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GENERAL AVERAGE.

A captain burnt some spars and a part of the cargo, to keep the donkey engine running to pump the ship in bad weather, and thus saved her. The ship sailed properly equipped with coals; but they ran short, owing to unexpected bad weather. Held, a case for general average. - Robinson v. Price, 2 Q. B. D. 295; s. c. 2 Q. B. D. 91, 11 Am. Law Rev. 695.

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See BEQUEST, 1.

GUARANTY. See COMPANY, 7; PARTNERSHIP, 2.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. A wife cannot commit larceny from her husband, no matter whether she has been guilty of adultery or not. The Queen v. Kenny, 2 Q. B. D. 307.

2. The wife of G. received a legacy, given her for her separate use, in the form of a banker's draft, to her order for the amount. She indorsed it to her husband; he indorsed it in blank, and deposited it to his own account. He died a few days after. Held, that the wife was entitled to the amount of the draft. — Green v. Carlill, 4 Ch. D. 882.

3. W. sold to T. a claim, which he had by right of his wife, to certain engravings, once the property of Turner, the artist, who died intestate in respect of them. W., T., and W.'s wife died in the order named, and W.'s executor's brought suit against T.'s representatives to set aside the sale. Held, on the preliminary objection that the wife's representative was the party who should have sued, that the suit was properly brought by W.'s executors. Widgery v. Tepper, 5 Ch. D. 516.

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The ship F. was insured while lying in the docks under repair, for "the space of twelve calendar months," from Jan. 24, 1872, to Jan. 23, 1873. The clause as to time was written in upon a printed blank, designed for a voyage policy; and some of the words, such as "present voyage,” inconsistent with the tenor of a time policy, had not been erased. The vessel was found to have been unseaworthy by the jury, though without the knowledge of the owner. Held, that the policy was a pure time policy, notwithstanding the printed words not erased; and the court reiterated the rule laid down in Gibson v. Small (4 H. L. C. 353), and repeated in subsequent cases, that in time policies there is no implied warranty of seaworthiness. The insured fails to recover, only when he had knowingly sent the ship to sea in an unseaworthy condition. Dudgeon v. Pembroke, 2 App. Cas. 284.

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LANDLORD AND TENANT.

She went to the she perceived a The house was

Defendant hired plaintiff's furnished house from May 7. house on that day, and had her horses put in the stable; but bad smell, left the house, and removed her horses at once. found to be untenantable from bad drainage, and the plaintiff put it in order, and tendered it to defendant, May 20. She refused to accept it. Held, that she was not liable. When a furnished house is let, there is an implied condition that it is tenantable at the beginning of the term. If it prove otherwise, the tenant may throw up the bargain. Wilson v. Finch Hatton, 2 Ex. D. 336.

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1. Lease not under seal for three years, with right in the tenant to remain on three and a half years more at the same rate, held to be within the Statute of Frauds, and of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, § 3. - Hand v. Hall, 2 Ex. D. 318.

Both leases

2. B. conveyed an eating-house in lease, and covenanted that he would not let any house in that street "for the purpose of an eating-house;" but it was provided that the covenant should not bind B.'s heirs or assigns. He then let another house in the street, and the lessee covenanted with him that he would not carry on any business there without a license from B. were assigned, and the assignee of the first brought action against the assignee of the second and B., to restrain them, respectively, from carrying on and allowing to be carried on the business of an eating-house. Held, that the covenant was not broken. — Kemp v. Bird, 5 Ch. D. 549.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 2.

