ing knowledge of the breaches of the policy was a waiver of its right of forfeiture.-GEORGIA HOME INS. Co. v. MORIARTY, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 628.

122. INSURANCE - Other Insurance. Where a policy of fire Insurance provides for forfeiture in case additional insurance be taken out without the consent of the company indorsed on the policy, the fact that the local agent who bas authority to issue policies and grant permission for additional insurance, and who gives such permission, forgets to indorse the same on the policy, will not prevent a recovery.-GERMAN INS. Co. v. CAIN, Tex., 37 8. W. Rep. 657.

123. INSURANCE-Policy-Construction.-A life insurance policy provided that the full amount of the pol ley should only be paid in the event insured died "after one year from the date of the policy." The policy took effect on the day of its date: Held, that in computing the year the day of the date of the policy should be excluded.-WALKER V. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. Co., Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 89.

124. INSURANCE-Policy-Divisibility.-Where an insurance policy covers a house, furniture, and merchan. dise, it is divisible; and the violation of a provision relating only to the merchandise is not a bar to a recovery under the policy for the loss of the other property.-GEORGIA HOME INS. Co. v. MCKINLEY, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 606.

125, INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT-Maximum RatesTransportation of Freight. The right to prescribe maximum rates for the transportation of freight is the right to dictate an indispensable fand one of the most important terms of the contract between the carrier and the shipper.-INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION V. CINCINNATI, N. O. & T. P.¡RY. Co., U. S. C. C., S. D. (Ohio), 76 Fed. Rep. 183.

126. INTERVENTION-By Receivers of Bank.-Under Code Civ. Proc. Cal. § 387, authorizing intervention by one "who has an interest in the matter in litigation," the receivers of a national bank may intervene in a suit against the bank to recover a debt.-BOWEN V. NEEDLES NAT. BANK, U. S. C. C., S. D. (Cal.), 76 Fed. Rep. 176.

17. INTOXICATING LIQUORS Illegal Sale.-Pub. St. ch. 213, § 19, which provides that "an offense committed on the boundary line of two counties, or within one hundred rods of such line, may be alleged to have been committed, and may be prosecuted and punished, in either county," in a case where defendant is indicted for the local offense of keeping a liquor nui. sance, has the effect of extending, not only the county line, but also the town line, for the purposes of allega. tion, prosecution, and punishment, into the county and town adjoining.-COMMONWEALTH V. MATTHEWS, Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 92.

198. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Unlawful Use of Premises by Tenants.-Where the owner of a tenement, with full knowledge, permits the tenant to use a portion of the premises not leased by him for the illegal sale or keeping of intoxicating liquors, he is liable for maintaining a nuisance, irrespective of the fact that he has no interest in the liquors himself.-COMMONWEALTH V. HATES, Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 82.

12. JUDGMENT Collateral Attack.-In an action against a sheriff and his sureties, brought by a judg ment creditor, for the failure of the officer to return an execution, the officer cannot, by way of defense, impeach the validity of the judgment on which the execution was issued.-VICKSBURG GROCERY CO. V. BRENVAN, Miss., 20 South. Rep. 844.

130. JUDGMENT-Collateral Attack for Fraud.-A judg ment or decree can be collaterally attacked for fraud only when such fraud is extrinsic or collateral to the matter tried, and an independent action cannot be maintained in equity to set aside a decree allotting a homestead to the widow of a decedent, on the ground that in procuring such decree the widow misrepresented to the court the facts as to the property.-HANBY V. HANLEY, Cal., 46 Pac. Rep. 736.

131. JUDGMENT-Entry Nunc Pro Tunc.-The authority of courts, both of law and equity, to enter a judg ment or a decree nunc pro tunc, does not depend upon statute. It is an inherent power lodged in the courts. -VAN ETTEN V. TEST, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1023.

