those which, following on the preamble, contain the gist of the new Convention, viz. "Her Majesty has been pleased to direct, and it is hereby declared, that the following articles of a new Convention shall be substituted for the articles embodied in the 1881 Convention." It would seem that the only meaning which these words can bear is that new "terms, conditions, reservations, and limitations" of the complete self-government granted to the Transvaal, and the suzerainty reserved to Great Britain by the former Convention, are substituted for those specified in the former Convention. As regards the contention that the suzerainty was impliedly abandoned by the deliberate omission of any mention of it or its substance from the later Convention, as stated by British ministers at the time of its being signed, there was no need to mention it if the later Convention only substituted new "terms, conditions, reservations, and limitations" of it for the old ones. Grammatically the grant of self-government in the former Convention is linked with the reservation of suzerainty, and yet it could not be supposed that the omission to mention that grant in the former Convention abrogated the Transvaal's right to enjoy self-government. The preamble of a treaty is the best guide to the intentions of the contracting parties; and the style of it, and of the operative words immediately following it, coupled with the provisions regarding British approval of treaties, and the continuance of a British Resident, seem to point throughout to a superior position of the British Crown in its relations with the Transvaal. Neither in the treaty nor in the statements of British ministers at the time, is there any statement that the suzerainty is abolished, or any provision incompatible with its continuance under the 1884 instrument, although the extent of it was largely diminished. If, in 1884, it had been intended by the British Government to treat with the Transvaal as completely independent of its supremacy, some acknowledgment of this fact might have

been expected in the treaty, as is to be found in the treaty between England and the United States in 1783, where George III. "acknowledged the United States to be free, sovereign, and independent States, that he treated with them as such, and for himself and his heirs and successors, relinquished all claims to the government, property, and territorial rights of the same and every part thereof." Thus although objection may be taken to the appropriateness of the word "suzerainty" being made in 1884 to mean a different relation between the contracting parties, from that which it meant in 1881, still there seems to be enough substance in the rights mentioned above to justify the retention of a term which need mean nothing more than supremacy to denote the superior position admittedly occupied by Great Britain under the last Convention.

Cuban Bondholders.

A question of considerable interest in international law is what effect the cessation of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba will have on the position of the holders of Cuban bonds issued by the Spanish Government under the loans of 1886 and 1890. The coupons or certificates of the bonds stated that the special security or guarantee for the loans was the produce of the customs and stamps of the Island of Cuba, as well as the produce of the direct and indirect taxes actually in existence or afterwards imposed, while the general security or guarantee was that of the Spanish nation. By the treaty of April 19, 1898, since ratified by the American Senate and the Spanish Cortes, Spain renounced all pretensions to sovereignty and all her rights over Cuba, but no mention was made of the Cuban loans. The Cuban Republic was not recognized as a State, but the United States assumed the government of the island, and promulgated a new Customs tariff, which made a reduction of 62

per cent. on all imports. a change in the form of civil government in a State, such as a colony or province of a country shaking off its sovereignty, does not affect the validity of the positive obligations which that state has undertaken to other powers or with creditors (Kent, Comm. i. 25; Wheaton, Int. Law, § 11), and accordingly Spain's liability for her debts is not affected by the loss of Cuba. On the other hand, where a State succeeds in asserting its independence of the State formerly sovereign over it, the debts contracted for local objects and debts secured upon local revenues, are binding upon the new State formed by the separation, although it is not liable for the general debt, of the parent State. If debts are secured upon special revenues derived from both sections of the old State (i.e. the separating portion and the portion remaining under the former sovereignty), eg. if they are secured upon customs or excise, they are evidently local to the extent that the hypothecated revenues are supplied by the two sections respectively, and they must therefore be proportionately divided (Hall, Int. Law, 97, 98; and see Pitt Cobbett, Int. Law Cases, 17; and D. D. Field, Int. Law Code, § 26, to the same effect). The formation of a new State so alters the nature of all the securities the creditor looked to, that the new State is under a general obligation to see that he does not suffer by the change (Dana's Wheaton, 30). An instance is to be found. in the case of Holland and Belgium. When they were joined together to form the kingdom of the Netherlands in 1814, the new State became responsible for the debts of both countries; and when they were separated in 1839, Belgium took over part of the Netherlands debt. In the present case, accordingly, if Cuba had become an independent State, she would have been liable to Spain's creditors secured on Cuba; but up to the present there is no Cuban State.

It is an undoubted principle that

Again, where a State, or part of a State, passes to another State by conquest or cession or annexation, it is a clear principle that the latter receives it subject to all its engagements and duties towards others, the fulfilment of which then becomes its own duty (United States Secretary Adams, Lawrence's Wheaton, 54; and so Hall, 593). It has been a common international practice in Europe for a cessionary. State to take over the proportion of the general debt of the ceding State which the ceded portion bears to its former sovereign. Thus in 1864, when Schleswig Holstein and Lauenburg were ceded by Denmark to Austria and Prussia, the debts of Denmark were divided between Denmark and the ceded provinces in proportion to their respective populations; and when Italy acquired the Papal States in 1864 and Venice in 1869, she, in each case, took upon herself so much of the debts as corresponded to the revenues of these provinces. There are, however, exceptions, eg. when Saxe Coburg ceded Lichtenberg to Prussia in 1834; and when Austria, Sardinia, and the other Italian States rectified their boundaries in 1844. So on the cession of Alsace and Lorraine by France in 1871, Germany refused to take on herself any share of the French national debt; and by the Berlin treaty of 1878, while the portions of Turkey given to Servia and Montenegro were charged with a share of the Turkish debt, the portions given to Russia were not so charged, being taken as part payment of the war indemnity demanded by Russia from Turkey (Boyd's Wheaton, 1889, 45). In the case of debts locally attaching to the ceded portion, however, there is a consensus of opinion among jurists that the liability for them should always be transferred to the cessionary State (Calvo, 1010; Halleck by Baker, 90-92; Hall, 98).

A good illustration of this principle in case of annexation is to be found in the case of Texas, which, during its independence, issued bonds secured on the revenues of the State.

In 1845 it was admitted as a State into the Union on condition (inter alia) that it should retain all public funds, debts, taxes, and dues due to her, and all vacant and unappropriated lands to be applied to the debts and liabilities of Texas, and the residue, after discharging these debts, to be disposed of as Texas should direct, but in no case were those debts to become a charge upon the United States Government, and all custom-houses and control over customs duties passed into the hands of the Federal Government. In 1850, however, in spite of this disclaimer of liability, the Federal Government undertook, in consideration of Texas ceding some territory and relinquishing any claims upon them for her debts or for indemnity on account of the surrender of the above described property, to pay Texas a certain sum, only half of which was to be paid until the creditors, holding bonds for which the import duties were the security, should release any claim against the United States upon them. An attempt by an English bondholder to make the Federal Government responsible for their payment by bringing his claim before the Commission of 1853, which was adjusting claims between the United States and Great Britain, failed, because the claim did not fall within the scope of the Commission. The British Commissioner, however, expressed the opinion that although the obligation of Texas to pay her debts was not in dispute, and it had not been argued that the mere act of annexation transferred her liabilities to the Federal Government, still, as regards foreign Governments, the United States were now bound to see that the obligations of Texas were fulfilled, the transfer of the integral revenues of Texas to the Federal Government being relied on as creating the new liability (Snow, Int. Law Cases, 18; Wheaton, by Lawrence, 54); and the American Commissioner admitted that the opinion given by the United States Attorney-General to the Government favoured the United States being held liable for these debts in part. Dana's