been asked is not small, and I hope that it may come into the hands of explorers more competent than myself. Its importance is not small, because even if this fine for breach of the king's peace stood quite by itself it would be a very noticeable fact in the history of our criminal law. But it does not stand by itself, for if once established, it might be brought into connection with those two most remarkable institutions, the frank-pledge and the murder fine. As regards the former, it certainly throws no light on the much debated relation of the territorial tithing to the personal frank-pledge, or group of ten or a dozen sureties, but it may suggest that the tithing which was fined if the peace proclaimed in its alehouse was broken, may have been a responsible unit in the police system for other purposes also. As to the murder fine it may suggest that neither of the two rival stories about its origin contains the whole truth, neither the story now generally accepted that William introduced it as a protection for his French followers, nor the story which Blackstone took from Bracton and Bracton from the Leges Edwardi that the English Witan introduced it at Canute's request as a protection for his Danes. If in the Daneslaw it was the practice to fine a hundred or several hundreds for breach of the king's peace, it may also have been the practice to fine the hundred within whose bounds was found the body of a murdered foreigner, a foreigner to whom the king was "a protector and a "kinsman."* Lastly, it may suggest that the twelfth century writers who spoke of England as divided between three laws, Danish, Mercian, West-Saxon, had more reason for insisting on this theory than they get credit for with most of their readers, and that there really were very great and very important diversities of local custom of which they tell us nothing expressly.

F. W. MAITLAND.

* Ethelred, VIII., 33; Canute II., 40; Leg. Hen. Prim. 75, § 6., 7.

III.--THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ON BILLS OF LADING.

AT

T the forthcoming Tenth Conference of the Association. for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations at Liverpool, the subject of Bills of Lading will, it is understood, form one of the prominent topics of discussion. Mr. Richard Lowndes, Mr. Charles Stubbs, and other members, are already well known to our readers as having treated this important question at previous Conferences. Under present circumstances, there seems a special reason for calling attention to one of the latest decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States;— decisions which, although, of course, not binding here, nevertheless always receive very careful consideration, and are not unfrequently referred to by the Bench as well as the Bar in this country, either by way of support, or for the purpose of distinction. The case of Pollard v. Vinton, reported in the Chicago Legal News, for June 3rd, and the Virginia Law Journal for June, seems the more deserving of attention from the circumstance that Mr. Justice Miller, in delivering the opinion of Court, was led to enter at some detail into the analysis of the character and effects of a Bill of Lading, thus, in fact, giving the Judgment a general as well as a particular value.

"SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

"Pollard v. Vinton.

"In error to the U.S. Circuit Court for District of Kentucky. "MILLER, J.-The defendant in error, who was also defendant below, was the owner of a steamboat running between the cities of Memphis, on the Mississippi river, and Cincinnati on the Ohio river, and is sued on a Bill of

Lading for the non-delivery at Cincinnati of one hundred and fifty bales of cotton, according to its terms. The Bill of Lading was in the usual form, and signed by E. D. Cobb & Co., who were the general agents of Vinton for shipping purposes at Memphis, and was delivered to Dickinson, Williams & Co., at that place. They immediately drew a draft on the plaintiffs in New York, payable at sight, for 5,900 dollars, to which they attached the Bill of Lading, which draft was duly accepted and paid. No cotton was shipped on the steamboat, or delivered at its wharf or to its agents for shipment, as stated in the Bill of Lading, the statement to that effect being untrue.

"These facts being undisputed, as they are found in the Bill of Exceptions, the Court instructed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, which was done, and judgment rendered accordingly. This instruction is the error complained of by the plaintiffs.

"A Bill of Lading is an instrument well known in commercial transactions, and its character and effect have been defined by judicial decisions. In the hands of the holder it is evidence of ownership, special or general, of the property mentioned in it, and of the right to receive said property at the place of delivery. Notwithstanding it is designed to pass from hand to hand, with or without endorsement, and is efficacious for its ordinary purposes in the hands of the holder, it is not a negotiable instrument or obligation in the sense that a Bill of Exchange or a Promissory Note is. Its transfer does not preclude, as in those cases, all inquiry into the transaction in which it originated, because it has come into hands of persons who have innocently paid value for it. The doctrine of bonâ fide purchasers only applies to it in a limited sense.

"It is an instrument of a two-fold character. It is at once a receipt and a contract. In the former character it

is an acknowledgment of the receipt of property on board

his vessel by the owner of the vessel. In the latter it is a contract to carry safely and deliver. The receipt of the goods lies at the foundation of the contract to carry and deliver. If no goods are actually received, there can be no valid contract to carry or to deliver.

"To these elementary truths the reply is that the agent of defendant has acknowledged in writing the receipt of the goods, and promised for him that they should be safely delivered, and that the principal cannot repudiate the act of his agent in this matter, because it was within the scope of his employment.

"It will probably be conceded that the effect of the Bill of Lading and its binding force on the defendant is no stronger than if signed by himself as master of his own vessel. In such case we think the proposition cannot be successfully disputed that the person to whom such a Bill of Lading was first delivered cannot hold the signer responsible for goods not received by the carrier.

"Counsel for plaintiffs however say that in the hands of subsequent holders of such a Bill of Lading, who have paid value for it in good faith, the owner of the vessel is estopped by the policy of the law from denying what he has signed his name to and set afloat in the public market. However this may be, the plaintiffs' counsel rest their case on the doctrine of agency, holding that defendant is absolutely responsible for the false representations of his agent in the Bill of Lading.

"But if we can suppose there was testimony from which the jury might have inferred either mistake or bad faith on the part of Cobb & Co., we are of opinion that Vinton, the shipowner, is not liable for the false statement in the Bill of Lading, because the transaction was not within the scope of their authority.

"If we look to the evidence of the extent of their authority, as found in the Bill of Exceptions, it is this short sentence:

"During the month of December, 1873' (the date of the Bill of Lading), 'the firm of E. D. Cobb & Co., of Memphis, Tenn., were authorized agents of the defendant at Memphis, with power to solicit freights, and to execute and deliver to shippers Bills of Lading for freight shipped on defendant's steamboat, Ben. Franklin.'

"This authority to execute and deliver Bills of Lading has two limitations, namely, they could only be delivered to shippers, and they could only be delivered for freight shipped on the steamboat.

"Before the power to make and deliver a Bill of Lading could arise, some person must have shipped goods on the vessel. Only then could there be a shipper, and only then could there be goods shipped. In saying this we do not mean that the goods must have been actually placed on the deck of the vessel. If they came within the control and custody of the officers of the boat for the purpose of shipment, the contract of carriage had commenced, and the evidence of it in the form of a Bill of Lading would be binding. But without such a delivery there was no contract of carrying, and the agents of defendant had no authority to make one.

"They had no authority to sell cotton and contract for delivery. They had no authority to sell Bills of Lading. They had no power to execute these instruments and go out and sell them to purchasers. No man had a right to buy such a Bill of Lading of them who had not delivered them the goods to be shipped.

"Such is not only the necessary inference from the definition of the authority under which they acted, as found in the Bill of Exceptions, but such would be the legal implication if their relation to defendant had been stated in more general terms. The result would have been the same if it had been merely stated that they were the shipping agents of the owner of the vessel at that point.