182. JUDGMENT-Laches.-On application to correct a judgment, it appeared that the individual members of R & Co. were each served in an action for debt, and made default; that said judgment was taken against all the "defendants," and was carried into the judg. ment records with a writ of inquiry; that on execu. tion of the writ a further judgment was made, and carried into the minutes of the court, which found "that the defendants are justly indebted to plaintiffs in the sum of," etc., and that plaintiffs "do have and recover of the defendants R & Co., a firm composed of R L and S, the said sum," and "for all of which let execution issue:" Held, that said judgment authorizes execution against all the defendants individually, as well as against the firm.-DE CAMP v. BATES, Tex., 37 8. W. Rep. 644.

133. JUDGMENT-Relief against in Equity.-A court of equity will not set aside a judgment at law on grounds which were presented to the trial court in a motion for new trial and held insufficient. TElford v. BRINKERHOFF, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 156.

134. JUDGMENT-Res Judicata.—A judgment in proceedings commenced by a municipal corporation for the condemnation of land for a street, fixing the amount to be paid to the owner as compensation, is an adjudication binding on the corporation; and it cannot ignore such judgment, and, by commencing new proceedings for the same purpose, again litigate the question of the amount of just compensation.-ILLINOIS CENT. R. Co. v. CITY OF CHAMPAIGN, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 120.

185. JUDGMENT-What Constitutes.-In consolidated cases in which the plaintiffs were creditors of K, one of the defendants in each case, and another of the defendant's bank, which held a deed of trust on K's prop. erty, the pleadings presented a controversy as to the amount of the debt due such bank. A decree was en. tered in favor of the bank, which also determined the order in which K's debts should be paid out of the proceeds of the property described in the trust deed: Held, that such decree was a judgment, under Code, §§ 2970, 2971 (Mill. & V. Code, §§ 3684, 3685), declaring that the word "judgment "is usually applied to a determination of the rights of the parties in an action at law, and the word 'decree" to a similar determination in equity, but the words are interchangeable "in this Code."— WARD V. KENNER, Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 707.

136. JUDGMENT LIEN-Surrender of Unrecorded Deed. -Property conveyed to an insolvent purchaser as trustee for his wife, the consideration being paid by the husband, becomes subject to the lien of a judgment against him, which is not divested by a return and cancellation of the deed, which is unrecorded.-KLINE V. TRIPLETT, Va., 25 S. E. Rep. 886.

137. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Surrender of Lease.Under Rev. St. § 2362, providing that no estate or interest in lands shall be surrendered unless by act or operation of law, or by deed of conveyance in writing subscribed by the party surrendering the same, or by his lawful agent, thereunto authorized by writing, a lessee under a written lease remains liable thereon to the lessor after an assignment of the lease to a third per. son as subtenant, where the consent of the lessor to such transfer, indorsed on the lease, expressly so provides, regardless of any oral agreement between the lessee and agents of the lessor, not shown to have written authority from him to make such agreement. -LOVEJOY V. MCCARTY, Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 1003.

138. LANDLORD AND TENANT-Trespass by Landlord. -Where a tenant is to pay his landlord as rent a specific portion of the crop after he has harvested it, but, while it is standing, the landlord and others, acting under him, go on the land, and remove the crop, the tenant is entitled to recover at least the value of his share as it stood, without any deduction for the ex

pense of harvesting the landlord's share.-FOLEY V. SOUTHWESTERN LAND CO., Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 994.

139. LIEN-Material Man's Lien.-A manufacturer, selling, in the usual course of trade, glass to a merchant, without any knowledge or understanding that it is to be used in the construction of any particular building, cannot enforce a material man's lien therefor against the building for which the glass was ordered by the merchant, by whom it was sold to the owner.-VAN CLEVE GLASS Co. V. ERRATT, Mich., 68 N. W. Rep. 978.

140. LIFE INSURANCE-Application-False Representations. Where a life insurance agent asks a part only of the questions printed in the application, assuming the responsibility of filling in the rest of the answers himself, and the assured signs the application without having his attention called to the answers written by the agent, the fact that some of such answers contain materially false representations will not avoid the policy.-VAN HOTTEN V. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. Co., Mich., 68 N. W. Rep. 982.

