2. A. sold goods to B., supposing him to be the partner of C.; but the partnership which had existed between B. and C. had in fact been dissolved, though A. had no notice of the dissolution. The only dealing which A. had previously had with the firm was to make a single sale to them, two years before. Held, that the firm were not bound to notify him of the dissolution, and therefore that C. was not liable to him for the price of the goods sold. Merritt v. Williams, 17 Kans. 287.

See BANKRUPTCY, 1; FRAUD; SET-OFF, 1.

PARTY-WALL.

A. being about to build on his land, in consideration of permission from B., the owner of the adjacent land, to build his wall on the division line between the estates, agreed that B. might use the wall without charge whenever he wished to build. Held, that the destruction of the wall by fire put an end to the agreement, and that B. could not claim the right to use, without pay, a wall built by A., with his assent, on the site of the former. Huck v. Flentye, 80 l. 258.

PENALTY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 2.

PLEADING.

Notwithstanding the code, which requires the facts constituting the cause of action to be stated, a declaration in the common-law form of indebitatus assumpsit will be good on demurrer, if sufficient at common law; but not otherwise. Williams v. Brunson, 41 Wis. 418.

See DAMAGES, 1; Demurrer; Judgment; TenANT IN COMMON.

PLEDGE.

Stock in a national bank was pledged to secure a debt, with power to the pledgees to sell it on default of payment. Held, that a sale by them pursuant to the power was not voidable as a fraud on creditors of the bank, though they sold because they believed the bank insolvent, and in order to escape personal liability as stockholders. Magruder v. Colston, 44 Md. 349.

POWER.

By the rules of a benevolent society, a sum was payable, on the death of any member, to his widow, children, or such persons to whom he might have disposed of the same by will or assignment; and if there should be no widow or child, and no disposition by will or assignment, the fund, after paying funeral expenses of the deceased, should go to the permanent fund of the society. A member died unmarried and without issue, and by his will gave the "entire residue" of his estate, after payment of debts and funeral expenses, to four persons equally. Held, (1) that the fund due from the society was

not assets of the testator's estate, but only the subject of a power; (2) that the power was not exercised.-Maryland Mut. Benev. Soc. v. Clendinen, 44 Md. 429.

See MORTGAGE, 2, 3, 4; WILL, 2.

See CORPORATION, 4; EXECUTION, 1, 2, 3; REMOVAL OF SUITS.

PREROGATIVE.

Mechanic's lien laws do not bind the State.

versity, 71 Ill. 310.

PRESUMPTION.

Thomas v. Industrial Uni

1. There is no presumption whatever as to the law in force among the Creek Nation of Indians; but their laws and customs, if material, must be proved. Duval v. Marshall, 30 Ark. 230.

2. The Supreme Court of Indiana refused to presume, in the absence of evidence, that the Stat. 3 & 4 Ann. c. 9, sect. 1, making promissory notes negotiable like bills of exchange, or any similar statute, was in force in another State. Alford v. Baker, 53 Ind. 279.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See AGENT.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY. - See SURETY.

PRIORITY.

Where several bonds, secured by one mortgage, are assigned at several times to divers persons, if the mortgaged estate proves insufficient to pay all the bonds in full, they shall be paid in the order of priority of assignment, without reference to their dates of maturity. — Gordon v. Fitzhugh, 27 Gratt. 835.

See MORTGAGE, 5; REGISTRY, 1, 2; SUBROGATION; USURY.

PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE.

A statute gives a right of action to a wife for injuries sustained by her “in consequence of the intoxication of " her husband, against the persons causing the intoxication. Defendants made plaintiff's husband drunk; he was carried home in a wagon, and on the way a barrel in the wagon fell on him, causing him fatal injuries. Held, that the injury was not the " consequence of the intoxication," and therefore that plaintiff could not recover. - Krach v. Heilman, 53 Ind. 517.

See TRESPASS, 2.

RAILROAD.

1. A "railway construction company" incorporated for the purpose of furnishing materials for, and building and equipping railroads, held, a railroad corporation within the meaning of a statute regulating the liability of stockholders in such corporations for the corporate debts. (BECK and ADAMS, JJ. dissenting.) — First Nat. Bank of Davenport v. Davies, 43 Iowa, 424.

2. Plaintiff rode in defendants' freight-car from A. to B., with the knowl

edge of the conductor, to whom he paid his fare to C., a place beyond B. on the same line. The conductor only went as far as B., and had no authority to collect fare to points beyond. At B. plaintiff left the car, and afterwards re-entered it, and the train proceeded in charge of another conductor, who did not know that plaintiff was in the freight-car. By defendants' negligence the car was set on fire, and plaintiff injured. Held, that defendants were not liable. Jenkins v. Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. Co., 41 Wis. 112. See AGENT, 2; CONTRACT, 2; CORPORATION, 1; ILLEGAL CONTRAct, 1.

RECEIPT. See DEED.

REGISTRY.

1. A mortgagee recorded his mortgage; the records were destroyed by fire. A statute was passed providing for their restoration, but he took no steps to restore his record. Afterwards the mortgagor conveyed to a bona fide purchaser without notice of the mortgage. Held, that the purchaser took the land subject to the mortgage. Shannon v. Hall, 72 Ill. 354.

2. Land which has been conveyed is not afterwards subject to confiscation by the United States for the offence of the grantor, though the conveyance be not recorded. — Burbank v. Conrad, 27 La. Ann. 152.

