leave this question to the jury, whether the party accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was wrong. There are, doubtless, persons who may not be designated insane, who yet exhibit peculiarities of thought and character striking enough to attract the observation of strangers, and these are to be dealt with not as persons absolutely irresponsible, but as subjects who, in the commission of crime, cannot be regarded in the same light as a deliberate criminal. So, again, arises a distinction between idiocy and insanity; an idiot is one who, from birth, owing to some incurable infirmity of mind, is incapable of exercising a judgment on human affairs; it is an absence or weakness of mind, congenital, such a defective understanding that no education can overcome; whereas a lunatic may, at times, exercise a judgment on human affairs-one who has had understanding, but by disease, grief, or other causes, has lost the use of reason, or has become of mind so unsound as to be incapable of managing his affairs; the unsoundness, in this case, may be of a transient character, and may be on one subject especially, and yet sound on most others. These peculiarities or distinctions are necessarily to be regarded in handling criminal responsibility, the unreasonableness being apparent of holding such persons as responsible as others who may not be acting under an almost inevitable fate. There is, again, another term, that of non compos, meaning the same as lunatic, as having a mind so unsound as to be incapable of conducting one's self or one's affairs, and is considered a legal phrase, as lunatic, from its derivation, is applicable especially to one that had lucid intervals, but it has become extended to any species of insanity, and is now generally used as signifying their unsoundness.

Sir M. Hale's theory of partial and perfect insanity was acted on by legal authorities in reference to crimes, the partial insanity being regarded as not exculpating a man

from crime; and in this, also, a distinction was made between criminal and civil matters, for though the doctrine of partial insanity could not exempt from punishment, the person suffering from it was deprived of managing his affairs, of the power of making a will or otherwise disposing of his property. It is in reference to the protection of property and safety of the person of the lunatic that what is called a commission of lunacy issues, which is granted by the Lord Chancellor, on a petition or information presented to him to inquire into the state of mind of the lunatic, and this inquiry takes place before certain officials, and, if desired, before a jury, whose verdict on oath of at least twelve men is taken in presence of the alleged lunatic, and if the verdict be of non compos the care of his person and property is committed to some friend called the committee, who is responsible to the Lord Chancellor.

The principle of the law requiring proof of a greater aberration of mind in criminal than in civil cases is, that some evidence must be adduced in the criminal case of insanity connected with the particular act. The deduction from Sir M. Hale's dictum has been thus appositely stated, "If there be a total permanent want of reason, it will acquit the prisoner; if there be a total temporary want of it when the offence is committed, it will acquit the prisoner; but if there be only a partial degree of insanity mixed with a partial degree of reason, not a full and complete use of reason, but a competent use of it sufficient to have restrained those passions which produce crime; if there be thought and design, a faculty to distinguish the nature of actions, to discern the difference between moral good and evil, then upon the fact of the offence proved, the judgment of the law must take place" (Townsend's State Trials, vol. i. 332). The first reported case carrying out this principle was on the trial of a man for shooting at Lord Onslow in 1733, when the judge laid down: "it is not every kind of frantic humour, or

something unaccountable in a man's actions, that points him out to be such a madman as is exempted from punishment; it must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing no more than an infant, than a brute or a wild beast: such an one is never the object of punishment." But in the case of Hadfield, tried in 1800 for shooting at the King, Mr. Erskine, who was the Counsel for prisoner, denied that there must be a total deprivation of memory and understanding to exempt him from punishment on the grounds of insanity, and that no such madness ever existed in the world, and that if the jury were satisfied that the act in question was the immediate unqualified offspring of the disease, that that delusion which originated it was the insanity which should exempt from punishment. Delusion, according to this theory, when there is no frenzy, or madness, is the true character of insanity. Hadfield was under a delusion that he was the Saviour of the world, and that his death was necessary for its salvation, so that it would appear he knew his act was illegal, that knowledge being the cause of the act for which he would be put to death, and, though knowing its illegality, he did not know it was wrong, and hence it was concluded he could not have formed any reasonable judgment as to the act. There was, in this case, evidence that the prisoner knew right from wrong, that he had deliberately planned the act, and was conscious of punishment following its committal, and so the act was regarded as the product of the madness, and on this ground the judge directed his acquittal.

