a sense of federal power as the power of powers, and fixes the federal authority as it were in the very habits of society." This last paragraph applies in almost identical terms to Canada, with this difference, that here the expansion in the civil service has all been on the side of the Provinces. The last and best instance of this is furnished by the late Fisheries decision of the Privy Council, one of the consequences of which has been the dismissal of the Dominion Fishery Inspectors, and the creation of provincial officers with powers similar to those of the former Dominion officials.

Perhaps arising out of the doctrine of the implied powers of Congress, and to offset it, came the attempt on behalf of the States to assert a jurisdiction in their legislatures to interfere should Congress, by accident or design, overstep its rights and encroach upon the States. I cannot do better than quote the substance of the controversy from a speech of Daniel Webster, in reply to Colonel Hayne, delivered in the Senate on January 26, 1830. "I understand the honourable gentleman for South Carolina to maintain that it is a right of the State Legislatures to interfere whenever in their judgment this Government transcends its constitutional limits, and to arrest the operation of its laws. . . . I understand him to maintain that the ultimate power of judging of the constitutional extent of its own authority is not lodged exclusively in the General Government or any branch of it, but that, on the contrary, the States may lawfully decide for themselves and each State for itself whether, in a given case, the act of the General Government transcends its power. I understand him to insist that if the exigencies of the case in the opinion of any State Government require it, such State Government may by its own sovereign authority annul an act of the General Government which it deems plainly and palpably unconstitutional. . . . I do not admit, that under the Constitution and in

conformity with it, there is any mode in which a State Government as a member of the Union can interfere and stop the progress of the General Government, by force of her own laws, under any circumstances whatever. . . . Some authority must therefore necessarily exist having the ultimate jurisdiction to fix and ascertain the interpretation of these grants, restrictions, and prohibitions. The Constitution has itself pointed out, ordained, and established that authority. How has it accomplished this great and essential end? By declaring (Art. VI.) that the Constitution and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.' This was the first great step. By this the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the United States is declared. The people so will it. No State law is to be valid which comes in conflict with the Constitution or any law of the United States passed in pursuance of it. But who shall decide this question of interference? This the Constitution itself declares also by declaring (Art. III.) 'that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States.' These two provisions cover the whole ground." This view was the one adopted by the Courts, and nothing has since been heard of such pretensions on the part of the individual States.

The States made their next stand in 1850, on one of the numerous questions arising out of the institution of slavery. Article IV. section 2 of the Constitution provides that any person "held to service" in one State and escaping into another "shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service" may be due. Under this clause the question was raised-in which Government was lodged the jurisdiction of seeing to its enforcement? A claim was made to legislative jurisdiction on behalf of the States as being evidently contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned

by their greater interest in the question; but it was ultimately held (Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Peters, 539) that the power and the obligation lay with the Central Government. I may be permitted to quote again from Daniel Webster, speaking in the Senate, March 7th, 1850. "I have always thought that the Constitution addressed itself to the legislatures of the States or to the States themselves. It says that those persons escaping to other States 'shall be delivered up'; and I confess I have always been of the opinion that it was an injunction upon the States themselves. When it is said that a person escaping into another State and coming, therefore, within the jurisdiction of that State, shall be delivered up, it seems to me the import of the clause is that the State itself, in obedience to the Constitution, shall cause him to be delivered up. That is my judgment. I have always entertained that opinion, and I entertain it now. But when the subject some years ago was before the Supreme Court of the United States, the majority of the judges held that the power to cause fugitives from service to be delivered up was a power to be exercised under the authority of this (the Federal) Government." A short paragraph from the judgment of Mr. Justice Story, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, will show the view taken by the Supreme Court. "If... the Constitution guarantees the right, and if it requires the delivery upon the claim of the owner (as cannot well be doubted), the natural inference certainly is that the National Government is clothed with the appropriate authority and functions to enforce it."

Interesting questions of interpretation arose in both countries, as they were sure to do, over the clauses granting apparently conflicting jurisdiction to the general and local legislatures; and I will refer to one case on each side of the border. The Canadian case is that of Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (4 C. 7), in which also a futile attempt was made to assimilate the principles of interpretation to be applied to

the two constitutions. An extract from the judgment of the Privy Council is as follows: "Their Lordships have been invited . . . to apply to the construction of the Federation Act the principles laid down for the United States by Chief Justice Marshall. Every one would gladly accept the guidance of that great judge in a parallel case. But he was dealing with the constitution of the United States. Under that constitution, as their Lordships understand, each State may make laws for itself uncontrolled by the federal power and subject only to the limits placed by law on the range of subjects within its jurisdiction. In such a constitution Chief Justice Marshall found one of those limits at the point at which the action of the State legislatures came into conflict with the power vested in Congress. The appellant invokes that principle to support the conclusion that the Federation. Act must be so construed as to allow no power to the provincial legislatures under section 92, which may by possibility, and if exercised in some extravagant way, interfere with the objects of the Dominion in exercising their powers under section 91. It is quite impossible to argue from the one case to the other." The Court then proceeded to hold that a subject might be no less of provincial jurisdiction, because if that jurisdiction is exercised the field of Dominion jurisdiction would be thereby lessened.

The view taken of their constitution in the American courts is well illustrated by the case of the City of New York v. Miln (2 Peters (U.S. Sup. Ct.), 1371), the judgment in which contains the following remarks: "It appears that whilst a State is acting within the legitimate scope of its power as to the end to be obtained, it may use whatsoever means, being appropriate to that end, it may think fit . . . subject only . . . to this limitation, that in the event of collision the law of the State must yield to the law of Congress. This must be understood, of course, as meaning that the law of Congress is passed upon a subject within the sphere of its power."

These decisions are of importance in that they clearly show with what different eyes our constitutions and that of the United States have been viewed by the highest tribunals of both countries. We started out with a central government of general powers only limited by a few enumerated exceptions; while in America the general residuum of power is clearly vested if anywhere in the States. Article X. of the amendments to the Constitution declares, "The powers not delegated by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The article of the American Constitution from which the more exalted view of the powers of Congress derives its greatest strength is the sixth, which declares that "the constitution and the laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; " yet how feeble this is, especially when read with the tenth amendment, in comparison with the last clause of our section 91: “And any matter coming within any of the classes of subjects enumerated in this section shall not be deemed to come within the class of matters of a local or private nature comprised in the enumeration of the classes of subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces." Yet mark the result. In Canada, if a subject-matter be shown to come within section 92, the jurisdiction of the Province over it is assured, although it may be so exercised as seriously to impede the jurisdiction of Parliament over a subject-matter equally within its scope. In the United States, on the contrary, if a State enactment.impedes the exercise by Congress of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the constitution, it will be declared void, though it may seem otherwise to be a fit subject for State legislation. If the result in America has savoured a trifle of Congressional usurpation, supporting itself on judge-made law, the result in Canada is directly attributable to provincial