141. LIFE INSURANCE-Contract - Waiver of Misrepresentation.-A life insurance company which, on an application of the assured, jhad issued to him a certifi cate payable to a woman described therein as his wife, was afterwards notified by the assured that the beneficiary was not his wife, and requested to correct the certificate. Ten days thereafter, the company wrote the assured to return the certificate for correction, at the same time sending him notice of an assessment thereon which assessment was paid by the beneficiary after the death of the assured, and retained by the company: Held, that such action by the company was a waiver of the misrepresentation as to the relationship of the beneficiary to the assured, and the certificate was enforceable.-SEIBEK V. NORTHWESTERN MUT. RELIEF ASSN., Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 1009.

142. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS-Executors.-The fact that notes of a decedent are held by his executor does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations against them.-IN RE KUHLMAN'S ESTATE, Penn., 35 Atl. Rep. 918.

143. MANDAMUS Form of Writ.-The peremptory writ of mandamus must conform strictly to the command of the alternative writ, or, in the absence of the alternative writ, to the prayer of the petition, which is the basis of the proceeding and clearly indicates the particular duty to be performed.-LAFLIN V. STATE, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1022.

144. MANDAMUS TO STATE OFFICER-State Treasurer. -Act April 21, 1893, requires bond investment com. panies to deposit with the State treasurer, in cash or securities approved by him $100,000, for the protection of investors, within 30 days, or, on failure, forfeit their charters. Held, that where the treasurer received from such a company a note for $100,000, secured by a trust deed on land on which there was $10,000 incumbrance, and $10,000 in cash, and agreed to apply the $10,000 to the discharging of such incumbrance as soon as the holder of it would accept the money, mandamus was the proper remedy to compel him to do so on his refusal.-STATE V. STEPHENS, Mo., 37 S. W. Rep. 506.

145. MARRIAGE-Evidence.-The issue being whether the deceased executed an alleged written contract of marriage with the petitioner, conveyances executed by the deceased, subsequent to the marriage contract, in which he was described as a single man, were inadmissible in evidence against the petitioner.-IN RE HULETT'S ESTATE, Minn., 69 N. W. Rep. 31.

146. MARRIAGE-Validity-Bigamy.-Act Nov. 28, 1861 (Gen. St. ch. 4), § 1, provides that amarriage is a civil contract, to which the consent of parties capable in law of contracting is essential. The act contains provisions requiring a license, directing how and by whom marriages may be celebrated, and prescribing other regulations, but contains no express clause making vold marriages contracted by mutual consent, per verba de præsenti, except a prior license is obtained or

solemnization had in accordance with its provisions: Held, that such statutes did not make void a common law marriage by contract per verba de præsenti.—STATE V. ZICHFIELD, Nev., 46 Pac. Rep. 802.

147. MASTER AND SERVANT-Assumption of Risk.-An employee assumes the risks arising from the unsafe condition of premises where his labor, or a portion of it, is to be performed, when the risks and conditions are known to him, or are apparent and obvious to persons of his experience and understanding, if he vol. untarily enters into the employment, or, after com. mencing, makes no complaint or objection in respect to the hazards.-CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. Co. v. MCGINNIS, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1057.

148. MASTER AND SERVANT - Negligence.-A servant who is injured in the discharge of his duties by falling from a trestle while walking on a plank which had be come so worn that it was not more than three inches wide at the top cannot recover, though he had previously notified the master of the defect, and was given a promise, indefinite as to time, that the plank would be replaced by a new one.-BREWER V. TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & RAILWAY CO., Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 549.

149. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligent-Pleading.-In an action against a master for the death of a servant, the general averment of knowledge or want of knowl edge by decedent of defects in the appliances includes both actual and imputed knowledge.-CHICAGO & E. R. Co. v. WAGNER, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 76.

150. MASTER AND SERVANT-Personal Injury.-Where, in an action by an employee against his master to recover for an injury, there was evidence that plaintiff, in going from one part of the mill, where he worked, to another, took the way ordinarily used for such purpose, and was injured by reason of a defect therein, due to the negligence of the master, the questions of negligence and contributory negligence should have been submitted to the jury.-DOLPHIN V. PLUMLEY, Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 87.