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Defendant was agent for C. & Co. and M. & Co., proprietors of certain musical and dramatic copyrights, and received the fees for their representation in theatres and concert-rooms. The plaintiffs were singers, and put the following advertisement in the Era newspaper: "The Sisters Hartridge have great pleasure in thanking Messrs. Chappell & Co., Messrs. Metzler & Co., and others, for their kind, unhesitating permission to sing any morceaux from their musical publications." Seeing this, defendant wrote to two concerthall proprietors, where the plaintiffs were singing, to the effect that the said advertisement was calculated to mislead them into incurring penalties under the Copyright Act, as the said C. & Co. and M. & Co. were not authorized to grant such permission; and he had been assured by them that they had not given such permission, and that the said proprietors had a poor opinion of concert-hall performances; and he added that he knew the lady advertisers had no such intention of so misleading them. Held, on a motion to set aside a non

suit, that the letters contained matter which might be libellous; and that the question should have been left to the jury. - Hart et al. v. Wall, 2 C. P. D. 146.

LIEN.

See CHARTER-Party, 1; Vendor's Lien.

LIFE SALVAGE.

See SALVAGE.

LIMITATIONS, Statute of. See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

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MARRIAGE.

B. and S., Portuguese subjects, and first cousins, went through the form of marriage, in 1864, in London, in accordance with the requirements of English law. Subsequently they both returned to Lisbon, and live there still, and have never lived together as husband and wife. By the law of Portugal, marriages between first cousins are null and void. A petition by the wife, S., for nullity of this marriage was refused. — Sottomayor, otherwise De Barros v. De Barros, 2 P. D. 81.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. The defendants employed the plaintiff with other workmen, and also a steam-engine, with an engineer, in sinking a shaft in their colliery. When the work was partly done, they employed W. under a verbal contract to finish it. W. was to employ and pay the plaintiff and the other workmen. The engine and engineer were under his control; but the engineer's wages were to be paid by the defendants. The plaintiff was injured through the negligence of the engineer. Held, on appeal, that the defendants were not liable. Rourke v. The White Moss Colliery Co., 2 C. P. D. 205; s. c. 1 C. P. D. 556; 11 Am. Law Rev. 286.

2. Defendant was proprietor of a cab, which was run over the plaintiff while being furiously driven by the cabman. The contract between the proprietor and the cabman was that the cabman should have the cab each day for as long as he chose, and pay therefor 16s. per diem. If he took more, he pocketed the surplus; if less, he made up the deficit. When the accident happened, the cabman had returned with the cab for the day; but, on approaching the stables, thought he would drive by a quarter of a mile to a tobacconist's and get some snuff. On his return, being drunk, he ran over the plaintiff. Held, that the defendant was liable. Venables v. Smith, 2 Q. B. D. 279.

See NEGLIGENCE, 1.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

A ship, owing to being unseaworthy, was one hundred and twenty-seven days on a voyage usually made in sixty-five. In consequence of the delay, had to be sold at a lower rate, the market having fallen, and

the

cargo

the assignee brought suit for damages. Held, reversing the judgment of the Admiralty Division, that he could not recover for loss of profits from a reduced market. The Parana, 2 P. D. 118; s. c. 1 P. D. 452; 11 Am. Law

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Dec. 1, 1874, M., the owner of a vessel, mortgaged it to the plaintiffs for £7,500. Jan. 4, 1875, defendants, in ignorance of the mortgage, advanced M. £3,000 on security of a cargo shipped by M. on nominal freight of 1s. per ton. Feb. 2, 1875, M. again mortgaged the vessel to the plaintiffs for £4,000. Feb. 19, M. and the defendants sold the cargo to J., on terms of freight being paid at 55s. per ton. Feb. 22, the defendants advanced £9,000 more to M. Feb. 26, M. assigned to defendants the freight at 55s. per ton, as security for their advances. On the arrival of the vessel, the plaintiffs took possession. The defendants acquired J.'s rights. Held, on appeal, reversing the decision of the Common Pleas, that the plaintiffs were entitled to 1s. freight, and not to 55s. — Keith et al. v. Burrows et al., 2 C. P. D. 163; s. c. 1 C. P. D. 722; 11 Am. Law Rev. 508.

MURDER.

