present judgment is in conformity with high judicial decision on the Continent of Europe, and the opinions of English writers, and proceeds on the principle that the tacit contract entered into by the parties at marriage, that the law of the country of their matrimonial domicile should govern their property acquired during marriage, ought not to be altered at the will of one party to it, the husband, without the consent of the other. The members of the court variously base their judgments on the grounds that, by French law, the wife acquired a proprietary right in any property, present or future, that might belong to herself or her husband, and that the provisions of the French code in this respect were equivalent to an express contract between the parties, which, beyond dispute, would not have been affected by any subsequent change of domicile. In a former case (Lashley v. Hog), the House had held that, where two English domiciled persons married in England, and afterwards the husband became domiciled in Scotland, the law of Scotland governed the rights of the wife over the property; and in the present case this decision is distinguished on the ground that the wife obtained no proprietary right by the law of the matrimonial domicile, and when the parties became domiciled Scotch spouses, the property which was not affected by any previous complete and irrevocable right, would properly be distributed by Scotch law.

The principle now adopted seems to be in accordance with American decisions, that rights, vested by the law of the original domicile are not diverted by change of domicile; but it has not the convenience of being the same as that applied in questions regarding the status of the married parties, such as divorce (although such questions as judicial separation, or restitution of conjugal rights can be decided by the court of the country where the parties reside), and testamentary power,

viz. that the law of the actual domicile governs. In the case of immovable property acquired after a change of domicile under the above conditions, it seems well settled by English and American law, that the lex situs will determine the rights of the parties over it, although French law and many continental jurists make no difference in this respect between immovable and movable property.

Another recent case of interest in this connection is that of Loustalan v. Loustalan, decided last year in the English Probate Court. There a testatrix, a French subject, who had lived in England as companion to a widow, and had made a will in accordance with French law, which she deposited with a notary in France, married in London a Frenchman domiciled in France, and carried on business with him in London till her death. The plaintiff claimed probate of the will which she had already established in France, and had been put in possession of the estate as universal legatee, and contended that the English Probate Court should, sitting as a French Court, apply French law to the will, under which a subsequent marriage does not revoke a will; while the defendant, who had obtained letters of administration in England prior to the proceedings in France, of which he had had no notice, contended that the law of the husband's domicile according to French law (ie. the English law) should apply. The Court decided that the husband's and wife's domicile, according to the law of his domicile (France), was in England, where he had his principal and only establishment of business, and where he resided in order to escape the penalty of a conviction in France; but held that, while the parties intended that English law should regulate their contractual relations, and that their marriage should be under the English régime, yet the provision of English law which revokes a will by subsequent marriage was not a reasonable one, and must be considered

as part of the testamentary rather than of the matrimonial law, and was accordingly not intended to affect their testamentary powers, and the will was therefore valid. The validity of the wife's exercise of testamentary power, according to the ordinary rule, was thus determined by the provisions. of the law of her domicile (French).

Samoa.

The Convention between Germany and Great Britain of November 14 last marks the close of the unsatisfactory tri-dominium set up in Samoa by the Final Act of the Convention between these two Powers and the United States. respecting Samoa made in 1889. The latter provided for the independence and neutrality of the islands of Samoa, and equality of rights between the subjects of the treaty powers there, and modified the earlier treaties made between Samoa and the treaty Powers separately: it set up a Supreme Court of Justice, consisting of a Chief Justice chosen by the three Powers, who had power to decide all questions arising under the Act, and the validity of the powers of the king and chiefs and the succession to the kingship, and differences arising between Samoa and the Powers, and was only removable by a majority of the treaty Powers. He could administer English common law, equity and admiralty law, and in the case of crimes apply the provisions of American, English, or German law, and in the case of Samoans and South Sea Islanders the punishment provided by the laws and customs of Samoa; but the consular jurisdiction was retained as well. On the death of the king,. however, disorder broke out, and the decision of the Chief Justice as to the succession was not obeyed: and the Commissioners sent by the treaty Powers last year to restore order reported in favour of abolishing the kingship and consular jurisdiction, and of setting up a legislative council,.

and other amendments of the Final Act, also recommending that the islands should be put under one Power. The present arrangement adopts this suggestion by dividing the islands between the three treaty Powers, and abolishing exterritorial jurisdiction of the two parties to it therein; while Germany also gives up her right of exterritoriality in Zanzibar, and she and Great Britain divide the neutral zone between their possessions in West Africa established by a Convention of 1888. It also extends to Samoa the stipulation of the Berlin Declaration of 1886 respecting mutual freedom of commerce between the two nations in the Western Pacific.

G. G. PHILLIMORE.

VIII. NOTES ON RECENT CASES (ENGLISH).

By sect. 25, subs. 2, of the Local Government Act, 1894, it is provided that where a highway repairable ratione tenure appears, on the report of a competent surveyor, not to be in proper repair, and the person liable to repair the same fails, when requested by the District Council, to place it in proper repair, the District Council may place it in proper repair, and recover from the person liable to repair the highway the necessary expenses of so doing. The Daventry District Council, in Daventry District Council v. Parker (108 L.T. 11), brought an action to recover the expenses incurred by them in repairing a certain highway in the district after they had requested the defendant to repair it, and he had failed to do so. The highway was on land which was owned by the defendant, but was in the occupation of his tenant. The defendant raised the point whether an owner of land who was not the occupier was "the person liable to repair under the above section. The Queen's Bench Division (Wills and Bruce, JJ.) held that the defendant was entitled to

judgment. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal, on the ground that even if the owner was not indictable, and the occupier was, nevertheless the occupier had a right of indemnity against the owner, and the owner therefore was in fact "the person liable to repair." The appeal was dismissed. It is evident that the above section does not alter the liability of persons liable to repair ratione tenure, but only the procedure for enforcing that liability.

The above case is on all fours with the earlier case of Cuckfield Rural District Council v. Goring (L.R. [1898] 1 Q.B. 865); moreover, in Baker v. Greenhill (3 Ad. & Ell. (Q.B.) 148), a case decided in 1842 by Lord Chief Justice Denman, it was distinctly held that where lands charged with repair of a bridge are occupied by a person not the owner, such occupier is primarily responsible to the public for the repairs, although he may demand reimbursement from the owner. The judgment in Daventry District Council v. Parker is therefore in every way entitled to respect.

In re London and Northern Bank, Ex parte Jones (W.N. 230), is an interesting case with regard to the law of offer and acceptance. One Jones, living at Sheffield, applied for shares in the above bank. On October 26 he wrote a letter to the bank, withdrawing his application; the letter was received by the bank at 8.30 a.m. on October 27. On the afternoon of October 26 the directors resolved to allot the

shares to Jones. The notice of allotment was prepared during the night of October 26, and about 7 a.m. on October 27 was taken to the outside of the General Post Office in St. Martin's-le-Grand. Here a postman came by and offered to take the letter. He was given a fee for his trouble, and entered the General Post Office, coming back afterwards to say that it was all right. The allotment letter