INJUNCTION.

A county was duly authorized by statute and by popular vote to issue, and levy a tax to pay, bonds to be signed by certain officers, and countersigned by the treasurer. The bonds were issued without the treasurer's signature. Held, that equity would not enjoin the collection of a tax levied for their payment. (BREESE, C. J. and MCALLISTER, J. dissenting.) Sed

dubitatur whether any action at law would lie on them. 72 Ill. 63.

See TAX, 3; WAY, 2.

Melvin v.

INSOLVENCY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1; Set-off, 2.

INSURANCE (FIRE).

Lisenby,

1. A building was insured by policy conditioned to be void if the building should fall. The wall of part of the building fell, leaving more than threefourths standing. Held, that the policy was not avoided.

Co., 51 Cal. 101.

· Breuner v. Ins.

2. Insurance was effected on a phaeton contained in a barn, particularly described. Held, that the phaeton, while left at a carriage-shop for repairs, was covered by the policy. · McCluer v. Girard F. & M. Ins. Co., 43 Iowa, 349.

INSURANCE (LIFE).

A son has not necessarily, as such, an insurable interest in the life of his father. Guardian Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Hogan, 80 Ill. 35.

INTENT.

The prisoner came to the prosecutor's house, where he had before bought cider, and asked the prosecutor's daughter, who was alone at home, for a drink of cider, offering to pay for it. She refused to let him have it, whereupon he opened the cellar door against her objection, went in and drew some cider. Held, that the evidence showed no criminal intent, and therefore that the prisoner was not guilty either of burglary or larceny, but only of a civil trespass. McCourt v. The People, 64 N. Y. 583.

See EVIDENCE, 5.

INTEREST.

- See BILLS AND NOTES; OFFICER; SURETY, 1; USURY. JOINT TORTFEasor.

See NEGLIGENCE, 1; TRESPASS, 1.

JUDGMENT.

In an action on a foreign judgment, the declaration need not show that the court, by which the judgment was rendered, had jurisdiction, either of the parties or of the cause of action. — Phelps v. Duffy, 11 Nev. 80.

See BANKRUPTCY, 1; CONTEMPT, 1; CORPORATION, 4; EVIDENCE, 2; WAR; WAY, 2.

See BANKRUPTCY, 1; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1; Judg

MENT; REMOVAL OF SUITS.

JURY.

Where aliens were prohibited by statute from serving on juries generally, held, that an alien accused of a crime could not have a jury de medietate. People v. Chin Mook Sow, 51 Cal. 597.

LACHES. See MONEY HAD AND REceived.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Notice to quit, addressed, and delivered on the demised premises, to the husband and general agent of the tenant, is well served, and sufficient, if otherwise in proper form, to determine a tenancy at will. Cook v. Creswell,

44 Md. 581.

In computing the Statute of Limitations on a promissory note, the day of its maturity is excluded; and it makes no difference that the note is payable at a bank, so that an action might be brought after business hours on the day of maturity, as (semble) it may in such case. Blackman v. Nearing, 43

Conn. 56.

See TRESPASS, 2.

LIS PENDENS.

1. A State statute provided that no person, not a party to a suit, should be affected with notice of its pendency, unless such notice was recorded as prescribed by the statute. Held, that causes pending in the United States courts in the State were not within the statute. Majors v. Cowell, 51 Cal. 478. 2. A bona fide purchaser is not affected with notice of a suit pending against his grantor, if the latter has not been served with process, or appeared gratis, though a bill has been filed. — Ib.

MANDAMUS.

The Secretary of State refused to publish a law in the official journal, on the ground that it had not been duly enacted. Held, that whether it had or not, he could not be compelled by mandamus to publish it. State v. Deslonde, 27 La. Ann. 71.

See CORPORATION, 2.

MARKET. See CONSTITUTIONAL Law, 7.

MARRIAGE.

By the law of North Carolina, marriages between negroes and white persons are unlawful. Such a marriage took place in another State, where it

was lawful, the parties having left their domicil in North Carolina in order to be married, and not intending to return; but they afterwards did return. Held, that the marriage was valid. READ and BYNUM, JJ. dissenting. State v. Ross, 76 N. C. 242. Secus, where the parties left the State with intent to evade its laws and to return. State v. Kennedy, ib. 251. See SLAVE.

MARRIED WOMAN.

See HUSBAND AND WIFE; WILL, 1.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

A piano entrusted to common carriers for carriage, was injured by the negligence of their servant, who was put in charge of it. Held, that they might recover of him the amount voluntarily paid by them, without suit, to the owner of the piano in settlement, if such amount did not exceed the actual damage. Smith v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244.

One who has accepted and paid to the holder a draft which has been altered by raising the amount, may recover the amount overpaid from the holder, though the latter was innocent of the forgery, and might have saved himself from loss if the acceptor had used reasonable diligence to notify him of it. White v. Continental National Bank, 64 N. Y. 316.

1. A mortgage of crops thereafter to be planted is valid. (WALLACE, C. J. and McKINSTRY, J. dissenting.) — Arques v. Wasson, 51 Cal. 620. 8. P. Goerman v. Robb, 52 Miss. 653.

