Bovill's Act, 28 and 29 Vict. c. 86, "in sums of £500, from persons willing to advance the same for the purpose of the said partnership; and the said capital shall be divided into sixty equal parts of £500 each," of which B. was to be the owner of seventeen, and H. of twenty-three; "and the remaining twenty equal parts or shares shall be considered as appropriated to or for the benefit of the person or persons so advancing money by way of loan, as aforesaid, on the proportion on which the same shall be advanced by them respectively." The capital was not to be drawn out of the business during the continuance of the partnership. Then followed a clause that the partners were to conduct the business to the best of their ability. The profits were to be paid out each year to persons holding £500 shares, according to the number thereof; and, on the expiration or earlier termination of the partnership, the parties thus making "advances by way of loan" were to be repaid the same, less what might have been overpaid them by way of profits. The other provisions usual to partnership articles were contained in these. About the same time, a deed was made between one D. and the partners B. & H., reciting the partnership papers, and that D. had agreed to advance them £2,500 under Bovill's Act, by way of loan, to carry on their business, which B. & H. agreed to repay within six months after the termination of the partnership; that B. & H. should observe all the provisions of the partnership articles, and the latter should be always open to D.'s inspection; that B. & H. would make out yearly accounts, and pay D. either five-sixtieths of the profits, or such a proportion of all the profits as D.'s advance bore to the whole capital; that, if either partner became bankrupt, the other should pay D. his advance and profits due him in full; that, within six months after the termination of the partnership, said £2,500 should be repaid "out of the assets" of the firm ; and that if, at the end of the business, the amounts paid D. as profits turned out to exceed the whole profits of the business, D. should refund the excess, not exceeding £2,500. There followed an arbitration clause. Bovill's Act provides that" the advance of money to a firm upon a contract that the lender shall receive a rate of interest varying with the profits, or a share of the profits, shall not of itself constitute the lender a partner." Held, that the act was declaratory of the common law; and that, at common law, D. was liable, as a partner, for the whole of the partnership debts. - Pooley v. Driver, 5 Ch. D. 458. A sea-wall had been maintained, time out of mind, along a creek on which plaintiff and defendant each had land. It was necessary now and then to put fresh material on the top of the wall, to keep it up to a proper height. Defendant neglected to "top" his wall, and, in consequence, the sea flowed over and injured not only his own land, but also that of plaintiff. Held, that there was no evidence of a prescriptive liability of any one abuttor to maintain his wall for the protection of the others; and the common law created no such liability on the frontagers. Hudson v. Tabor, 11 Q. B. D. 290; s. c. 1 1 Q. B. D. 225. Where a widow was entitled to an annuity, during life or widowhood, out of property bequeathed to her sons, and the sons had given bonds for the payment of the same, and then went into bankruptcy, held, that the value of her claim was capable of being fixed and proved through the report of an actuary. Ex parte Blakemore. In re Blakemore, 5 Ch. D. 372. RAILWAY. 1. A person was informed against under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, § 145, for not showing his ticket on a railway company's carriage, for which offence a by-law of the company required him "to pay the fare from the station whence the train originally started to the end of his journey." Held, that to recover under this by-law, there must have been a demand of the specific sum due thereunder in the particular case complained of. - Brown v. The Great Eastern Railway Co., 2 Q. B. D. 406. 