venting it is not to extend the electoral district too much.

It cannot be denied, on the other hand, that a small uninominal district is a source of corruption. The too close bonds which unite the electors to their member, make of him a business agent, a pleader for private interests, from whom all the electors claim his assistance and service, and his influence in administration of justice and of local interests. To that indirect form of corruption is often joined a more direct one, since the scanty number of electors in a small electoral district makes the venality of voters easy. This, I fear, happens more or less everywhere, since a small district is like a pond, in which stagnation of necessity induces putrefaction. As to the effects which it produces in England, I am not competent to speak. I believe, however, that I am not much mistaken in affirming that corruption in the small districts is very extensive, although it may not attain such a high degree as was manifested in the towns of Oxford, Gloucester, Macclesfield and others, over which the threatened punishment of a temporary disfranchisement is hanging.

What the small Electoral district proved itself to be in France under Louis Philippe, we are told in the burning words of Armand Carrel, Paul Louis Courier, and Louis de Cormenin, who have held up to condemnation that corruption which a man so eminent as Guizot did not know how to abstain from allowing. What that same corruption was under the Second Empire, the sad notoriety of the candidature officielle has revealed. Neither does it work better under the Republican régime.

In the Italian Constituencies, it may be affirmed, that trading in votes was limited to a very few cases; on the other hand, all too extensive was the indirect corruption by which a member held his supporters close in hand by getting honours conferred upon them; by upholding their preponderance

in the Municipal administration; by obtaining reprieve or diminution of punishment for them when falling under the rigour of the law; by causing functionaries obnoxious to them to be removed; and by backing them up in their transactions with the Government, obtaining for them favours, advantages, privileges, or even material gains. The spreading and the deep root of these pernicious customs, derogatory to the dignity both of the electors and the elected, has urged Parliament to dry up their source by suppressing the uninominal Constituencies. The majority of the Moderate Liberal party, although it acknowledged the evil, was still opposed to the Scrutinio di Lista, and proposed other remedies in its stead. Signor Minghetti, who, if not the first of Italian statesmen for acquaintance with the practical art of government, is certainly one of the very first in eloquence and learning, in a book where he reviews all the evils and inconveniences which affect the Parliamentary system, pleads for an ample Decentralization, the responsibility of Public Officers, the suppression of many arbitrary privileges which the law grants them, and finally for justice in the administration, which Signor Spaventa had already loudly demanded. While joining in all these demands, I remain of opinion that the Scrutinio di Lista will also efficiently contribute to that effect. And though I do not share the unbounded confidence which Signor Zanardelli, who has been its most zealous advocate places in it, I yet cannot, like Minghetti, feel distrust of it. Much less can I agree with the illustrious political and scientific luminary, Quintino Sella, who has shown so much aversion to it as to decline the command laid upon him by the King to form a Ministry, because he could not agree with his colleagues on the subject of the Scrutinio di Lista. However, we have in Italy a fair opportunity of comparing the Political with the Municipal elections, in which latter no corruption is or could be detected, because carried out on the principle of the Scrutinio

di Lista. In England, on the other hand, where the Municipal Councillors are elected by wards, it is found that, where there is corruption in the Political Elections, there is it also in the Municipal. Thus in the Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed to inquire into the existence of corrupt practices in the City of Oxford, I read as follows:-" Politics have for a considerable period largely "influenced the municipal elections for the different wards, "and although the expenditure at these elections has been "far below that incurred at the Parliamentary elections, "it is certain that money has frequently been expended in "the municipal contests in ways which would not bear the light." I believe that in England also a reform, based on that lately adopted in Italy, would raise a bulwark against corruption. Lord Brougham has already pointed this out in his well-known work on the English Constitution, in these remarkable words :-"It is certain that bribery is "confined to the towns, and to those generally speaking of "a moderate size; that in hardly any of the very large ones "does it prevail at all; that in none of the counties is it "known. The right course, it should seem, is to choose "the members not by towns and counties, but by districts "composed of town and country together. Nor can there "be any valid objection to thus blending the town with "the country. Nay, were there even an objection, it

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must be a very formidable one to counterbalance the "mighty benefit of putting down the pest of corruption, "which threatens our national morals as well as the purity "of our parliamentary system and the existence of our "free Constitution."

Against the moderately extensive Constituencies of the Italian law objections were raised in Parliament by the partisans of the opposite extremes. Those who wished for very large Constituencies wanted to destroy absolutely all local influences, affirming that this was the only way to fill

may

Parliament with the best men. Το this we answer first of all that industrious and modest mediocrities are a necessity in legislative assemblies, and that it would be impossible to govern a country with a Parliament composed of great intellects exclusively, who, of course, would all claim to have their say in every discussion, and would all aspire to a seat in the Ministry. As chiefs are necessary, so are also rank and file; nay, nothing can be worse for discipline and compactness, whether in an army or in a Political party, than to have too many chiefs or leading men. Besides, the virtue of choosing illustrious men is not possessed by the very extensive Constituencies: I believe that they prefer colourless candidates. Men of mark will rise under any system whatever. In Italy, as in England, many distinguished statesmen are elected by small Constituencies; nay, they have often found there a refuge when abandoned by large ones. We can therefore reckon that a country will always produce a sufficient number of distinguished men under any system. When in the House of Commons the Electoral Reform was under discussion in 1831, Macaulay very properly remarked in one of his speeches :-"In whatever way the House of "Commons may be chosen, some able men will be chosen "in that way, who would not be chosen in any other way. "If there were a law that the hundred tallest men in England should be Members of Parliament there would probably be some able men among those who would come "into the House by virtue of this law. If the hundred

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persons whose names stand first in the alphabetical list of "the Court Guide were made Members of Parliament "there would probably be able men among them.”

The objection of the partisans of the uninominal vote is against the inequality of the number of representatives ascribed to different Constituencies. It is said that an elector in a Constituency which returns four members.

exercises a right twice as great as an elector who belongs to a Constituency which returns only two. This, I think, is a fallacy, as the elector who takes part in the election of two members exercises his right in common with say 10,000 other electors, while the one who elects four exercises his right in common with say 20,000 other electors. It is, therefore, not one elector who elects two members, but 10,000 who elect two, and 20,000 who elect four. And this is in accordance with justice. If it were possible to unite the whole nation into one Constituency, as has been proposed by Thomas Hare, would the right of the electors, who should thus take part in the election of 508 members, be more important or more extensive than that which they had previously exercised in electing one member in the uninominal Constituencies? It is evident it would not; therefore this objection, which originated in that love of equality and symmetry inborn in the Latin races, and which cannot well be applied to the varied and complex social organism, has no real value. These inequalities are unavoidable in any system whatever; nor are they avoided in the uninominal Constituency. In France an arrondissement with 95,000 inhabitants, forms a Constituency, and returns one member, whereas an arrondissement with 105,000 inhabitants is divided into two Constituencies, and returns two members. In Italy, the Constituency of Benevento, with 25,000 inhabitants, has hitherto returned one member, like the first collegio of Palermo, with 80,000. But what of that? It would be absurd to require that the Constituencies of any country should have the regularity of a chess-board. From what I have already said, it results therefore that the new Constituencies of the Italian law, whilst they mark an advance on the uninominal Constituencies, will also avoid many of the inconveniences of the Scrutin de Liste of the French school, or at least will modify them. I spoke last year at a great meeting of the Political party to which I