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to the Massachusetts statute of distributions, was (c), and not (6) (Codman v. Brooks (1897), 167 Mass. 499).
Another Act of Congress, dealing with the same subject in the same terms, was passed on March 3, 1899; and in an interesting article in the Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer of April 14, 1899, M. F. J. Brown, of Baltimore, after discussing the various decisions of the American Courts upon the Act of 1891, expresses the view that (c), which seems likely to be adopted generally by the State Courts following the lead of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, is not the true principle, unless modified by allowing the subdivisions of the classes taken as the stirpes to share equally instead of as representing their stirpes, eg. on the facts in Codman v. Brooks, dividing the fund into twenty-thirds, each living grandchild taking one part, and the remaining four twenty-thirds being divided equally among the twelve living grandchildren whose parents are dead. He also advocates the Supreme Court laying down a definite general principle of distribution of these amounts, instead of leaving it to be decided by the various State statutes of distribution on the ground that these do not contemplate a distribution taking place sixty, seventy, or ninety years after a given death ; and he also would extend the principle of per stirpes and representation to collaterals and their descendants indefinitely, as has apparently been allowed in a case in Maryland, modified as above (modified (c)).
There seems to be good reason for the contention that a uniform principle should be adopted as the basis of distribution in this case, and that the ordinary law of distribution should not be applied to a highly artificial state of circumstances; and, on the facts in Codman v. Brooks, if the per stirpes principle is overridden by the principle of “equality is equity” in the case of the grandchildren, logically it should be overridden in the same way in the case of the great-grandchildren. The English statute of distribution, after some
doubt, has been held to be governed absolutely by the per stirpes principle in the case of descendants of an intestate, and grandchildren always take per stirpes and not per capita (22 & 23 Car. II. c. 10, SS 3, 5, 6, 7; Ross's Trusts, 1871, L.R. 13 Eq. 286; In re Natt, 1888, 37 Ch. D. 517), although there are still opinions to the contrary (Williams (1893], E.recutors, ii, 1368); and in case of collaterals, no representation is allowed after brothers' and sisters' children (§ 7). We should accordingly apply theory (b) above, which the dissenting opinion in Codman v. Brooks thought was that indicated by the Supreme Court in Blagge v. Balch.
The decision in Re Chatard's Settlement Trusts (1899, 1 Ch. 712) illustrates the way in which an English Court deals with a foreign guardian of foreign children who wishes to obtain payment to himself of a fund under control of the Court for the benefit of those children. In this case infant children, who were French subjects domiciled in France, petitioned by their father and lawful guardian and next friend for payment out of Court to him of a fund to which the infants were entitled under a settlement, the trustees of which had paid it into Court under the Trustees Relief Act. It was assumed in argument that, according to French law, the father as guardian could give a legal discharge for the fund on the infants' behalf; and the question was whether the Court, having the money under its control, was bound to comply with the petition without exercising its discretion. The Court held that it was not so bound, but must be satisfied that the payment out of the fund was properly required for the infants' benefit; and no proof to this effect being given, it directed that the income of the fund should be accumulated.
Generally speaking, on proof being given that by the law of the children's domicile the guardian can give a valid
discharge for the money, payment out to him has been allowed (In re Crichton's Trusts (1855), 24 L.T. O.S. 26, and In re Ferguson's Trusts (1874), 22 W.R. 762, a case of Scotch infants and curator ; In re Brown's Trusts (1865), 12 L.T. N.S. 488, Prussian guardian); but in one case it was held that a legacy bequeathed to an infant domiciled abroad may be paid when he comes of age either by the English law or by the lex domicilii, whichever happens first, and meanwhile must be dealt with as an infant's legacy, although by the lex domicilii the guardian may be entitled to receive it (In re Hellmann's Trusts (1866), L.R. 2 Eq. 363). In the present case, the Court cited as an analogy to its decision the various English decisions with regard to foreign lunatics who have property in England, which establish that an English Court is not bound to allow that property to be transferred to the Committee appointed by the Court of the lunatic's domicile without exercising its discretion in the matter (of which the latest instance is Didisheim v. London and Westminster Bank  (Law Times 233).
