does not pay within a term, generally short, his goods are sold by auction, and if no offer be made they are immediately adjudged to the creditor. The administration of justice is confided to a judge called Commissary, or Auditor of the Regency, with whom the Captains according to the Statutes share the jurisdiction. He must be a foreigner, a learned man, doctor in jurisprudence, take the oath and remain in office three years, after which he may be reconfirmed.

He is, like the Captains, answerable to the Syndicate. From the Government he receives salary and residence, and takes precedence directly after the Captains. He is a chief judge in all civil cases of greater value than fifty lire, and, as Government's Counsel, gives his opinion in demands for pardon, etc. Among his minor duties we may note the singular one of advocatus diaboli. When a novice is about to take the veil, some one must represent to her in colours, more or less vivid, the delights and the attraction of the world. This work of temptation is confided to the Commissary. Like the Roman judge—si licet parva-he elaborates the legislative material when necessary; yet he remains modestly in the shade; he does not put his name to any edict. To two eminent foreign lawyers are confided the duties of the judge of appeal. They are not obliged to reside on the spot, nor is their presence necessary, the procedure being carried on entirely in writing.

The Treaty of June 28, 1897, regulates the relations of the Republic with the kingdom of Italy. There is recognition of the validity of contracts by deed stipulated in the other State (save the payment of the taxes in the State in which they are to be used). The sentences pronounced in one country may be executed in the other according to the principles of international private law. The citizens of one State are exempt. from any caution or judicial deposit for law-suits. But the cautio judicatum solvi struck out of the Italian legislation has also fallen into disuse in the Republic. The acts of

penal inquiry and those of civil procedure of one State are carried on, when necessary, in the other by means of rogatories. For this purpose the judicial authorities of the kingdom and that of the Republic (Commissario) are in direct communication. The penal inquiries are regulated by the laws of the State requiring them. Extradition of foreigners is conceded provided the inflicted penalty be at least of two months for one who has been condemned, and that incurred by one who is accused be at least of one year, and the misdeed be punishable also by the legislation of the country from which the extradition is requested. It is admitted for offences reckoned as crimes except political ones or offences therewith connected. For purpose of extradition, however, neither an attempt on the head of the State nor desertion is considered as a political offence. Deserters must be arrested, even without request, and sent back with arms and baggage. In no case, not even, therefore, for desertion, can the extradition be required of citizens of the State in which they have taken refuge or have been domiciled for ten years. This principle is often found in international practice, but it is not universally taken for granted. It must be noted, in addition to this rule, that the State of which the delinquent is a citizen is obliged to proceed judicially against him either on the request of the injured party, or of the Government in the territory of which the offence was committed.

Extradition has no other object than that of preventing the commission of offences by giving up offenders to competent judges; it has no raison d'être in the case of a delinquent taking refuge in his own land where he can always be judged and competently punished. The obligation in respect to Italy exists only in a few Treaties (San Marino, Uruguay, Russia); with other States it is customary practice.

The Extradition Treaty recently concluded between England and the Republic of San Marino is very like the Italo-sammarinese Treaty, except with regard to deserters.

In the latter these give rise to a remarkable exception on account of the peculiar topographical situation of the small Republic, which is enclosed in the heart of Italy.

TORQUATO C. GIANNINI.

THE

IV. THE TAXATION OF COSTS.

HE question of the costs of litigation has again been brought to the fore by the recent report of the General Council of the Bar on the scales of costs and the methods of taxation in the Queen's Bench Division. The report itself is so short, and avoids details so completely, that it can only be considered as a pronouncement that the present state of matters in regard to costs is not satisfactory. But one thing is certain, that, though improvements are needed, the question of costs is one which can hardly ever be satisfactory to every litigant. "The successful litigant should be entitled to be indemnified by the unsuccessful litigant in respect of all costs properly incurred in and about the litigation." This is the fundamental principle which is laid down in the above memorandum. It is perfectly certain, however, that each litigant has his own ideas as to what costs are proper. One litigant may wish to have every step in the litigation reported to him by his solicitor; he may write innumerable letters, to which he requires answers. If a taxing officer comes to the conclusion that such expenditure is unreasonable, the litigant will not be in the least satisfied. Every litigant would like to be his own taxing officer. Temperament, time, and purse all cause different litigants to have different ideas as to the propriety of expenditure in a law-suit. It is impossible, therefore, for a large number of litigants to be satisfied with any system of taxation, however liberal and reasonable.

There are many laymen, therefore, who will say with some reason that the taxation of costs is academic; it is not business; that if A goes to law with B, and B loses his case, A should be paid all the expenses which he has incurred without more ado. It is probable that such a system, though it would cause unsuccessful litigants often to pay a heavier bill of costs than is reasonable, would be satisfactory to the general public. People every day of their lives are paying unreasonable charges, or, at any rate, charges which they consider unreasonable. In the aggregate, at the end of a year, these charges, or overcharges, amount to a considerable sum. there any practical reason why an unsuccessful litigant should be protected as he now is, or why the successful litigant should not receive from him every penny which he has expended in litigation? Of course in any such system there would be a scale of court fees; but the charges of solicitors would be regulated only by themselves or by contract with the litigant. Any such system, there can be very little doubt, would often result in agreements being made to carry on the litigation for a particular sum.

Is

However, it is equally clear that legal traditions are at present so contrary to any such free and even rough system, that the taxation of costs is sure to continue. In theory nothing can be better. It is supposed that under it the party who is victorious receives all the expenses to which he is fairly entitled; and further, that the system itself helps to keep the cost of litigation within due bounds. The weak spot in the system is that no two persons can agree in regard to a number of charges whether they are reasonable or not, and that a certain number of these charges are regulated by rules of Court, and are fixed items, sometimes less and sometimes more than the work done in respect of them is worth.

It is obvious, therefore, that the first necessity for making the taxation of costs as satisfactory as may be is that the scale of costs fixed by the Judicature Rules should be such

that it covers all reasonable expenditure, which can be regulated by fixed items. The present scale cannot be said to fulfil the test. Neither taxing officers nor solicitors are to blame for this. The responsibility rests wholly and solely with the authorities, who are responsible for the Judicature Rules.

An example or two may very well be given. By Order LXV. r. 27 (44) no retaining fee may be allowed as between party and party. But in important cases a solicitor, either on his own initiative or at the request of his client, will retain a particular counsel. If by this expenditure he can obtain the best professional assistance, it is obviously reasonable that the fee should be paid. Yet the taxing officer has no discretion to allow such a fee.

The next example is No. 170 in the scale of costs, the amount to be allowed to a solicitor for attending in court when a case is in the paper but is not reached. The fee is ten shillings. Every one knows that it is not possible when many cases are in the list to be sure at what moment a case will be called on. Thus it is constantly found that a solicitor has to waste his time about the court, waiting for a case to come on. If it does not, he can only receive the remuneration, as between party and party, of ten shillings for the day. Of course the client has to pay more, but the item illustrates the need for a careful revision of the existing scale of costs, with a view to bringing it more into accord with the ordinary expenses incurred by a successful litigant.

And on this point it should be borne in mind that no change has been made in the present scale for years-the experience of those engaged in litigation has not been utilized to improve the scale in any way. If there is to be a scale of costs at all, it should, as far as possible, regulate all the items to which it applies. In theory it is the scale which should meet the requirements not only of a bill of costs as between party and party, but as between a reasonable solicitor and a