tion only of the income of the estate of the testator as with the income from other sources will make up" the amount needed for the wife's support, &c. The court would not interfere with the exercise of the discretion given to the trustees by the will. — Gisborne et al. v. Gisborne et al., 2 App. Cas. 300.

3. Residuary bequest to trustees to hold "in trust for such of my nieces, M. and N., as shall be living at my death, my desire being that they shall distribute such residue as they think will be most agreeable to my wishes." Held, that M. and N. took absolutely for their own benefit. - Stead v. Mellor, 5 Ch. D. 225.

See DEVISE, 2.

TRUSTEE.

Trustees advanced money to A., a builder, on security of land purchased by A. of B., the defendant and one of the trustees, and which A. had built upon. The money was used partly to pay for the land, and partly to repay other sums which A. owed B. The plaintiff, the other trustee, knew that A. and B. had had business relations. A. went into bankruptcy, and the plaintiff

filed a bill against B., his co-trustee, alleging that the security was insufficient, and asking that the property be sold, and that the defendant be held to make up the deficiency. Refused. - Butler v. Butler, 5 Ch. D. 554.

ULTRA VIRES.

Suit to recover money advanced by the plaintiff bank to the O. R. Company, and secured by equitable mortgage. Under art. 50 of the articles of association of the company, the power of the directors thereof to borrow money "should not exceed in the aggregate, as an existing debt at the same time, one-half of the then actually paid-up capital." Under art. 31, the power of the directors to borrow could be extended by one-half the votes of all the shareholders at a general meeting. There was no limit of the power of the company to borrow. Dec. 23, 1867, the directors got a credit for £10,000; Sept. 11, 1868, one for £5,000. Oct. 29, 1868, these acts were ratified by the company. Subsequently, the first credit was renewed, and another for £5,000 obtained, neither of which were ever ratified. The paid-up capital was £8,850; and in February, 1871, the amount borrowed was £15,000. Held, that the ratification by the company of Oct. 29, 1868, was within the powers of the company; but it did not authorize any similar transaction by the directors in the future; and all done by them subsequently to that date, contrary to art. 50, was ultra vires. Decree for £8,850 only. — Irvine v. The Union Bank of Australia, 2 App. Cas. 366.

See COMPANY, 2, 7.

USAGE. See VENDOR'S LIEN.

VENDOR AND Purchaser.

Feb. 10, 1876, L., a merchant, and W., a manufacturer, made an agreement under which W. was to supply L. with goods from time to time, and W. should draw upon L. bills of exchange for the invoice price, which L. should accept, L. having regularly a credit of £5,000. L. was to ship the goods to R. & Co., Shanghai, for sale on his account; sending the bills of lading by post, and

made out to R. & Co.'s order. W. was to have a lien on the bills of lading, and the goods in transit to Shanghai, or in anybody's hands as well as upon the proceeds or the goods purchased therewith in the hands of the consignees, or in transit homewards; such lien not to be general, but to be confined to the particular shipment, and cease when the bills for such shipment had been paid by L. L. was to insure primarily for the benefit of W., as mortgagee or pledgee. L. promised W. to give R. & Co. notice of this agreement; but they had no notice of it. Under the agreement, L. ordered goods of W.; they were packed by W.'s packer, and marked "Shanghai." W. sent the invoice to L., headed "L., bought of W." L. wrote the packer to send the goods to the G., a Shanghai vessel loading at the dock. W. paid the freight to the dock, and the packer advised L. that he had sent the goods thither, at L.'s disposal. W. drew on L., at six months, for the amount of the bill of the goods; and L. accepted the bill. The carriers who took the goods to the dock notified L. that they had arrived at their warehouse, and would be sent to the G.; and they were shipped on board that vessel, and the bills of lading made out to L.'s order. He did not, however, pay the freight, and the bills of lading remained in the ship-owners' hands. Subsequently, April 5, 1876, L. suspended payment. April 8, the G. sailed. April 12, L. filed his petition in bankruptcy, and, May 20, was adjudged bankrupt. The trustee in bankruptcy and W. each demanded the bills of lading before the ship reached Shanghai; and it was agreed that the goods should be sold, and the proceeds held to abide the decision of the court. page in transitu until the goods reached the bills of lading, he had exercised his exchange accepted by L. paid out of the proceeds of sale of the goods. Ex parte Watson. In re Love, 5 Ch. D. 35. See BILL OF LADING; SALE, 3.

Held, that W. had a right of stopShanghai; and that, by demanding right, and could have the bill of

VENDOR'S LIEN.

The P. Company, defendants, manufacturers of steel rails, made a contract for rails with S. & Co., to furnish them a certain quantity at stated times, delivered at Liverpool on board ships; payment to be made three-fifths net cash, and two-fifths by buyer's acceptance, at four months, as each five hundred tons of rails were ready for shipment. The warrant signed by the defendant company for the delivery of the rails contained the phrase, "Iron deliverable (f. o. b.) to S. & Co., or to their assigns by indorsement hereon;" and it was shown to be the usage of the iron trade that such warrants were considered to pass the goods to the holder thereof free from vendor's lien. Several warrants in this form were sent, with invoice and drafts, to S. & Co., as the instalments of rails were finished, and the rails stored at the company's works. S. & Co. pledged the warrants to the plaintiff banking company for advances; and, before the contract was completed, and while some of the goods were still at the works, and some had been sent to Liverpool on the order of S. & Co., and were in the railway company's warehouse, S. & Co. suspended. Held, that under the above usage, the plaintiffs were entitled to the goods at the works, and were, moreover, entitled to those in

the warehouse, as being no longer in transit. — Merchant Banking Co. of London v. Phoenix Bessemer Steel Co., 5 Ch. D. 205.