A man indicted as an accessory after the fact to murder may be convicted as an accessory after the fact to manslaughter. - The Queen v. Richards, 2 Q. B. D. 311.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. The defendant was a coal merchant; and, in delivering coals to a customer, one of his men left the coal grate in the sidewalk open, and the female plaintiff, without negligence on her part, fell in and sprained her ankle. It was the sole duty of the servant to deliver coals for defendant to his customers. It was objected, on the strength of Pickard v. Smith (10 C. B. N. s. 470), that the customer, as occupier of the premises, was responsible for the grate's being open. Held, that defendant was liable. Whiteley and Wife v. Pepper, 2 Q. B. D. 276.

2. Plaintiff was a third-class passenger on defendant's underground railway; and at the G. station three persons got in, and stood up, the seats in the compartment being already full. The plaintiff objected to their getting in; but there was no evidence that defendant's servants were aware of it, and there was evidence tending to show that there was no guard or porter present at the G. station. At the next station the door was opened and shut; but there was no evidence by whom. Just as the train started, there was a rush by persons trying to get in; the door was thrown open; the plaintiff partly rose to keep the people out; the train started; the plaintiff was pitched forward, and caught with his hand by the door-hinge to save himself; a porter pushed the people away, just as the train was entering the tunnel, and slammed the door to, and thereby plaintiff's thumb was caught and injured. Held, by a divided court, that, on these facts, there was evidence from which the jury

might find negligence on the part of the defendants. —Jackson v. The Metropolitan Railway Co., 2 C. P. D. 125; s. c. Law Rep. 10 C. P. 49.

See MASTER AND SERVANT, 1, 2.

See BILLS AND NOTES, 1.
See PARTNERship, 1.

NOTICE.
NOVATION.

NUISANCE.

A person having an artificial drain under his house is bound so to keep it as not to do injury to his neighbor, although he has been guilty of no negligence, and the existence of the drain was not in any way known to him. Humphries v. Cousins, 2 C. P. D. 239.

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1. Prior to April 16, 1872, H. & E. were partners under the firm of H. & Co., and by the name of the "L. M. Bank." April 16, 1872, W. and J. H. were admitted partners; April 29, 1872, H. died; and May 23, 1874, E. died. The business was, during all this time, carried on under the same firm name and designation, and the customers of the same knew of the various changes. In December, 1875, the firm went into liquidation. The business of the bank was to receive money on deposit, for which they gave notes signed "H. & Co., L. M. Bank ;" and, when a customer changed his deposit, his note was given up, and another made out to him. The claims in this action were by depositors against the estate of H. Some of the claimants had left their deposits unchanged from H.'s death, and some had changed them; and all had received interest from the firm up to its suspension, and a dividend in the settlement of the firm's affairs, "for money lent and advanced" to the bankrupts. Held, that they had no claim against the estate of H., but that there had been a complete novation, a new liability had been substituted for the old. Bilborough v. Holmes, 5 Ch. D. 255.

2. J. gave a guaranty for £1,000 to a bank, in favor of A. & Co., of which firm he told the bank he was a member, though he did not wish the fact to be known. A. subsequently went into bankruptcy as " A. & Co.;" and the bank filed proof of a claim against the firm, and brought a suit at law against J., as being a partner. J. filed a petition in equity to restrain, and denied the partnership. The claim against J. was settled; and the bank gave up the guaranty to J., indorsed in payment and discharge thereof, and "also of all claims against J. in reference to us in connection with A. & Co." Held, that the indorsement did not preclude the bank from proving against A. & Co. in bankruptcy, though J. must be held to have been a partner. Ex parte Good. In re Armitage, 5 Ch. D. 46.

3. By deed of partnership, dated Oct. 10, 1868, B. & H. agreed to become partners on the terms therein mentioned, the partnership to continue fourteen years under the name of B. & Co. The capital was to be £30,000, of which £15,000 was the good-will of the business. B. put in £1,000, and H. £4,000, and the remaining £10,000 was to be raised "by way of loan" under

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