Similarly, the English Courts have always maintained their right to appoint a guardian for any infant, foreign or native, who is resident within British jurisdiction, however short the term of that residence may be, irrespective of the fact whether the infant has or has not already a guardian appointed by the Court of its domicile, the reason for this being that the status of a guardian is not recognized in England unless it has been there constituted. It is not a matter of course to appoint a foreign guardian to be English guardian ; that is only a matter to be taken into consideration (Johnson v. Beattie , 10 C1. & F.42 ; Stuart v. Bute [1861), 9 H.L.C. 440). So an English Court can appoint guardians for an infant in its jurisdiction although it has foreign ones already (Nugent v. De Vetsera, L.R. 2 Eq. 704); it can prevent foreign guardians from removing their wards out of England, where they have been brought by former foreign guardians
(Dawson v. Fay (1854). 3 De G. M. & G. 764); and if a foreign guardian wishes to exercise his powers in England, he must apply to the Court to be appointed English guardian. But in practice our Courts pay complete respect to the appointment of guardians by a competent foreign Court ; they will assist such guardians to the utmost of their ability (Savini v. Lousada (1870), 18 W.R. 415); and they will not interfere with the discretion of such guardians, from any
idea of supposed benefit to their wards, infant subjects of a foreign country sent here for education, to remove them from England (Nugent's case, above). They will generally follow the foreign appointment if the foreign guardians are within English jurisdiction (ibid.); and they have refused to appoint guardians for infants possessed of considerable personal property in England, born, domiciled, and resident in France, children of a Frenchman who was naturalized in England, married an Englishwoman there, and lived there till shortly before his death, for whom the French Court had already appointed guardians (Re Bourgeoise (1889), 41 Ch. D. 310). Our Courts in ordinary circumstances recognize the principle stated by Lord Brougham in Johnson v. Beattie, that a guardian validly appointed in any country has an authority for protection of his ward and administration of his personal estate everywhere ex comitate (see Dicey, Conflict of Law; Piggott, Foreign Fudgments).
A recent decision of the Admiralty Court has added Dutch pilots to the ranks of foreign pilots, who, though compulsorily em yed by vessels in foreign waters under foreign law, yet because they are not in control of them do not by their presence on board exempt the owner of the ship from liability to another in an English Court for a collision caused solely by their default (The Prins Hendrik, Law Journal, 267). It
has previously been decided that pilots employed compulsorily under the French Code in a French river (The Augusta (1886), 6 Asp. 58 & 161), or in the Suez Canal under the Canal Regulations (The Guy Mannering (1882], 7 P.D. 132), or in the Danube under the Danube International Rules of Navigation (The Agnes Otto (1887), 12 P.D. 56) are in this position, being only "a kind of living chart," in the words of the late Master of the Rolls ; but that if a pilot is in control of the navigation of the ship, the shipowner is exempt, even though the foreign law which governs the locality of the collision expressly provides that nevertheless the owner shall remain liable to other persons for the negligent navigation of his ship (The Halley , L.R. 2 P.C. 193, a collision in Belgian waters : The Hibernian (1872), 1 Asp. 491, P.C. Canadian waters). The principle on which this non-liability of the shipowner for a collision for which the lex loci makes him responsible, is that a tort committed in a foreign country gives no cause of action in England, unless it is also a tort by English law (Chartered Bank of India v. Netherlands India S.N.C. , 10 Q.B.D. 521, 536, Brett, L.J.), and by our law the owner of the ship which is in fault for a collision caused by the fault of a compulsory pilot is not liable for the tort of the pilot as the relation of master and servant does not exist between them (The Maria [1839), 1 W. Rob. 39).
There are, however, signs of a growing opinion that the favoured position of the shipowner in this respect under English law, as compared with foreign law, should not continue, and that the compulsory employment of a pilot by English law should only render him, as in the case of a foreign pilot, an official guide to assist ships in their navigation or a "living chart," instead of constituting him a state officer, who supersedes the master in the charge of the ship. By the general maritime law as expounded by Lord Stowell, Sir John Nicholl, and Sir Robert Phillimore, a shipowner is liable for damage done by the negligent navigation of his ship, even though it