In 1834, Chief Justice Tindal directed the circumstances of an action in the Common Pleas to be set forth in a special case, and to contain any opinions of French advocates which had been taken on either side up to that period. (Trimbey v. Viguier, 1 Bing. N.C., 153.)

In the Sussex Peerage Case (1844), it was objected that the late Cardinal Wiseman, then Dr. Wiseman, holding the office of co-adjutor to a Vicar Apostolic in this country, was not admissible as a witness to prove the Canon Law with respect to marriage administered by Ecclesiastical Courts in Rome; for it was necessary that he should have some peculiar means of knowledge, as for instance from his office. But the Committee of the House of Lords determined that he did come within the description of a person peritus virtute officii, for he was engaged in the performance of responsible public duties, and in order to discharge them properly, was bound to make himself acquainted with the subject of the law of marriage. (11 Cl. & Fin., 133.)

In 1845, the Court of Queen's Bench permitted a French Advocate, practising at Strasburg, to give evidence that the feudal law had been put an end to in Alsace de facto by the French Revolution in 1789, and de jure by the Treaty of Lunéville in 1801; and upon the said Advocate being asked whether there was not a decree to that effect, he added that there was such a decree of the National Assembly of the 4th of August, 1789, and that he had learned this in the course of his legal studies, it being part of the history of the law which he learned while studying for the Bar. It was objected that this evidence was inadmissible, on the ground that it was not offered as secondary evidence admissible on account of any difficulty in procuring primary evidence, but as the primary evidence itself, and that it was as if the original decree were shown to be in Court, and yet oral evidence were offered. The evidence was, however, held admissible by Lord Chief Justice Denman and Justices

Williams and Coleridge, on the ground that the opinions of persons of science must be received as to the facts of their science, and that this rule applies to the evidence of legal men, and is not confined to the unwritten law, but extends also to the written laws which such men are bound to know. Properly speaking, the nature of such evidence is not to set forth the contents of the written law, but its effects and the state of law resulting from it. The mere contents, indeed, might often mislead persons not familiar with the particular system of law; but the witness in such cases is called upon to state what law results from the instrument referred to. This rule does not apply to the case of a Treaty, for no class of persons are so peculiarly conversant with the subject matter as to invest it with the character of a science. (Baron de Bode's case, 8 Q.B., 208.)

In 1849 the Court of Common Pleas admitted a native of Belgium to give evidence of the law of Belgium with respect to bills and notes. He had formerly carried on the business of a merchant and commission agent in stocks and bills of exchange at Brussels, but was then an hotel keeper in London. He stated that he was well acquainted with the Belgian law on the above subject. The Superior Court, consisting of Justices Maule, Cresswell, Williams, and Talfourd confirmed the admissibility of this evidence, on the ground that he was a person having special and peculiar means of knowledge of the law of Belgium with regard to bills and notes, one whose business it was to attend to and make himself acquainted with the subject, and that inasmuch as he had been carrying on a business which made it his interest to take cognisance of the foreign law, he fell within the description of an expert. Applying common sense to the matter, why should not persons who may be reasonably supposed to be acquainted with a subject, though they have not filled any official appointment such as judge or advocate, be deemed competent to speak

upon it? Persons who have practised as physicians are frequently examined, and no inquiry is ever made as to whether or not they have a regular diploma. All persons who practice a business or profession which requires them to possess a certain knowledge of the matter in hand are experts so far as expertness is required. Foreign law is a matter of fact; any person who can satisfy the Court that he has had the means of knowing it is an admissible witness to prove it. (Vander Donckt v. Thellusson, 8 C.B., 826.) But in 1850, in the case of Bristow v. Sequeville (5 EXCH., 275), Baron Alderson, sitting at Nisi Prius, doubted whether the law of Prussia was sufficiently proved by a witness who stated that he was a jurisconsult and adviser to the Russian consul in England, that he knew the Code Napoléon was in force at Cologne, and that by that Code certain receipts would be inadmissible in foreign courts, because unstamped; the witness also stated that he had studied law at the University of Leipzig, and from his studies there was able to speak as to the Code Napoléon being the law of Cologne. On a motion for a new trial, Chief Baron Pollock, and Barons Platt, Alderson and Rolfe, threw doubts on the relevancy of such evidence; the rule, however, was refused on another ground. This case is to be distinguished from the two last foregoing cases, in this, that the Court doubted the competency of the individual, but it does not shake the now generally received opinion, that the oral evidence of a trustworthy expert is always admissible to prove a foreign law.

In 1862, a certificate of the Ambassador from the King of Hanover, under the seal of the Legation, declaring the Hanoverian law on a question concerning testaments, was admitted in the Probate Court (Re Klingemann, 32 L.J. (N.S.), P.M.A., 16), and in an earlier case in the Ecclesiastical Court, the certificate of the French Consul General was

deemed sufficient evidence of the law of France. (Re Dormoy, 3 Hagg. Eccl., 767.)

The Courts of the United States generally require authenticated copies of foreign laws to be produced when they can be procured. Foreign unwritten laws and customs are proved by parol evidence, and when such evidence is objected to on the ground that the law in question is a written law, the party objecting must show the fact (15 Serg. & R., 87). Proof of such unwritten laws is usually made by the testimony of witnesses learned in the law, and competent to state it correctly on oath (2 Cranch, 237; 15 Serg. & R., 84). By the Constitution of the United States (Art. 4, s. 1.) "full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts of every other State" of the Union; and these Acts are authenticated by having the seal of the respective State affixed thereto.

The public seal of a foreign sovereign, or foreign State, affixed to a writing purporting to be a written law or edict, is of itself the highest evidence; although further proof of the seal of a foreign court is required. Courts of Admiralty, however, are Courts under the Law of Nations, and their seals are always admitted without further evidence.

The reported cases which we have considered in the earlier part of this article, form a curious exception to the rule of law, that witnesses are to inform the tribunals of facts, and not of their opinions. But cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. When circumstances rebut the presumption that a tribunal is as capable of forming a judgment on the facts as a witness, the rule gives way, and competent witnesses are permitted to give their opinions in evidence on questions of science, skill, trade, and the like, as well as on questions of Foreign Law.

SHERSTON BAKER.

III. SUZERAINTY: MEDIEVAL AND MODERN.

EVENTS which have taken place within the last year

bearing directly or indirectly on the international relations between most of the leading European Powers and countries so widely distinct in race, civilization, and laws as the Transvaal in South Africa, Tunis and Egypt in North. Africa, Tonquin in Assam, and Borneo in Malaysia, have rendered the subject of Suzerain and Vassal States of considerable interest not to those nations alone, but to the world in general.

Notwithstanding the importance of the subject, it appears to have been treated only in a superficial manner by the writers on International Law; it is proposed, therefore, as far as the limits of space will allow, to discuss the meaning of the words Suzerain and Vassal as applied to States and as defining their relative positions, the one to the other and each to the world in general. In other words: to determine what are the rights and duties of a Suzerain Power and its Vassal State?

That a considerable difference of opinion exists in the minds of eminent Statesmen and Lawyers as to the meaning of suzerainty has latterly become only too apparent. In the discussion in the House of Lords that immediately followed the announcement of the terms of the Convention for the settlement of the Transvaal territory, the present Lord Chancellor, Lord Selborne, is reported to have said that " Suzerainty means that the "Suzerain is lord paramount of the people who are subject "to it. The control of foreign and Frontier rela"tions essentially distinguishes a paramount Power. No war can be made upon adjoining Native tribes, no treaty can be made with (foreign) Powers except by the authority

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