2. A deed of trust gave a power to the trustee, "or his legal representatives," to sell the property conveyed by the deed on default of payment of the debt for which it was conveyed as security. Held, that the power could not be exercised by the administrator of the trustee, but only by his successor in the trust. (BREESE, C. J. and SHELDON, J. dissenting.) Warnecke v. Lembca, 71 Ill. 91.

3. A trust deed contained a power of sale "at the north door of the courthouse." The court-house having been destroyed by fire, and remaining in ruins, held, that the power was well executed by a sale at the place where the north door had been. Walter v. Arnold, 71 Ill. 350.

4. A mortgage contained a power of sale on default, after advertisement every other day for twenty-one days in some paper in the county. When the mortgage was made, and when a default happened, there was no paper published oftener than weekly in the county. Held, that the mortgagee might

make a valid sale in the manner prescribed by law for cases where there was no agreement of the parties as to notice. Warehime v. Carroll County Building Association, 44 Md. 512.

5. Two mortgages on the same land to different persons were given simultaneously, all parties intending that neither should have priority. One of the mortgages was, however, recorded before the other; and, after the other had been recorded, the former was assigned to a bona fide purchaser, who had no notice of the original agreement. Held, that such purchaser had not priority over the other mortgagee, but took his mortgage subject to the latter's equities. Greene v. Warnick, 64 N. Y. 220.

See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF; PRIORITY; REGISTRY, 1; USURY.

MORTMAIN. See CONFLICT OF LAWS.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

1. A city, authorized by its charter to license, tax, and regulate omnibuses, cannot grant an exclusive right to run omnibuses within its limits. — Logan v. Pyne, 43 Iowa, 524.

2. Legislative power over municipal corporations is unlimited; and therefore a statute extending the limits of a city must be held constitutional, though the extension is wholly unnecessary and unreasonable, and made only to enable the city to tax the inhabitants of lands covered by the extension. Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53.

See BY-LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 1, 3; TAX, 3, 5; Way, 1, 2. NECESSARIES. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. Defendants having contracted to erect a building under the direction of an architect, sub-let the mason-work to sub-contractors, who agreed to cut, when directed, a recess in the wall to receive a waste-pipe to carry water from the roof to a sewer. No directions were given; the recess was not cut, and water ran from the roof into the cellar, where other water leaked in from the street through negligence of the sub-contractors; and the water thence leaked into plaintiff's adjoining building, injuring his goods. Held, that it was the duty of defendants, and not of the architect, to give directions to the sub-contractors; that they were, therefore, guilty of negligence in not giving directions; and that though they were not liable for the negligence of the sub-contractors, yet, as it was impossible to apportion the responsibility for the damage done, they were liable for the whole of it. Slater v. Merserau,

64 N. Y. 139.

2. In an action to recover for injuries caused by the defendant's negligence, if the defendant would defeat the action on the ground of contributory negligence in the plaintiff, it lies on him to prove such negligence; and the plaintiff is not called on, as part of his prima facie case, to show, affirmatively, due care in himself. Hoyt v. Hudson, 41 Wis. 105.

See MASTER AND SERVANT; RAILROAD, 2.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS. See BILLS AND NOTES.

NOTICE. - See LIS PENDENS; REGISTRY, 1; REPEAL.
NOTICE TO QUIT. SEE LANDLORD AND TENANT.

NUISANCE.

1. One who owned land on which was a kiln for drying lumber, let the same to be used for that purpose, knowing that such use endangered neighboring buildings. Held, that he was liable for an injury to an adjoining house caused by fire set from the kiln. Helwig v. Jordan, 53 Ind. 21.

2. A county is not liable for damages sustained by a person by reason of the erection of a jail near his house, nor by reason of the negligent and improper keeping of the same rendering it a nuisance. Wehn v. Gage County, 5 Neb. 494.

A public officer, as a county treasurer, is not a trustee in respect of the public money received by him; and is, therefore, not accountable for interest received by him on a loan of such money, if he makes no default in paying over the principal. — Shelton v. The State, 53 Ind. 331.

See SUBROGATION.

ORDINANCE. See BY-LAW; EVIDENCE, 3; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1.

PARDON.

Under the Constitution of North Carolina, which authorizes a pardon only "after conviction," held, that a pardon after verdict and before judgment was valid. (PEARSON, C. J. dissenting.) — State v. Alexander, 76 N. C. 231.

See BAIL..

-

PARENT.

The mother of a bastard child, which is supported by another person, under a lawful contract with her, and without expense to her, cannot maintain a bastardy process against the child's father. Young v. The State, 53 Ind. 536. See CONTRACT, 2; GUARDIAN; INSURANCE (LIFE).

PARTIES.

The charter of a toll-bridge provided that no other toll-bridge, nor any ferry, should be established within three miles. Held, that the owner of the bridge was a necessary party to a suit involving the right to establish a free bridge within three miles of it. Satterthwaite v. Beaufort County, 76 N. C.

153.

See DEVISE, 2.

PARTNERSHIP.

1. A. agreed to advance money to B. from time to time, up to a certain amount, to enable B. to carry on business; and B. agreed to pay interest to A. on the average balance advanced, and also half the profits, after deducting a fixed sum for expenses; but A. was not to bear any losses. Held, that A. and B. were not partners as to third persons. Smith v. Knight, 71 Ill. 148.