151. MASTER AND SERVANT-Risk of Employment.-A railroad company is not liable for the death of a switchman employed in its yards, who was killed while coupling cars, by reason of one of the cars being out of repair, where it was a part of the duty of switchmen in such yards to handle cars out of repair, and the car in question had been marked, in accordance with a rule of the company, by a card showing it to be in bad order, which fact was also known to the deceased before he attempted to make the coupling. Under such circumstances, the danger incident to the handling of the car was a part of the risk assumed by the employee.-GULF, C. & S. F. RY. Co. v. MAYO, Tex., 87 S. W. Rep. 659.

152. MECHANICS' LIENS - Amendment of Claim.-Under Sanb. & B. Ann. St. § 3320, which provides that a claim for a lien shall contain, among other things, "a description of the property affected," and that it may be amended the same "as pleadings," where a claim is not so defective as to be an absolute nullity, and the rights of third persons have not intervened, it may be amended as to the description, even after the expiration of the 6 months from the date of the last charge for work or material, within which (section 3318) the claim must be filed.-MARK PAINE LUMBER Co. v. DOUGLASS COUNTY IMP. Co., Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 1013. 153. MECHANIC'S LIEN -Enforcement.-Where the wife ratifies and adopts a contract entered into by her husband for the construction of a building on her lot, the lot is subject to a mechanic's lien therefor.-BUM GARTNER V. HALL, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 168.

ant of the lien.-BAKER V. ROBBINS, N. Car., 25 8. E. Rep. 576.

15. MORTGAGE-Pledge of Note.-Where a note valid between the parties has been pledged, the pledgee may recover from the maker the whole amount of the note.-SEELEY V. WICKSTROM, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1018.

156. MORTGAGES-Priority of Liens.-The rules of the law merchant governing the transfer of negotiable paper protect bona fide purchasers before due only as against equities of latent defenses to the paper itself, and do not affect the question of priority between a mortgage by which such paper is secured and other liens, as to which the purchaser takes only the rights of the seller, and such as may be afforded him in addition by the registry laws.-BUTLER V. BANK OF MAZEPPA, Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 998.

157. MORTGAGES-Trustee's Sale.-The grantee in an absolute deed gave an agreement to reconvey on pay. ment of his advances. The title was subject to a prior trust deed, payment of which the grantee did not assume. The grantor afterwards informed the grantee that he could not pay off this incumbrance, and that he elected to abandon the property, and the grantee thereupon bought in the property at trustee's sale: Held, that he acquired a good title thereby, since, after the grantor elected to abandon the property, there was no longer any confidential relation between them.-EASTMAN V. LITTLEFIELD, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep.

137.

158. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE-Growing Crops.-Sale by the owner of land of growing crops works a severance thereof, so that the purchaser at mortgage sale of the land cannot claim them, though the sale of the crops is subsequent to maturity of the mortgage debt, and at the time of mortgage sale the crops are not even approaching maturity.-LOMBARDI V. SHERO, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 613.

159, MUNICIPAL BONDS-Res Judicata.-A decree upholding the validity of municipal bonds, rendered in a suit in which that issue was raised by the pleadings, is conclusive in favor of one who intervened in the suit, alleging the validity of the bonds.-AUSTIN V. HAMILTON COUNTY, U. 8. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 298.

160. MUNICIPAL BONDS-Validity.-A school district bond for more than $500, reciting that it issued pur suant to Sp. Act Feb. 21, 1879, is void, even in the hands of an innocent purchaser; it being provided by the act, which authorizes bonds to the amount of $2,000, that they shall be issued "in denominations of not more than $500.00 nor less than $50.00."-LIVINGSTON V. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 7 OF BROOKINGS COUNTY, S. Dak., 69 N. W. Rep. 15.