2. By the Railway and Canal Traffic Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 31), § 2, railway companies are forbidden to "give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to, or in favor of, any particular person or company," in the matter of carrying and forwarding traffic. Plaintiff had a brewery at B., where there were three other breweries. The latter were connected with the M. Railway; plaintiff was not. In order to get some of the freight from the three breweries for themselves away from the M. railway, the defendant company carried their goods from the breweries to their freight depot, free of charge, and still made a profit on the transportation. They made a charge to the plaintiff for the same service. Held, that this was "undue preference" within the act, and the plaintiff could recover an amount equal to the cost of carting his goods to the defendant's depot. —Evershed v. The London & Northwestern Railway Co., 2 Q. B. D. 254. See COMPANY, 1, 2; FERRY; NEGLIGENCE, 2. RAPE. The prisoner was consulted by the prosecutrix, a girl of nineteen, with her mother, for fits. He said the difficulty was, that "Nature's string wanted breaking." Without knowing what that meant, the girl consented to his remedy; and, under pretence of performing a surgical operation, he had carnal intercourse with her, she being wilfully and fraudulently induced to believe that it was merely medical treatment. Held, that he was guilty of rape. The judges all intimated a wish that the point decided in Reg. v. Barrow (Law Rep. 1 C. C. 156) might be reconsidered. - The Queen v. Flattery, 2 Q. B. D. 410. 1. March 3, 1876, D., a broker, bought for B. & Co., his undisclosed principals, certain dry goods lying at the K. Docks consigned to C., payment to be made in fourteen days. C. signed a delivery order to the Docks' superintendent to the order of D. D. indorsed it to B. & Co. B. & Co. indorsed it to plaintiffs, as security for advances. March 18, being prompt day, plaintiffs sent the delivery order to the Docks' office, with the request to hold the order, and have warrants made out as soon as possible. He was told the goods would be ready for delivery on the 20th; and a clerk was sent to the Docks' warrant office with the order, where he arrived at 3 P. M. Meantime D., hearing that B. & Co. had suspended, paid C. for the goods, sent to the Docks' warrant office, and obtained a warrant for the goods in the name of C. before the other order arrived, had C. indorse the warrant to him, and give him a second delivery order. The Docks Company returned the first delivery order unexecuted, and plaintiffs brought suit against C., D., and the company. It is a usage of the London Dry Goods Market, that a broker who does not disclose his principal is liable as surety for the latter's default. Held, that the unpaid vendor's lien had passed to D., who was surety for R. & Co., and the plaintiffs gained no title. — Imperial Bank v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 5 Ch. D. 195. 2. A man brought in pigs from his infected herd, out of which many had died, and had them sold, expressly stating that they were to be taken with all faults. Held, that at common law, as well as by the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1869, he was liable in damages to the buyer, on whose hands the pigs died. -Ward v. Hobbs, 2 Q. B. D. 331. 3. N. undertook to sell to E. three farms. The agreement to purchase was signed Sept. 3, 1873, and payment was to be made and possession given Sept. 29 following. In case the purchase was not completed on that day, the purchaser was to pay interest to such reasonable date as might be agreed upon. On that day it turned out that the seller had not a legal title to the property, and the purchaser refused to accept the same, and afterwards, when the seller offered him a clear title, persisted in his refusal. Held, that time was of the essence of the contract, and therefore the refusal was justified. - Noble v. Edwards, 5 Ch. D. 378. 4. The defendants were auctioneers, and issued a list headed: "Great Western Railway Co., catalogue of unclaimed property, which will be sold by auction by Messrs. H. & E., on Tuesday, November 7, or following day. By order of the directors of the above company," &c. There were the following conditions also printed on the same document: "The lots to be cleared away within three days after the sale, at the purchaser's expense. If any deficiency arise, or from any cause the auctioneer shall be unable to deliver any lot. . . then, in such case, the purchaser shall accept compensation. Upon failure of complying with the above conditions, the money deposited in part payment shall be forfeited. All lots unclaimed within the time aforesaid shall be resold by public or private sale, without further notice, and the deficiency made good by the defaulter." Plaintiff bought a lot on Wednesday, and paid his deposit, but did not go for the goods till Monday, when he was told the lot had been delivered to another party. A witness said that he saw the goods Saturday morning in process of being delivered. Defendants claimed that they were not liable, on the ground that they were the agents merely of the railway company, and, also, on the ground that plaintiff was bound to take the goods within three days, that being a condition precedent. Held, that there was evidence of a personal contract on the part of the defendants, and that the condition to remove the goods was not a condition precedent.