorsement by him. Garton v. Union Bank, 34 Mich. 279.

2. Defendants' agent, having authority to issue bills of lading, upon delivery to him by M. of a forged warehouse receipt, gave M. bills of lading for the goods mentioned in the receipt, knowing that he intended to raise money on the bills; and plaintiffs advanced money to M. on the security of the bills. Held, that defendants were bound by their agent's act, and estopped to deny the receipt of the goods. (EARL, C. dissenting.) Armour v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 65 N. Y. 111.

3. The owner of property offered to pay a broker a certain sum for selling it; the broker procured parties to treat for the purchase, and the owner gave them time to consider his terms, but, before the time was out, sold the property to a third party. Held, that the broker was entitled to recover the agreed compensation. Reed v. Reed, 82 Penn. St. 420.

See DAMAGES, 3.

ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

The maker of a note, after it had been indorsed for his accommodation, fraudulently altered it to a larger sum, and procured it to be discounted for that sum. Before it was due the fraud was discovered, the original writing was restored, and the note duly protested. Held, that the indorser was not liable. Citizens' National Bank v. Richmond, 121 Mass. 110.

AMENDMENT.

1. The court refused to permit a record to be amended six months after final decree, so as to show that the cause was one of which the Supreme Court of the United States would have jurisdiction on error. Snell v. Dwight, 121

Mass. 348.