See LIS PENDENS, 1; MORTGAGE, 5.

RELEASE. See DEED.

REMOVAL OF SUITS FROM STATE TO UNITED STATES COURTS.

1. Where foreign corporations are required by statute to have an agent in the State to accept service of process, and to deposit with the State treasurer a fund to answer claims on them, semble, that by compliance with the law they become, quoad hoc, domestic corporations, and cannot remove into the United States courts actions brought against them in State courts. — Continental Ins. Co. v. Kasey, 27 Gratt. 216.

2. An inferior State court made a decree for the plaintiff in a suit in equity. The Supreme Court of the State, on appeal, reversed the decree, and remanded the cause with a direction to dismiss the bill. Held, that the plaintiff could not, after the cause had been remanded to the inferior court, and before the bill had been actually dismissed, remove the cause out of that court into the United States Circuit Court. Boggs v. Willard, 70 Ill. 315.

3. Sect. 639 of the United States Revised Statutes, providing for the removal of causes, at any time before trial, from State to United States courts, on the ground of prejudice or local influence, is not repealed by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1875 (18 Sts. at Large, Pt. III., 470), which provides generally for the removal of causes at the time of appearance. Barber v. St. Louis, Kansas City, & Northern Ry. Co., 43 Iowa, 223.

4. Judgment rendered in an United States court, in a cause removed thither from a State court by the plaintiff, was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the cause was remanded to the State court where it was begun. Held, that there was no discontinuance of the original action, and that the plaintiff was not barred by any lapse of time since it was first begun. — Germania Ins. Co. v. Francis, 52 Miss. 457.

5. An affidavit by the vice-president of a foreign corporation, sued in a State court, that he has reason to believe, and does believe, that from prejudice and local influence the corporation cannot obtain justice in that court, is not sufficient to remove the suit into the United States Circuit Court, under the Act of Congress of 1867, as that act requires an affidavit of the defendant's own belief. Semble, that an agent may make oath on behalf of a corporation, but that he must have special authority for this purpose. - Quigley v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 11 Nev. 350.

6. In an action against several defendants, judgment was rendered for them all; on appeal, the judgment was affirmed, except as to one defendant, and as to him it was reversed, and a new trial ordered. Held, that having thus become the sole defendant, he could not, under the Act of Congress of 1866, c. 287 (14 Sts. at Large, 306, U. S. Rev. Sts. sect. 639, cl. 2) remove the action into the United States Circuit Court. Vose v. Yulee, 64 N. Y. 449.

REPEAL.

Where indorsers on a note are by the law in force at the time of their indorsement chargeable without demand or notice, they remain so chargeable though the law is altered before the note falls due, so as to require demand and notice. Duerson v. Alsop, 27 Gratt. 229.

In an action for seduction of the plaintiff's daughter and servant, evidence that the defendant, after the seduction, procured an abortion to be made is admissible to aggravate damages, at least if such matter is laid in the declaration; and evidence of an offer of marriage by the defendant after action brought is not admissible in mitigation. White v. Murtland, 71 Ill. 250.

SET-OFF.

1. A statute allowed set-off in case of mutual debts between the plaintiff or plaintiffs, or either of them, and the defendant or defendants, or either of them. In an action by partners, held, that the defendant could not set off a debt due him from one of the partners individually. — Meeker v. Thompson, 43 Conn. 77.

2. A depositor in a savings bank cannot, if the bank is insolvent, set off

his deposit against a debt due from him to the bank. Osborn v. Byrne, 43

Conn. 155.

SLANDER.

See EVIDENCE, 2.

SLAVE.

The marriage of a master to his slave, if otherwise valid, and not forbidden by law, is valid, and works an emancipation of the slave. - Pearson v. Pearson, 51 Cal. 120.

The court will not hold a statute void without further evidence than the agreement of parties that it was not passed with the forms required by the Constitution. · Happel v. Brethauer, 70 Ill. 166.

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See BURGLARY; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE; ILLEGAL CONTRACT, 2; MandamuS; PRESUMPTION, 2; REPEAL; WILL, 1.

STATUTE Of Frauds.

See FRAUDS, Statute of.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE of.

SUBROGATION.

A sheriff who pays an execution against B., in his hands, without taking at the time an assignment of the judgment on which it is issued, is not entitled to be subrogated to the lien of that judgment as against subsequent creditors of B. - Clevinger v. Miller, 27 Gratt. 740.

SUCCESSION DUTY. - See TAX, 2.

SURETY.

Scott v.

1. Sureties are discharged by an extension of time given to the principal debtor, though the consideration of such extension be usurious. Harris, 76 N. C. 205.

2. A debtor offered to pay his debt which was due; the creditor requested him to keep the money, saying that he had no use for it; the debtor afterwards became insolvent. Held, that a surety for the debt was not discharged. — Clark v. Sickler, 64 N. Y. 231.

See BANK.

TAX.

1. Under a constitutional provision that all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, held, that debts due were not property, nor taxable. (Overruling former decisions; RHODES, J. dissenting.) - People v. Hibernia Savings & Loan Society, 51 Cal. 243.

2. A statutory exemption from taxation of all personal property of charitable institutions does not relieve property bequeathed to such institutions from the payment of legacy duties. — Miller v. The Commonwealth, 27 Gratt. 110.

3. One town cannot maintain a bill to enjoin the collection of a tax by