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action of State tribunals under State laws, as State courts are generally authorized to do? It did not attempt to do so in forming the Electoral Commission: for it was obvious, as has been already stated, that the existing dispute must be decided upon the state of the law, good or bad, as it stood at the time of the election.

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That Congress can and ought to provide for ascertaining what is a vote at the count is clear; but to provide that, in so doing, the action of the State tribunals in regard to the title of Electors to their offices shall be the subject of review, is quite a different thing. In the first instance, the inquiry would be simple and short and consistent with the Constitution, the genuineness of the documentary evidence of the appointment and action of the Electors and their personal identity, would usually exhaust the inquiry. In the other view, the extent and magnitude of the investigation would be universal. The Constitution declares that," each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct," its Electors, and that "the Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote," and transmit a list of their votes to the President of the Senate; and it also provides that these votes so transmitted shall be counted." It also declares that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution." It follows that the legislative power can be exerted upon the subject in respect of the act of the counting commanded by the Constitution only as an administrative, and not as a judicial, ceremony. It is not denied that a constitution, or a law consistent with it, may deposit the full power of judging elections in administrative officers, and that the decision of such officers upon all questions so left to them is final, and conclusive upon the judiciary. But the pre-eminent question still remains, from whatever side we approach it, whether the action of the State governments in the choice of Electors is, or ought to be, in any form, a subject of national revision? Who compose the State governments is confessedly a question necessarily within the function of Congress, as such, to determine, for that is a political question; but to revise the correctness of the manner in which such governments, being ascertained, have performed the duty of choosing a President, is a matter of an entirely different character. If the States must, under the Constitution, appoint the Elect

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ors in such manner as their law-making power shall direct, then they may, and ought to, provide for determining what persons have been appointed; for, the appointment and its manner reach to the full ascertainment of the officers to be selected. It may, perhaps, be thought, consistently with such a power, that, inasmuch as the judicial power of the United States extends to all cases arising under the Constitution, and inasmuch as the Constitution of the United States alone, and not the State Constitutions, provides for Electors, the national courts can review the regularity of the action of the State authorities upon the same principles that the State courts act upon in similar cases. In such a case, the inquiry in the courts of the United States, if it could be had at all, would be, whether the State law had been followed, just as in many cases of federal judicial jurisdiction they so act, and yet take as the best proof of the State law the judgments of the highest State courts.

If the disputes touching the constitution of the Electoral Colleges in the States could be disposed of in advance of their action, the counting of the electoral votes at the seat of government, by, or in the presence of the two Houses of Congress, would usually be little more than a formal ceremony.

That it would be safer for the peace, order, and justice of the Republic in the long run, to have such disputes settled by honest judicial means in the States in which they may occur, seems to be clear from a study of the nature of the government, and to flow from the principle of State rights before mentioned, on which the Republic is founded. That instances of wrong will occur in such a case is to be expected. Are they not likely to occur much oftener in the exercise of centralized power, and, particularly, by large bodies of men like the Senate and House of Representatives? Even in judging of the elections and qualifications of their own members, such assemblies anywhere cannot be affirmed to exhibit models of justice or jurisprudence.

Assuming, as we must, that the States are willing to do their duty in such cases, may not a practicable means of avoiding future trouble be found without any change of the Constitution? If the elections for Electors were held on the first of September, and the Electors were to meet and vote on the first of January, each State could, and no doubt would, provide by law for the immediate decision, by its own highest court, of all contests touch

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ing the choice of Electors. Congress could also provide by law that such a decision, or, in its absence, the decision of the State canvassing board, or the certificate of the Governor, as to the persons chosen Electors, should govern in the counting required by the Constitution. And, if the judicial power of the United States can interfere in any case, provision might easily be made for a prompt review of the decisions of the State courts by the Supreme Court of the United States, so that before the counting of the Electoral votes every dispute concerning title to the office of Elector would be lawfully disposed of. The railway and telegraph have made intercommunication with every part of the Republic so speedy and perfect, that four months for determining such disputes, in advance of the casting of the Electoral votes, are equal to a year of earlier times.