-Woolfe v. Horne, 2 Q. B. D. 355. See COMPANY, 5; FACTOR; VENDOR'S LIEN. SALVAGE. The crews of a pilot cutter and three boats, all of the Scilly Islands, saved ten of the passengers of the wrecked German steamship, the Schiller. Subsequently, some of the specie on the Schiller was recovered by divers; and the owners, masters, and crews of the cutter and boats made a claim for salvage out of said specie. Held, that they were entitled. - The Cargo ex Schiller, 2 P. D. 145; s. c. 1 P. D. 473; 11 Am. Law Rev. 702. See INSURANCE. SHIPPING AND ADMIRALTY. See CHARTER-PARTY, 1, 2; FREIGHT; GEN- SLANDER. See LIBEL AND SLANDER. SOLICITOR AND CLIENT.-See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. 1. Demurrer that the following note did not revive a debt otherwise barred by the statute: "Your note . . . forwarded to me here. I return to S. about Easter. If you send me there the particulars of your account, with vouchers, I shall have it examined, and check sent to you for the amount due; but you must be under some great mistake in supposing that the amount due to you is any thing like the sum you now claim." Demurrer overruled. Skeet V. Lindsay, 2 Ex. D. 314. 2. In 1783, a lease was granted for ninety-nine years, and there was enjoyment under the lease until 1876, when an action was brought for possession, on the ground that the lease was void under 13 Eliz. c. 10. Demurrer that the claim was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Held, that the lease was voidable, not void, and that consequently the statute did not begin to run till the action was brought.-Governors of Magdalen Hospital v. Knotts, 5 Ch. D. 175. See COMPANY, 2. STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. See BILL OF LADING; VENDOR And Pur- A tenant for life was allowed by the court to retain possession of the titledeeds, as against the remainder-man, who applied to have them deposited in court. Leathes v. Leathes, 5 Ch. D. 221. 1. In 1807, a testator left a will, with the following clause: "I appoint my executor, Charles E., my youngest brother, to be trustee for the following legacies," naming them: "Considering that money will be more essential to my brother Samuel than a distant possession of land, I bequeath to Samuel, during his natural life, the interest of £3,000; and, after his death, to his eldest son, James, by his last wife, Margaret J., or M. or E., till he attains twenty-one, and then to obtain the principal. I order that my youngest brother, Charles E., shall be liable to all my lawful debts of every description, and pay them as soon as he can; and also pay my legacies when regularly due; . . . and, to enable him to do this, I bequeath unconditionally to him all my estates in Armagh. I also bequeath to him. . . all my estates . . . in Louth or elsewhere." The legacy of £3,000 to Samuel was not paid; but, in 1833, his son accepted £300 in settlement, on the ground, urged upon him by Charles's representative, that he was entitled to nothing, as being illegitimate. In 1872, a bill was filed by parties interested under his claim, asking that the composition of 1833 be set aside as unconscionable, and the £3,000, with interest, be declared well charged upon the estates and for general relief. Held, that the agreement of 1833 was null and void, all the parties having plainly proceeded upon the assumption that the question of the illegitimacy of Samuel's son decided his right; whereas, on the words of the will, that had nothing to do with it; that there was created a trust in respect of the £3,000 on the estates in Armagh bequeathed to Charles (quare as to the Louth estate, that point not having been disputed), and consequently the Statute of Limitations did not apply. Interest on the legacy was, however, allowed for six years only, on the ground that no direct proceedings had been taken to enforce the claim before 1872. — Thomson v. Eastwood, 2 App. Cas. 215. 2. A testator devised his property to trustees upon trust, inter alia, that they should," in their discretion and of their uncontrollable authority, pay and apply the whole or such portion only of the annual income . . . as they shall think expedient to or for the clothing, board, &c., for the personal and peculiar benefit and comfort of my dear wife." One of the trustees was residuary legatee. The wife was an insane person, and had property in fee in her own right. Held, that the court would not make a decree that the trustees" should exercise such discretion by paying and applying such por |