"It appears to us that this proposition was distinctly adjudged by this Court in the case of Schooner Freeman v. Buckingham, 18 How., 182.

66

In that case the schooner was libelled in Admiralty for failing to deliver flour for which the master had given two Bills of Lading, certifying that it had been delivered on board the vessel at Cleveland, to be carried to Buffalo and safely delivered. The libellants, who resided in the city of New York, had advanced money to the consignee on these Bills of Lading, which were delivered to them. It turned out that no such flour had ever been shipped, and that the master had been induced, by the fraudulent orders of a person in control of the vessel at the time, to make and deliver the Bills of Lading to him, and that he had sold the drafts on which libellants had paid the money, and received the Bills of Lading in good faith.

"A question arose how far the claimant, who was the real owner, or general owner of the vessel, could be bound by the acts of the master appointed by one to whom he had confided the control of the vessel, and the Court held, that having consented to this delivery of the vessel, he was bound by all the acts by which a master could lawfully bind a vessel or its owner.

"The Court in further discussing the question says: 'Even if the master had been appointed by the claimant, a willful fraud committed by him on third persons, by signing false Bills of Lading, would not be within his agency. If the signer of a Bill of Lading was not the master of the vessel, no one would suppose the vessel bound; and the reason is because the Bill is signed by one not in privity. with the owner. But the same reason applies to a signature made by a master out of the course of his employment. The taker assumes the risk not only of the genuineness of the signature, and of the fact that the signer was master of the vessel, but also the apparent authority of the master

to issue the Bill of Lading. We say the apparent authority, because any secret instructions by the owner, inconsistent with the authority with which the master appears to be clothed, would not affect third persons. But the master of a vessel has no more apparent authority to sign Bills of Lading, than he has to sign Bills of Sale of the ship. He has an apparent authority if the ship be a general one, to sign Bills of Lading for cargo actually shipped; and he has also authority to sign a Bill of Sale of the ship when, in case of disaster, his power of sale arises. But the authority in each case arises out of and depends upon a particular state of facts. It is not an unlimited authority in one case more than in the other; and his act in either case does not bind the owner even in favour of an innocent purchaser, if the facts on which his power depended did not exist; and it is incumbent upon those who are about to change their condition upon the faith of his authority, to ascertain the existence of all the facts upon which his authority depends.'

"And the Court cites as settling the law in this way in England, the cases of Grant v. Norway, 2 Eng. Law & Eq., 337; Hubbarts v. Ward, 18 id., 551; and Coleman v. Riches, 29 id., 323. Also Walter v. Brewer, 11 Mass., 99. See also, McClean v. Fleming, L. R., 2 H. of L., 128; Maclachlan's Law of Merchant Shipping, 368-9.

"It seems clear that the authority of E. D. Cobb & Co., as shipping agents, cannot be greater than that of the master of a vessel, transacting business by his ship in all the ports of the world.

"And we are unable to see why this case is not conclusive of the one before us, unless we are prepared to over rule it squarely. The very questions of the power of the agent to bind the owner by a Bill of Lading for goods never received, and of the effect of such a Bill of Lading as to innocent purchasers without notice, were discussed and were properly in the case, and were decided adversely to the

principles on which plaintiffs' counsel insist in this case. Numerous other cases are cited in the brief of counsel in support of these views, but we deem it unnecessary to give them more special notice.

"The case of the New York and the New Haven R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y., 65, is much relied on by counsel as opposed to this principle.

"Whatever may be the true rule which characterizes actions of officers of a Corporation who are placed in control as the governing force of the Corporation, which actions are at once a fraud on the Corporation and the parties with whom they deal, and how far Courts may yet decide to hold the Corporations liable for such exercise of power by their officers, they can have no controlling influence over cases like the present. In the one before us it is a question of pure agency, and depends solely on the power confided to the agent.

"In the other case, the officer is the Corporation for many purposes. Certainly a Corporation can be charged with no intelligent action, or with entertaining any purpose, or committing any fraud, except as this intelligence, this purpose, this fraud is evidenced by the actions of its officers. And while it may be conceded that for many purposes they are agents, and are to be treated as the agents of the Corporation or of the Corporators, it is also true, that for some purposes they are the Corporation, and their acts as such. officers are its acts.

We do not think the case of the R. R. Co. v. Schuyler presents a rule for this case.

"The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed."

388

IV. SCRUTIN DE LISTE, AS MODIFIED BY THE ITALIAN PARLIAMENT.

AN Act just passed in Italy, as a complement to the

National Parliamentary Reform, adopts that form of Electoral procedure which is known under the name of Scrutin de Liste. Its working at the coming Elections will serve to demonstrate practically, whether it is preferable for the Constituencies to be divided into small districts each of which elects but one member, each elector writing the name of a single candidate on his voting paper; or whether it is preferable for the Constituencies to be divided into large districts each of which may return several members, the voting paper of each elector containing as many names as there are members assigned to his district. Speaking of the system called Scrutinio di Lista one must necessarily examine the phases through which the question has passed in France, where it had its origin, where it was revived, and where it has been developed side by side with Italy, although with different success. For in Italy the adoption of the Scrutinio di Lista has been, so to say, the crowning of the edifice of Electoral Reform, while in France its rejection caused the fall of its principal advocate at the time he had attained the climax of his power and seemed as if he alone had not only the destinies of his country in his hand, but also the peace or war of Europe in the folds of his garments. It would be too long, though perhaps not devoid of interest, to sum up all the arguments alleged for or against the Scrutinio di Lista. In the discussion of these great reforms a free course is usually given in political assemblies to the wildest exaggerations. To the supporters of a reform it seems that the greatest evils will befall the country unless it is adopted, while to its

opponents it appears evident that it will be the beginning of unheard of calamities. Thereupon both supporters and opponents vie with one another in attributing to it imaginary merits and faults, and founding upon it the most contradictory predictions, which are afterwards completely refuted by practical experience. The now celebrated expression of an English statesman "a leap in the dark" may well be applied to every electoral reform whatever it be, and therefore the artifices of the different parties to modify it so as to render it favourable to themselves respectively appear useless. This is natural. The mechanism of all political proceedings can have but a very limited influence on the social body, of which the most complicated evolutions are set in motion by many and various causes.

An illustrious man, whose loss Science has lately lamented, Littré, in his early enthusiasm for the Positivist system of Comte, had wished to apply it to the political events of his time, predicting with confidence the results which they would have. During the latter years of his life, wishing to republish the work containing those ideas, he remarked. with melancholy how not one of his forecasts had been realised, and laughed at the human conceit that thinks it can penetrate with its sight into the depths of the future.

One of the most celebrated English philosophers, Herbert Spencer, who is very popular in Italy, has devoted one of his works to demonstrate the difficulties and the prejudices which obscure the right appreciation of social phenomena. One of the examples which he alleges is English Parliamentary Reform. Here are his words:-" Both advocates "and opponents of the first Reform Bill anticipated that "the middle classes would select as representatives many "of their own body. But both were wrong. The classquality of the House of Commons remained very much "what it was before. While, however, the immediate and

66