It may be thought that, in high party excitements, both when the two Houses of Congress are impressed with the same bias, and when they are in opposition, preliminary decisions will be disregarded; and that other questions, such as the right of a particular State to vote at all, or the official character of the person in a State who certifies the Electors, &c., will arise on the occasion of counting the Electoral votes, and thus there will still be danger. All this doubtless may happen; but under any system of government dangers of this sort will always exist, and legislation will have done its utmost when it has reduced these dangers to a minimum.

If it were possible to find or to constitute one single tribunal, having final power to count the votes and declare the result after the States had, through their tribunals, disposed of disputes, being the farthest possible removed from the heat of political prejudice, and possessing from its character and constitution the general confidence of the country, the best method of ascertaining who had been elected President would be reached. It is of course impossible in a free country that any body of persons, otherwise fit to compose such a tribunal, can be found who will not have some degree of prejudice. They will usually wish that one person rather than another may be elected; but almost every step in government is attended with this element of error. The experience of governments seems to have proved that, on the whole, judicial tribunals are best calculated to hear and decide disputed questions of law and fact, although they may

involve inquiries extending into the domain of politics and the decision of the fact of an election.

With the exception of decisions upon the elections of members of legislative assemblies, which have almost universally been lodged with the assemblies themselves, the judicial tribunals have, in nearly every civilized country, been clothed with and exercised such powers with beneficent effect. In nearly, if not quite every State of the Union, such powers are continually exercised in respect of rights to hold office; and in few, if any of them, it is believed, does any exception exist of the office of Chief Magistrate.

If the whole power of deciding upon Presidential elections and of providing for such decision were removed from Congress to a tribunal that could not, like it, change the law according to party emergency, or in obedience to any spasm of popular clamor, it might be better. But the proposal to do this by so amending the Constitution as to impose the duty upon the Supreme Court, was lately defeated in the Senate by a large majority. It may safely be predicted, however, that from the causes which have been referred to, and with the increase of the number of the States and of population, and so of the number of Senators and Representatives, the time is not far distant when the decision of such questions, judicial in their nature, as are left to the national authority after the States have acted in a disputed Presidential election, will be withdrawn entirely from the political department of the government, and lodged where, according to the philosophy of free governments, it ought to be with the judiciary. All such questions, as they affect the right of the people at large, as well as private rights, and depend exclusively upon pre-existing laws and events, and require for their solution only a discovery and declaration of them, contain no element for the discretion of the legislator or the policy of the statesman. They are just as essentially judicial as any of those that belong to the judicial branch of the government. The means of preserving the purity and independence of the judges, and punishing their corruption, are always at hand, and are much more effectual than any that can be applied to the members of legislative assemblies; for the legislative branch of the government can impeach and remove wicked judges, but cannot punish the illegal or corrupt action of majorities in itself.

GEO. F. EDMUNDS.

THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER.

FEW things are more intimately associated with the despotism of the times of the Tudors and the Stuarts, in the history of England, than the name and transactions of the Star Chamber Court. It has become a generic term to denote a system of arbitrary measures, where the forms of judicial proceedings are made the means of perpetrating acts of injustice, or of consummating schemes of oppression and wrong. And yet comparatively few, at this day, have ever taken the trouble to trace the history of this court, or to inquire why its very name has excited the odium of successive ages.

It is proposed in the following pages to attempt to sketch, as briefly as the nature of the subject admits, an outline of the history, character, and powers of this court, commencing, as it did, with no bad purposes, and, after being perverted to an instrument of despotic power through a succession of administrations, being extinguished at last as one of the acts of concession made by Charles to the demands of an injured and indignant nation.

In order to understand the history of this court, and the grounds upon which it became so odious to the English people, through its acts of cruelty and injustice, we must go back to a condition of the government whose very history is but little better than traditional.

From a very early period there were certain high officers in the State, and men of influence and power, who were called upon by the king to act as his council or advisers in matters of government. One of these bodies, which seems to have stood in more confidential relation to the crown than the others, was known as the Privy Council, including a portion, if not all, of the peers of the realm, with the Chancellor and other civil and judicial officers of the State. The king being considered the fountain of justice, it was a common thing for persons who felt themselves aggrieved by others to apply to him for redress by way of petition. In this

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