was the case in Blackborn v. Edgeley (1 P. Williams, 600), where a son in affluent circumstances gave his father a bond promising to pay him an annuity for life. It was the free act of the son, there was no proof of fraud, and Equity refused to set the bond aside.

By the Larceny Act of 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 116), if any person being the member of any co-partnership, or being one among other beneficial owners of any money or property, steals or embezzles any money or property belonging to such co-partnership or to such joint beneficial owners, he shall be liable to be dealt with as if he had not been or was not a member of such co-partnership or one of the beneficial owners. It was, however, held in R. v. Robson (16 Q.B.D. 137) that an association having for its object not the acquisition of gain but the spiritual and mental improvement of its members, is not a "co-partnership" under the above Act. Consequently a member of such an association who has embezzled monies belonging to it cannot be convicted of embezzling the monies of a “co-partnership" under this Act. The association was the Bedlington Colliery Young Men's Christian Association. It is pleasant to note that the edge of the above decision has been somewhat blunted by the recent decision of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved in Reg. v. Neat (108 L.T. 224). There the Court held that A., a member of a committee formed from the committees of certain friendly societies for the purpose of organizing and carrying out the arrangements for a fête, could properly be convicted of stealing money in which other persons were interested as beneficial owners, within the above Act. A. had obtained possession of the entrance money and appropriated it to his own use. The members of the committee guaranteed the expenses of the fête and were entitled to apply the entrance money towards the extinction of any liability so guaranteed.

The decision in National Sporting Club, Limited v. Cope (108 L.T. 369) is distinguishable from Graff v. Evans (8 Q.B.D. 373). In the latter case, the manager of an institution, carried on bonâ fide as a club, under rules by which members paid an entrance fee and subscription, had in the course of his employment supplied intoxicants to a member (who paid for them) for consumption off the premises. All the club property was vested in trustees, and there was a committee of management to conduct the general business. The club was not licensed for the sale of intoxicating liquors, but these were supplied at fixed prices to members for consumption on and off the premises, 33 per cent. above the cost price being charged for liquors to be consumed off the premises, and the money produced thereby going to the general funds of the club. It was held by the Queen's Bench Divisional Court that the manager did not "sell by retail" intoxicating liquors within the meaning of section 3 of the Licensing Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94). But in the case just decided the institution was a joint stock company carrying on the business of a club under the name of the "National Sporting Club, Limited." Shares in it were held by persons who were not members of the club. The company sold intoxicating liquors to members of the club on the club premises. It was held by the Queen's Bench Divisional Court that the company was carrying on the business of a proprietary club, that the proprietors as a company constituted a separate legal entity distinct from the club, and also distinct from the shareholders, and that the transfer of intoxicants by the company's servants (who were nominally the club's servants) to members of the club was a sale by retail. While not deciding whether a proprietary club may not be so constituted as not to be within the Excise Acts, or that a company may not be constituted out of the members of a club, so as to be within the law applicable to members' clubs, we merely draw attention to the fact that in this recent

case the shareholders of the company and the members of the club were not the same persons, and that the profits from the sale of the liquors belonged not to the club but to the company.

The well-known section 4 of the Statute of Frauds was once again considered by Buckley, J., in Hucklesby v. Hook (35 L.J. 151). There the plaintiff called on the defendant, the proprietor of a hotel at Clacton-on-Sea, and offered to purchase certain land of him. The plaintiff wrote on a sheet of the defendant's hotel note-paper, on which was printed the name and address of the defendant, his (the plaintiff's) own address, date, and words implying that he (the plaintiff) agreed to purchase certain land of the defendant at a certain price. The next day the plaintiff sent to the defendant a cheque in payment of deposit; and the day after the defendant wrote to plaintiff that the land was not for sale, and returned the cheque. On the plaintiff bringing an action for specific performance, Buckley, J., found that the defendant took the letter-paper out of the paper rack, that the agreement was not written (as alleged) at the dictation of the defendant, but that the defendant wanted the plaintiff to put something in writing, and that the plaintiff asked the defendant to countersign it, but that he refused, saying that he never signed documents except in the presence of his solicitor. Buckley, J., decided in favour of the defendant, on the ground that there was no sufficient memorandum in writing to satisfy the statute. It is plain that if the defendant had verbally accepted the written offer of the plaintiff, he would have been bound. This was so held in Reuss v. Picksley (L.R. 1 Ex. 342). But in the case just decided, the printed words at the head of the note-paper were not really any part of the memorandum, and the plaintiff, by writing his own address underneath the printed heading, in effect struck them out. The cases show that signing, for the purposes of the statute,

does not necessarily mean writing a name, but it is enough if the document be ratified in some way by the writing of the person to be charged. In Schneider v. Norris (2 M. & S. 286) the defendant wrote the plaintiff's name on a paper containing the name of the defendant in print. In Evans v. Hoare (61 L.J.R., Q.B. 470) the defendant's agent wrote the whole document on which the defendant's name was contained. And in Torret v. Cripps (27 W.R. 706) the defendant wrote and sent the letter, but it was not signed by him; the principle being that if such a document were recognised by. the defendant sending it to the plaintiff, there was enough to satisfy the statute. In the case before us the defendant wrote no part of the document, and the other facts did not help the plaintiff.

The month of March was productive of cases elucidating the obscurity of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37). Mason v. Dean (108 L.T. 392) decides that where A. contracts with the owner to build him a theatre, power being reserved in the contract for the owner to put part of the work of decorating the building into the hands of another contractor, and M., a workman employed by this other contractor (D.), is killed through a loose plank of a scaffold erected by A., that D. is an "undertaker" within the Act. Then Cooper v. Davenport (44 S.J. 311) decides that a sub-contractor is not an "undertaker;" and, in so deciding, the Court followed Cass v. Butler (44 S.J. 277), decided by the same Court earlier in the month. Next we have Milner v. Great Northern Railway Co. (108 L.T. 442), which ungallantly, but quite logically, refused a barmaid compensation for injuries sustained by the fall of a framed advertisement on her in the refreshment-room of a railway station; the Court holding that the plaintiff's employment was not "on, or in, or about" a "railway" within the meaning of the above Act. Then, Lysons v. Andrew, Limited

(108 L.T. 442), which held that before a workman can be entitled to compensation under the above Act, he must have been working at least for two weeks for the same employer in the employment in the course of which the accident happened. Lastly, Powell v. Main Colliery Co. (108 L.T. 489) decides that no compensation can be made under this Act unless the request for arbitration be made within six months from the occurrence of the accident.

"When is a house not a house?" This new forensic riddle was evolved in the case of Kimber v. Admans (35 L.J. 147), where the plaintiff bought one of several plots of land, which plots were sold subject to certain covenants. One of these was that not more than one house should be erected on any one plot. The defendant was also a purchaser, and proposed to erect on his plot a block of buildings containing flats. The plaintiff alleged that such a building constituted more than one house. Cozens Hardy, J., denied this, and the Court of Appeal confirmed his decision. In The AttorneyGeneral v. Mutual Tontine Association (45 L.J.R., Exch., 886) the Court of Appeal held that duty was properly charged upon the entire block as one "house," and not upon the separate suites of rooms as distinct properties. This decision is concomitant with the recent case. We should, however, observe that in Rogers v. Hosegood (69 L.J.R., Ch. 59), decided last November, the Court held that a block of flats is not one messuage but several; and it was not evident if there was any substantial difference, for the purposes of the covenant in dispute in that action, between a terrace of adjoining residences separated from each other vertically, and a pile of residences separated from one another horizontally.

SHERSTON BAKER.