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161. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Abolishing OfficeCompensation.-A city incorporated under the general law, under Rev. St. 1879, art. 467, created the office of "health and sanitary officer." A person was appointed to the office under such ordinance, which made his term concurrent with that of the mayor, "unless sooner removed." During his term such ordinance was repealed: Held, that the officer was not entitled to compensation for the balance of his term.CITY OF PALESTINE V. WEST, Tex., 87 S. W. Rep. 783. 162. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Contracts with Water Companies.-A city of the second class under the laws of the State of Kansas has power to contract with a private party for the construction and operation of waterworks, to agree to pay rent for the use of hydrants, and to grant to such a party the use of its streets for the purpose of laying pipes to conduct the water-ILLINOIS TRUST & SAVINGS BANK V. CITY OF ARKANSAS CITY, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 271.

rounding property is urban.-CITY OF MCKEESPORT V. SOLES, Penn., 35 Atl. Rep. 927.

164. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Negligence.-A town which permits the erection or maintenance of a wire fence across a previously traveled highway, after its discontinuance, without barriers or warnings to trayelers, is guilty of negligence, and is liable for an injury resulting therefrom to one using reasonable care. -BILLS V. TOWN OF KAUKAUNA, Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 992.

165. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Negligence-Defective Sidewalks.-A pedestrian is not, as a matter of fact, guilty of contributory negligence in walking upon two boards, 20 inches wide, laid over an excavation in the sidewalk next to a building, in the wall of which there was an opening, through which opening the pedes. trian fell, into an excavation inside the building; the balance of the sidewalk being muddy, and covered in places with ice, and it not appearing that the pedestrian was aware of either excavation.-WIGGIN V. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, Mo., 37 8. W. Rep. 528.

166. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Ordinances-Licensing Bawdy Houses.-A charter giving a city power, by ordinance, "to prevent and punish the keeping of houses of prostitution, and to adopt summary measures for the removal or suppression, or license, taxation, regulation and inspection of all such establishments," does not authorize the city to tax and license bawdy houses.-CITY OF SAN ANTONIO V. SCHNEIDER, Tex., 87 S. W. Rep. 767.

167. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Power to Abolish Office. A municipal corporation has power to abolish an office during the term of an incumbent by a repeal of the ordinance creating it, and by the repealing ordi. nance to create a similar office, and provide for the immediate election of an officer to fill it; and such power is not affected by a provision in the former ordinance that the incumbent should be removable for cause.-DONAGHY V. MACY, Mass., 45 N. E. Rep. 87.

168. NATIONAL BANKS-Authority of President - Bor. rowing Money.-A vice-president of a national bank, who is the acting president, may, in conformity with established custom, without special authority from the board of directors, borrow money on behalf of the bank from another bank.-CHEMICAL NAT. BANK OF NEW YORK V. ARMSTRONG, U. 8. C. C., S. D. (Ohio), 76 Fed. Rep. 339.

169. NATIONAL BANKS-Effect of State Laws.-Pub. St. Mass. ch. 157, §§ 96, 98, which invalidate transfers of property made with a view to a preference by any one insolvent or in contemplation of insolvency, where this fact is known to the transferee, in no way conflicts with Rev. St. U. S. § 5137, which grants to a national bank the right to hold such real estate as "shall be mortgaged to it in good faith by way of security for debts previously contracted," and such as "shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts previously contracted in the course of its dealings;" nor does it impair any function of national banks as instrumentalities of the federal government. MCCLELLAN V. CHIPMAN, U. S. S. C., 17 8. C. Rep. 85.

ceased son, who was killed by the neglect of the defendant, the fact that the death was in part occasioned by the contributory carelessness of the father cannot be set up in defense of the action. CONSOLIDATED TRACTION Co. v. HONE, N. J., 35 Atl. Rep. 899.

173. NEGLIGENCE-Proximate Cause.-Where defend. ant's negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, any negligence on the part of plaintiff which did not directly contribute to his injury will not prevent a recovery, but will be taken in mitigation of damages.SOUTHERN RY. Co. v. PUGH, Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 555. 174. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Action by Indorsee. -Where an accepted draft is transferred before maturity as collateral security to an existing debt, the transferee is protected against all defenses and equities arising between the drawer and indorser after such transfer.-TRIGG V. SAXTON, Tenn., 37 S. W. Rep. 567.

175. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-Notes-Indorsement. -A writing on a note, over one's signature, reciting that, "for value received, I hereby transfer my interest in the within note," does not render the assignor liable as an indorser, after due notice of non-payment. -SPENCER V. HALPERN, Ark., 37 S. W. Rep. 711.

176. NEGOTIABLE NOTE. -That a note provides for payment "in gold coin or its equivalent in currency of the United States, at the option of the holder," does not render uncertain the amount to be paid, or affect its negotiability. - WRIGHT V. MORGAN, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 627.

177. NUISANCE-Abatement-Evidence.-In an action brought to abate a nuisance caused, as appeared from the evidence, by the careless manner in which defend. ant handled coal oil in the vicinity of plaintiff's dwelling, and to recover damages, it is held that the court below erred when it excluded evidence as to whether plaintiff had ever complained of the alleged nuisance to defendant's agent or employees-FRIBURK V. STANDARD OIL CO., Minn., 68 N. W. Rep. 1090.

178. OFFICE AND OFFICERS Death of One Elected to Office. Where one, elected to an office, dies before his term begins, no vacancy is thereby created in the office until the end of the term of the existing incumbent; and, if this falls within 30 days of the next proper election (section 11, Rev. St.), the vacancy cannot be filled by an election thereat.-STATE V. DAHL, Ohio, 45 N. E. Rep. 56.

Fee of Counsel.

179. PARTITION PROCEEDINGS Where an attorney makes an agreement with the plaintiff in partition proceedings, whereby he is to receive a certain compensation for his services in the matter, he necessarily waives any right he might otherwise have had to be awarded compensation by the court under the statute. In such case the contract fixes his rights and the measure of the relief to which he may be entitled. YOUNG V. STONE, Ohio, 45 N. E. Rep. 57.

180. PARTNERSHIP - Collusive Settlement with One Partner.-A collusive settlement between a firm debtor and one of the partners, in fraud of the others, does not bind the firm, whether such partner had authority to collect the debt or not. — LOFTUS v. Ivy, Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 766.

181. PARTNERSHIP Death of Partner. On the dissolution of a partnership by the death of one of its members, the possession and control of the partner. ship assets vest in the surviving partner, who has power to dispose of the same. - LINDNER V. ADAMS COUNTY BANK, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1028.

182. PAYMENT-Illegal Charges-Recovery-Municipal Corporations.-A manufacturing corporation, entirely dependent upon the water supplied by a city for its supply in operating its factory, may recover the excess of the legal rate which it was compelled to pay under the threat of having the water turned off.-ST. LOUIS BREWING ASSN. V. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MO., 37 S. W. Rep. 525.

Denial of Corporate

183. PLEADING - Abatement Existence. In an action against the "Grand Lodge of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen," where service was made upon the officers of a subordinate lodge as agents of the grand lodge, a plea in abatement alleging that the "Brotherhood Firemen" is not a corporation, and has exercised corporate powers, is insufficient as an allegation that the defendant named in a writ is not a corporation. - GRAND LODGE OF BRotherhood OF LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN V. CRAMER, Ill., 45 N. E. Rep. 165.

never

184. PLEADING-Allowing Amendment During Trial.— In an action against an officer to recover the value of property sold on execution against another than plaintiff, where the answer denied plaintiff's ownership, defendant was permitted, during the trial, and after plaintiff had proved a sale and transfer of the property to him from the execution defendant, to amend his answer by alleging that such transfer was fraudulent as to creditors of the seller: Held, that the allowance of such amendment was within the discre tion of the court, under Hill's Ann. Laws, § 101, authorizing the allowance of amendments, in furtherance of justice, where they do not substantially change the cause of action or defense.-DAVIS v. HANNON, Oreg., 46 Pac. Rep. 785.

185. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Authority to Receive Payment.-Ostensible authority to act as agent may be conferred if the party to be charged as principal, affirmatively or intentionally, or by lack of ordinary care, causes or allows third persons to trust and act upon such apparent agency.-THOMSON V. SHELTON, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1055.

186. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Evidence.-As evidence that M was the agent of a corporation, letters to him from S, its vice-president and general manager, directing him to placard the buildings in which he was do ing business with the corporation's name, photographs showing that they were marked as directed, letter heads and stationery showing that the business was conducted with M as agent, and shipping receipts and bills of lading all showing the same thing, and seen by S, are admissible.-BERGTHOLDT V. PORTER BROS. Co., Cal., 46 Pac. Rep. 738.

187. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT Mortgage. One who makes payment to a second person, not the owner of a note, and not in possession of it, of money to be ap plied in payment of the debt thereby evidenced, assumes the burden of proving that the party to whom payment was made was empowered to collect the RICHARDS V. WALLER, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep.

money.

1053.

188. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Power to Warrant Goods Sold. An agent authorized to sell a horse cannot bind his principal by a warranty that the animal is sound, in the absence of express authority or of a usage to warrant on such sale -WESTURN V. PAGE, Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 1003.

189. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Scope of Authority-Neg ligence.-Plaintiff was induced by an agent of the defendant to come from another State, and take service in defendant's coal mine. The agent represented that the mine was free from explosive gas and in every way safe. Two or three days after plaintiff began work an explosion occurred, by which he was seriously in jured: Held, that the representations made by the agent touching the condition of the mine were within the apparent scope of his authority, and admissible against the employer, though made without express authority.-GOWEN V. BUSH, U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 349.

the latter had no knowledge of any agency when he purchased, and though the agent was not, in fact, anthorized to act.-RUTHERFORD V. MONTGOMERY, Tex., 378. W. Rep. 625.

191. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY Release of Surety.-A surety on a contractor's bond is not relieved from liability for the payment of claims for material-men, because the contractor was paid at an earlier date than fixed by the contract.-KING V. MURPHY, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1029.

192. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY - Release of Surety.When the name of one of two sureties in a bond has been forged, the other cosurety is not released, though be signed in the belief that the forged signature was genuine, if the forgery was unknown in the obligee when the instrument was delivered and accepted.KANSAS CITY TERRA-COTTA LUMBER Co. v. MURPHY, Neb., 68 N. W. Rep. 1030.

1. PROCESS-Summons-Service.-Under Code § 2880 (Mill. & V. Code, § 3535), providing that all civil process shall be returnable to the first day of the next term if served five days before such term, or if served within the five days shall be returnable to the first day of the succeeding term, a summons served within the five days, and returnable on its face to the next term, is not invalid, so as to authorize its being quashed and the dismissal of the action, but merely requires defendant to appear at the second succeeding term.-PADGETT V. DUCKTOWN SULPHUR, COPPER & IRON CO., Tenn., 37 8. W. Rep. 698.

194. RAILROAD COMPANIES Construction of Road.In an action against a railroad company and the receiver of such company for the price of materials furnished by plaintiff for the construction of the road, and to foreclose a lien on the road, plaintiff alleged that it had obtained leave to bring suit, and prayed judgment against the railroad company for the sum named, and to foreclose its lien: Held, that the petition showed that plaintiff had the right to bring the suit.-COLORADO FUEL & IRON Co. v. RIO GRANDE SOUTHERN R. Co., Colo., 46 Pac. Rep. 845.

195. RAILROAD COMPANIES - Depot Grounds - Injury to Trespassing Animals.-Depot grounds of a railroad company prima facie include all that part of the right of way which is left unfenced between the switches and cattle guards, on either side of the platform, inelading the switches and side tracks, and, in the absence of evidence showing that they are unreasonable in extent, will be deemed the true limits.-MILLS & LE CLAIR LUMBER CO. v. CHICAGO, ST. P., M. & O. RY. Co., Wis., 68 N. W. Rep. 996.

