another town, on the ground that the person taxed is lawfully taxable by the former and not by the latter. - Nunda v. Crystal Lake, 79 Ill. 311.

4. Where the Constitution provided that "such property as the General Assembly may deem necessary for schools, religious and charitable purposes, may be exempted from taxation," held, that only such lands could be exempted as were actually used for the purposes named in the Constitution; and that there could be no exemption of charity lands not occupied for purposes of the charity, but leased. — Northwestern University v. The People, 80 Ill. 333.

5. Property exempted by statute from taxation, pursuant to a clause in the Constitution allowing such exemption to be enacted, is not taxable by a municipal corporation any more than by the State. Lefranc v. New Orleans, 27 La. Ann. 188.

6. A banking corporation a few days before the day of assessment of a State tax, with the intention of escaping the tax, converted all its capital stock, except real estate, into United States bonds, not taxable by the State, and sold them soon after the day of assessment. Held, that the capital stock was taxable by the State. - Holly Springs Savings Co. v. Marshall County,

52 Miss. 281.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 2, 3; INJUNCTION; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,

2.

TENANT IN COMMON.

Tenants in common bring trespass qu cl. for digging coal. Plea, leave and license of the plaintiffs. Evidence of a license from one of the plaintiffs will not support the plea; and (semble) would be no defence even if it were admissible under the pleadings. — Murray v. Haverty, 70 Ill. 318. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2; TRESPASS, 1.

1. Tenants in common are jointly liable for trespasses committed by cattle kept in one herd on their land, though the beasts composing the herd are owned by them severally. - Ozburn v. Adams, 70 Ill. 291.

2. Defendants wrongfully entered plaintiff's land, and dug a ditch, which plaintiff left open, though he might easily have filled it up; four or five years after, his crops were destroyed by water overflowing from it. Held, (1) that defendants' trespass was complete when the ditch was dug; (2) that the continuance of the ditch was not a new trespass; (3) that the injury to the crops was not a proximate result of the trespass, and that defendants were not liable for such injury; (4) that they were not liable at all if the Statute of Limitations had run since the ditch was first dug. - Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mihlman, 17 Kans. 224.

See INTENT; TENANT IN COMMON; WAY, 2.

TRUST. ULTRA VIRES.

See BANKRUPTCY, 2; MORTGAGE, 2; Officer.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 1; MUNICIPAL COR

PORATION, 1.

USURY.

A stranger to a contract shall not impeach it on the ground of usury; and, therefore, a mortgage made to secure an usurious debt shall have priority to its full extent over a second mortgage, when the question is between the two mortgagees; though the mortgagor might avoid the first mortgage. Pritchett v. Mitchell, 17 Kans. 355.

See SURETY, 1.

VARIANCE.

See GAMING; Indictment; TENANT IN COMMON.
VOID AND VOIDABLE. - See EXECUTION, 1.

WAR.

A grant of administration by a Probate Court of Arkansas during the war, held, valid. (Overruling former decisions.) — Berry v. Bellows, 30 Ark. 198. See ACTION, 1.

WAY.

1. A city cannot, without special authority given by statute expressly or by reasonable implication, take for a highway land of a cemetery, though not used for burial, but for paths and shrubbery. — Evergreen Cemetery Association v. New Haven, 43 Conn. 234.

2. Bill in equity against town officers to restrain them from removing plaintiff's fences, which they had done repeatedly, under pretence that the fences obstructed a highway, and threatened to do again as often as the fences should be restored. Held, (1) that the bill was maintainable; (2) that the burden was on the defendants to show the lawful existence of the way; (3) that judgments rendered against the plaintiff in actions at law to recover penalties for obstructing the highway at the point in question, were not conclusive evidence that the way was lawfully laid out. — McIntyre v. Storey, 80 Ill. 127.

See ACTION, 2; BOUNDARY; EASEMENT.

WILL.

1. Where a married woman had by statute power to dispose of all her property by will; a widow, having children, made her will, married again, and died without issue by her second husband. Held, that her will was not revoked by implication of law, nor by virtue of a statute passed after the marriage, which enacted that marriage should revoke a prior will. In re Tuller, 79 Ill. 99.

2. A testator by his will named executors "with discretionary powers to settle my estate as they shall judge best for the interests of my heirs." Held,

that the executors had no power to sell real estate. N. C. 109.

See DEVISE; GUARDIAN; Power.

Skinner v. Wood, 76

"Fiduciary Capacity."-See BANKRUPTCY, 2.
Legal Representatives.”- See MORTGAGE, 2.
"Member of the Family.' See CONTRACT, 2.

"Railroad Corporation."

See TAX, 1.

See RAILROAD, 1.

DIGEST OF CASES IN BANKRUPTCY.

[THIS Digest includes Nos. 8 to 12, inclusive, of Vol. XV. National Bankruptcy Register and No. 1 of Vol. XVI.]

ACTION.

1. When an execution creditor of a bankrupt petitions the Bankrupt Court to so modify an injunction as to allow the sheriff to sell the property levied on and deposit the proceeds in the Bankrupt Court, and the order is granted, he cannot maintain an action against the sheriff for paying the money into court in pursuance thereof, instead of paying it to him, but he is bound by it. O'Brien v. Weld, 15 N. B. R. (U. S. S. Ct.) 405.

2. The holder of a note for $500 was paid $409 of it by the maker, who, within four months thereafter, was adjudged a bankrupt. Upon suit brought by his assignee to recover it back, upon the ground of preference, he was compelled to pay it. The sureties upon the note paid the balance to the maker's clerk, and took it up. In an action brought against them to recover the amount originally paid, it was held, that, having acted in good faith toward the sureties, and been reasonably diligent to save them from loss, he was entitled to recover the amount originally paid and endorsed. Watson v. Poague, 15 N. B. R. (Sup. Ct. Iowa) 473.

3. An assignee in bankruptcy is but a trustee for the creditors. While he holds the property the creditors are cestuis que trust, and a cestui que trust may bring an action to set aside a fraudulent transfer of property by the debtor, if he makes the trustee a party. - Dewey v. Moyer, 16 N. B. R. (Sup. Ct. N. Y.) 1.

4. Even after the appointment of an assignee in bankruptcy, creditors may bring actions to set aside fraudulent transfers of property. Not joining the assignee as a party is a defect of parties; and, if not set up in the answer, is waived. - Ibid.

The omission to file proof of an act of bankruptcy is substantial, and cannot be cured by amendment. — In re Brown, 15 N. B. R. (Col. Dist.) 416. See PROOF, 4.

APPEAL.

1. A proceeding to prove a debt is part of the suit in bankruptcy. An appeal from the allowance or disallowance by the District Court of a claim may be taken to the Circuit Court; but when that court acts thereon all parties are concluded. No appeal lies. — Wiswall v. Campbell, 15 N. B. R. (U. S. S. Ct.) 421.

2. The fact that an appeal was taken from a judgment does not affect the lien acquired thereby, if no bonds were given by the appellant, as required by law. In re Gold Mountain Mining Company, 15 N. B. R. (Cal. Dist.) 545. See PRACTICE, 1.

ASSIGNEE.

1. The trustee or assignee in bankruptcy takes the property, subject to all legal and equitable claims of others. — Hayes v. Dickinson, 15 N. B. R. (Sup. Ct. N. Y.) 350.

2. Where a receiver, in an action to foreclose a mortgage, was appointed to take the rents and profits before the mortgagor was adjudged a bankrupt, the assignee is not entitled to the fund in the hands of the receiver as against the mortgagee, upon a sale of the premises, for a sum less than the mortgagee's claim. Ibid.

3. The discharge of the bankrupt interposes no obstacle to the right and duty of the assignee to collect the assets of the bankrupt, whether they were placed upon the schedule or not. · Maybin v. Raymond, 15 N. B. R. (S. D. Miss.) 353.

4. An assignee in bankruptcy has a stronger right than the bankrupt. He stands in the place of an attaching or an execution creditor, and may impeach the validity of contracts void as to creditors. — In re Gurney, 15 N. B. R. (E. D. Wis.) 373.

5. Where assignees redeem pledges, they are subrogated to all the rights of the pledgees, until, from the proceeds of the pledges redeemed, the fund for general distribution is made good. — McLean v. Cadwalader, 15 N. B. R. (C. Pl. Phila.) 383.

6. Upon the discharge of the assignee, the property reverts to the debtor without a reassignment. Dewey v. Moyer, 16 N. B. R. (Sup. Ct. N. Y.) 1. See ACTION, 4; BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS; COURT, 2; EXEMPTION, 3.

ASSIGNMENT.

An assignment for the benefit of creditors of "all the goods, chattels, and effects, and property of every kind, personal and mixed," does not pass the real estate of the debtor. - Rhoads v. Blatt, 16 N. B. R. (Sup. Ct. Pa.) 32.

See JURISDICTION, 4.

ATTACHMENT.

1. Under the statutes of Vermont the attachment of a debt by trustee process creates a lien upon the fund attached, though no service is made upon or notice given to the principal debtor. — In re Peck, 16 N. B. R. (Vt. Dist.) 43. 2. Such lien is a lien by attachment upon mesne process, and is saved by the act, if made within the time prescribed. — Ibid. See COMPOSITION, 1.

See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 1.

BANKRUPT LAW.

1. The statute of New Hampshire of 1874, which provides that when the assets of a savings bank fall below ninety per cent of the amount of deposits, the deposit accounts shall be reduced so much, and the balance equitably dis