1. Testatrix made a will disposing of all of her property. In 1860, she made another, making some changes in the bequests as they stood in the first document. The second will contained no residuary clause, and made no allusion to the previous will; but it declared that "this is the last will . . . of me." Held, that the first will must be considered revoked; the second alone admitted to probate. Dempsey v. Lawson, 2 P. D. 98.

2. Clause: "I appoint my sister

my executrix, only requesting that my nephews," F. and J., " will kindly act for' or with this dear sister." Held, that F. and J. were duly named executors with the sister of the testatrix. In the Goods of Brown, 2 P. D. 110.

3. Testatrix wished to revive a will and codicil dated respectively Jan. 26, and Feb. 21, 1876, and which had been subsequently revoked. Her solicitor made copies of them, and had the two documents re-executed Jan. 18, 1877. He neglected to change the reference to the date of the will made in the codicil, and the codicil read, " my last will dated Jan. 26, 1876." Held, that the will and codicil should be admitted to probate. In the Goods of Ince, 2 P. D. 111.

4. Clause in will: "I hereby appoint one of my sisters my sole executrix." Testator had three sisters living at the date of the will; but only one survived him. The court refused to grant probate to her on the ground of uncertainty. - In the Goods of Blackwell, 2 P. D. 72.

5. Testator, living in Brighton, left a will appointing twelve executors thereof, one of whom he described as "Percival of Brighton, the father." There was evidence that testator had an intimate friend in Brighton, named William Percival Boxall; that testator was accustomed to call him Percival, and had appointed him executor in a previous will; that Boxall had a son named Percival, well known to the testator; and that testator knew no other person named Percival. This evidence was admitted to determine who was meant. In the Goods of De Rosaz, 2 P. D. 66.

6. H. made a will dated March 15, 1864, giving his property to his wife. Oct. 12, 1874, he and his wife made a joint will, “in case we should be called out of this world at one and the same time, and by one and the same accident.” There was a clause revoking all previous wills. He died Dec. 31, 1876; his wife surviving. Held, that the joint will was made in view of an event which never happened, and hence it had become and was of no effect. The other will was good. In the Goods of Hugo, 2 P. D. 73.

7. Testator used a blank lithographed form for a will to give property absolutely to children after the life-estate of the widow. The lithographed words giving to the children were marked out, and the words, " to my only son, H.," written in. No note was made on any part of the will to these alterations, and the attesting witness (one witness had died) knew nothing

about it. Testator left five children by a former wife, and the said son H. by a wife living. Testator had said to the trustee named in the will that he meant to provide for his son H.; and this evidence was admitted, and the will admitted to probate. Dench v. Dench, 2 P. D. 60.

See BEQUEST, 1, 2; CONSTRUCTION, 1, 2; DEVISE, 1, 2; ELECTION; TRUST, 1, 2, 3.

WINDING UP. - See COMPANY, 4.

WORDS.

Money, Cattle, Farming Implements, &c." - See BEQUEST, 2. "All and Every the Children or other Issue." See CONSTRUCTION, 1.

SELECTED DIGEST OF STATE REPORTS.

[FOR the present number of the Digest, selections have been made from the following volumes of State Reports: 30 Arkansas; 51 California; 43 Connecticut; 27 Grattan (Virginia); 70, 71, 72, 79, and 80 Illinois; 53 Indiana; 43 Iowa; 17 Kansas; 27 Louisiana Annual; 44 Maryland; 52 Mississippi; 5 Nebraska; 11 Nevada; 64 New York; 76 North Carolina; and 41 Wisconsin.]

ACTION.

1. The city of Williamsburg, Va., being occupied by the United States forces during the war, the officers in command furnished supplies to a lunatic asylum in the city, the directors of the corporation owning the asylum having left the city and dispersed; and under such military authority, provisions were taken without compensation from the house of G., which he had left, and were converted to the use of the asylum. Held, that the corporation of the asylum was liable to G. in trover. (CHRISTIAN, J. dissenting.) — Eastern Lunatic Asylum v. Garrett, 27 Gratt. 163.

2. No action lies at common law against a supervisor of highways for injuries caused to a traveller by defects in the highway. McConnell v. Dewey,

5 Neb. 385.

See DEVISE, 2; NUISANCE, 1, 2; PROXIMATE CAUSE.

ADMINISTRATION. - See EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR.

ADULTERY. See DOWER, 2.

1. A broker is entitled to a commission for effecting a sale of land, if he has procured a person to enter into a binding agreement to purchase it, though the agreement be not carried out. - Love v. Miller, 53 Ind. 294.

2. A railroad company is not liable for advances made by a commission merchant on the faith of a bill of lading fraudulently signed by one of its station agents, the goods therein specified never having been shipped or received at the station for transportation. ·Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Wil

kens, 44 Md. 11.

3. The owner of a mill contracted to buy provisions and supplies for the men employed in the mill; and such supplies were furnished as required, on the order of the owner's agent. Held, that the contractors so furnishing them, after the owner's death, but before they had notice of it, could recover the price against his administrator. — Lenz v. Brown, 41 Wis. 172.

See ATTORNEY, 2; BANKRUPTCY, 2; LANDLORD And Tenant; REMOVAL OF SUITS, 5.