18. RAILROAD COMPANY - Injuries by Train -Trespassers.-A railroad company is not bound to any act cr service in anticipation of trespassers on its track, nor is the engineer obliged to look out for them; and a trespasser venturing upon the track for purposes of his own assumes all risks of conditions which may be found there, including the operation of engines and Cars.-SHEEHAN V. ST. PAUL & D. RY. Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Seventh Circuit, 76 Fed. Rep. 201.

17. RAILROAD COMPANY-Negligence.-In case of death of an employee on a regular train, running on time, caused by collision with a train "working wild," the company is not negligent in failing to notify the regular train of the wild train, or to have a rule requiring such notice; all trainmen being furnished with time cards of regular trains, on which is a rule requir. ing wild trains to keep out of the way, and off the Ume, of regular trains.-TERRE HAUTE & I. R. Co. v. BECKER, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 96.

198. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Contributory Negligence. -The fact that the mother of decedent, a child two years of age, permitted the child to play in the yard with other children, from which it wandered onto the tracks of defendant railway company, does not, as a matter of law, show contributory negligence, so as to prevent a recovery for its death; the testimony show. ing that the child was only out of sight for a few min.

utes.-GREEN V. CHICAGO & W. M. RY. Co., Mich., 68 N. W. Rep. 988.

199. RAILROAD COMPANY Negligence Hidden Defect. A railroad company is not liable for injuries to its employees caused by a car's hidden defect, of which it had no knowledge, and of which it could not have known by the exercise of ordinary care. Where the inspection of a car has been performed with ordinary care, and a defect then existing has not been discovered, the company is not liable for an injury caused thereby to an employee, unless it had knowledge of such defect.-LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. Co. v. BATES, Ind., 45 N. E. Rep. 109.

201. RAILROAD RATES Control by Congress.-The presumption that a rate fixed by congress is reason. able cannot be overcome except by some showing as to expenses and receipts during an adequate period.ATLANTIC & P. R. Co. v. UNITED STATES, U. S. D. C., S. D. (Cal.), 76 Fed. Rep. 187.

202. REMOVAL OF CAUSES - Separable Controversy.In a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage, a defendant, who is alleged to be personally liable for the deficit, cannot remove the cause from the State court on the ground that the controversy as to his personal liability is a separable one.-LEWIS V. WEIDENFIELD, U. s. C. C., E. D. (Mich.), 76 Fed. Rep. 145.

203. REPLEVIN - Judgment Sufficiency.-In replevin of merchandise, a judgment against plaintiff and the sureties on the replevin bond must show the value of each separate article replevied.-HERDER V. SCHWAB CLOTHING Co., Tex., 37 S. W. Rep. 784.

204. REPLEVIN - Requisites of Valid Judgment.-In replevin, where both parties, by their pleadings, claim the right to possession of the property, the judgment must be for its return if in the hands of the defeated party, or for its full value where possession cannot be had (Civ. Code, § 227); and a judgment permitting the party in possession to retain it, and establishing a lien thereon in favor of the other party for a specified amount, is not responsive to the issues, and is unauthorized and void.-HORN V. CITIZENS' SAVINGS & COMMERCIAL BANK OF DENVER, Colo., 46 Pac. Rep.

206. SCHOOLS Powers of School Board-Injunction. -Under the provisions of Gen. St. § 3046, giving to school boards the power to employ and discharge teachers, injunction will not lie at the suit of a tax. payer to restrain the discharge of a teacher with or without cause.-SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1, PITKIN COUNTY V. CARSON, Colo., 46 Pac. Rep. 846.

207. STATUTE-EX Post Facto Law-What Constitutes. -Laws 1893, Act No. 118, § 33, provides that convicts who shall have no infractions of the rules of the prison against them shall be entitled to a reduction from their sentences according to a certain scale, with a proviso that a convict who shall be serving a second term in said prison shall be entitled to a less favorable reduc. tion: Held, that such act is not ex post facto as to an offense committed after its passage by one who had completed a term in the prison before it took effect.IN RE MILLER, Mich., 68 N. W. Rep. 990.

208. STATUTE Tax on Auction Sales.-Under Code Pub. Local Laws, art. 4, §§ 74-80, imposing a duty or tax on real estate sold at auction in the city of Balt