A case which arrested attention, by reason of its subject, was that of the man named Bellingham, who, in 1812, shot Mr. Perceval, then Prime Minister. Bellingham was a merchant who had trade connections with Russia, where he had been imprisoned for a debt which he alleged he did not owe. He thereupon, complaining of his wrongs, sought redress through the British ambassador, who satisfied himself on inquiry that

Bellingham had been fairly dealt with, and therefore declined interference. Then Bellingham made frequent application to the Government for redress, and desperation succeeding these ineffectual efforts, he wrote a menacing note to the magistrate at Bow Street, stating he would take justice for himself. No notice being taken of this threat, a month after its transmission he shot Mr. Perceval, and at once gave himself up to justice, declaring he had done the deed deliberately, and rejoiced in its execution. On his trial an application was made to the presiding judge (Mansfield, C.J.) to postpone its hearing, on the ground of insanity; but the attorney-general objecting, the judge refused the application, and the trial proceeded. Bellingham enumerated at the trial his wrongs, and expressed his sole regret that he had not shot the Russian ambassador instead of Mr. Perceval. The Chief Justice thought the prisoner rational and responsible, and submitted to the jury, Did the prisoner know he was committing a crime when he committed this act? As long as a man could distinguish good from evil, he was answerable for his conduct. Although he might be incapable of conducting his own affairs, he may still be answerable for his criminal acts, if he possess a mind capable of distinguishing right from wrong. He was found. guilty, and the indecent haste which characterized his trialthe refusal to delay the trial for evidence of insanity, to be produced by his relatives-the finding, conviction, and execution of the prisoner taking place within one week from the swearing the information, concurred to fix the case as a blot on our criminal procedure. On what ground, then, was Bellingham found guilty? Because an absence of a knowledge of right and wrong generally, not having a reference to the particular crime, could only justify an acquittal; and the jury finding there was no such absence of knowledge, he was accordingly convicted.

In Hadfield's case the prevalence of delusions instigating to the crime was held to justify his acquittal ; but in Bellingham's

case, though certain delusions existed, the result of misfortune, though possibly in a minor degree, but yet, having a capacity in other matters of distinguishing right from wrong, for the particular offence he was held inexcusable. This doctrine has not been acceded to; and the more generally approved direction to a jury is, if some controlling disease be in truth the acting power within the mind of a prisoner which he cannot resist, then he is not responsible for the crime; or that the prisoner did not know at the time when he committed the act in question what its effect would be with reference to the crime of which he was charged, that he was committing an offence against the law of God and Nature. The settled rule, however, now acted on by judges, results from answers given to the House of Lords in 1843, in reference to a case known as MacNaughter's case, reported in 10 Clark and Finnelly's Reports, 200.

MacNaughten had delusions as to imaginary wrongs, for which there was not a shadow of foundation; but believing that he was a subject of persecution by distinguished persons, who were blasting his character, he shot Mr. Drummond, an eminent political official, by mistake, for Sir Robert Peel. He was tried within a fortnight after the occurrence, and being called on to plead, answered by saying, "I was driven to desperation by persecution." A delay of a month was had to enable witnesses to be produced to establish insanity; and on his trial the medical evidence was so strong on the question that he was not amenable to punishment for the act, because at the time of its committal he did not know he was violating the law of God and man, the proceedings were stayed, and certain questions were propounded for the consideration of the judge, the answers to which now regulate trials of this kind. The old test being, Did the prisoner at the time of doing the act know the difference between right and wrong? The judges submitted the proper question to be, Whether he had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing