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misconstrued. It is beside the mark, we cannot but hold, to say that political offenders are "not always wicked or perverse men, but sometimes men of lofty soul and of good faith, sometimes even generous and honourable patriots." This admission does honour to Dr. Bluntschli's sense of justice, but none the less must we say that these are not the grounds upon which we understand the non-extradition of political offenders to be based. Nor can we admit that it is a question of "interest," and that the extradition of such persons might be "contrary to the interests of the country of asylum." We do not believe that a refusal to extradite would stand for a single day, if it were based on no better ground than admiration for the possibly high personal character of a political offender, or the assumed "interests" of the State from which, ex hypothesi, such extradition might be demanded. The true doctrine, we hold, is that laid down by Dr. Spear in his able and lucid work on Extradition (Albany, N.Y., 1879): "It is to be remembered that each Government assumes as its starting point in making an extradition treaty, that every person within its jurisdiction and not violating its laws is entitled, as against all the world, to the prima facie right of undisturbed and protected asylum." (Op. cit., p. 173.) Again, to say that a State cannot be expected to deliver up its "friends or protégés" is, we think, to depart widely from the real question. Can it be supposed that Winslow was a "friend and protégé" of the British Government, or the so-called Hoffmann of the French Government? The latter case, we believe, could the alleged identity have been proved, really would have trenched upon a question which Dr. Bluntschli distinctly raises in a subsequent paragraph, viz., the view that Nihilism is an offence against the public order of all civilised nations, and should be made an extraditable offence. Dr. Bluntschli here seems to desire a great and undefined extension for the area of extradition. In such a desire he is to some extent supported by the authority of a well-known character in English history. Henry VIII., so the Institute was reminded by Sir Sherston Baker, argued (with an eye to the person of Cardinal Pole) that high treason was an extraditable offence, and wrote, or caused to be written, a treatise to that effect. But three centuries have passed away without carrying into the practice of the Law of Nations this contention of one who, in his day, was of considerable weight in the Councils of Europe.

Sir Travers Twiss, returning, as it were, to occupy once more, though but for a season, an Oxford Cathedra of Law, brought his usual wealth of learning and research to bear upon one of the most intricate Juridical and Diplomatic problems of the day-the application of the European Customary Law of Nations to Oriental States. Our only regret is that the particular branch of the subject to which this wealth of learning was devoted should have been the rather unprofitable one of the Ottoman Empire. For in the actual attitude of the Porte towards Reform, and towards the Western States which have the right and the duty to press that Reform, it seems a waste of power to go so elaborately into the Hatti Cheriff of Gulhani, 1839, and the Hatti Hamaioum of 1856. Paper Constitutions and Paper Reforms there have been, no doubt, in Turkey, as erstwhile in Naples. But the Gate of Felicity still shows not a sign of yielding, and the striking testimony, which is cited by Sir Travers, of the British Consul-General in Belgrade, as to the practical nullity of the supposed concession of equal admissibility of Christian and Mussulman witnesses, is one with the testimony that comes from Armenia, and from many another part of the so-called Ottoman Empire. The words of Sultan Hamid at the opening of the second Ottoman Parliament were doubtless very charming. But if the Commander of the Faithful really desired to see all "classes of his subjects enjoy complete equality," he has signally failed in accomplishing this desire. And he has also failed in satisfying Europe of the sincerity of his professions.

Two features of interest in regard to the practical results attained by the discussions of the Institute must not be passed over in silence. On the Conflict of Civil Laws the meeting, after close and prolonged debate, passed eight articles (extending even to the case of foundlings and their nationality) almost exactly in the terms proposed by the reporters of the Committee, Prof. Arntz and Mr. Westlake, Q.C., who were present to defend and explain their own theses. On another no less important and difficult question, that of the Regulation of the Laws and Customs of War, a draft Manual, due to the initiation of M. Moynier, of Red Cross fame, which had been for some time under consideration, was finally discussed and settled, with a view to its being communicated to the various Governments of Europe and America. The Committee charged with the weighty task of preparing the Manual included, besides

M. Moynier, representative names both from Great Britain and the Continent, viz., Prof. Holland, Mr. W. E. Hall, Profs. Bluntschli and Schultze, of Heidelberg, Prof. De Martens, of St. Petersburg, and Prof. Rivier, of Brussels.

From the space which we have devoted to the Oxford meeting of the Institute of International Law, enough may have been gathered of our sense of its importance. We have criticised. freely theories which were advocated by some of its most distinguished members, because it is our function to be a Review, not merely a Chronicle, and because we believe such a course to be most in harmony with the spirit of the Institute itself. But we rejoice to find the learning of Neumann and Arntz, the acuteness of Martens, the subtle judgment of De Laveleye, the unwearied zeal of Rivier, commemorated and appreciated by the Regius Professor of Civil Law side by side with the high merits of those who were called to the citizenship of the University. We rejoice to have seen this Senate of Jurists convoked in Oxford. We rejoice also to know that Oxford delighted to honour her guests, and that the "egregius" Bluntschli, the "excellentissimus" Rolin-Jaequemyns, were able to receive in person the Doctorate of Civil Law, for which the Placet of the House was likewise conferred, in their unavoidable absence, upon the Senator Mancini," decus Romanorum," and the President of the Paris meeting of the Institute, De Parieu. It was fitting that the Rt. Hon. Mountague Bernard should have occupied the Presidential chair at Oxford, and that Dr. Holland, his successor as Chichele Professor of International Law should have personally cared for the well-being of the members during their visit. Fitting was it, too, that the Lord Chancellor, and the Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Phillimore, should have come down specially to meet their University's honoured guests in the Sheldonian Theatre and at All Souls, in the ancient home of Gentili, and Zouch, and Sir Leoline Jenkins. We do not doubt that the Oxford meeting will linger long and pleasantly in the memory of those who took part in it.

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Our attention has recently been drawn to a valuable work on Nationality in International Law (La Nationalité au point de vue des Rapports Internationaux, par George Cogordan, Docteur en Droit. Paris, Larose, 1879), which appears to us to have been brought out at a very apposite time. For whether we look at the subject from the side of its relation to the constituent

elements of the State, or the Family, or of the Individual, as a member alike of the body politic and of the family, the question is a question of the day in most countries. M. Cogordan, from his diplomatic experience in Eastern Europe, as a Secretary of Legation, has seen something of the difficulties which constantly arise under this head. He is impressed with the conviction that, on the one hand, nobody should be without a nationality, but that, on the other hand, nobody should have more than one nationality. In practice, says M. Cogordan, there are too many persons who belong to no nation: the pariahs, we might say, of International Law. For such sporadic citizens, Proudhon would have instituted a separate status, which he proposed to define as "l'incolat," a proposal which has never taken shape in practical legislation. The embarrassment which may be caused by the want of nationality, is curiously illustrated by the recent case of the Russian emigrants to Buenos Ayres, cited by M. Cogordan, where a considerable body of persons arrived in Antwerp in a state of destitution, with no means of returning to what had been their country, but which now disowned them, saying, that by their expatriation they had lost their Russian nationality. Citizens of the world at large, they were to look to the world at large for support and protection. But such a thing as Ecumenical citizenship is unknown alike to Territorial and International Law, so these unfortunate returned emigrants were but "Ginx's Babies" in the eyes of the Law of Nations. Belgian humanity disregarded the absence of citizenship, and tended the wants of the natural man. But nations, like individuals, are not always willing to succour those who have no claims upon them, and the state of things to which M. Cogordan demurs is one which should not be capable of recurring.

Nationality is so intimately bound up alike with Family Law and Electoral rights that it is impossible to consider it without touching upon those questions. M. Cogordan accordingly devotes no small portion of his work to the conflicts of law arising under some of the various heads comprised under these titles. Marriage, Divorce, Naturalisation, Expatriation, Domicile, all receive a due share of his attention. A man should have but one nationality, says our author; this doctrine, if generally accepted, would in itself solve many a difficulty by preventing it from arising, and prevention, it is allowed, is better than cure.

But how this happy consummation is to be reached we do not at present see. If the place of birth impresses a national character, M. Cogordan's solution can only be attained through a change-and that no inconsiderable one-of the existing territorial law of the principal States throughout the world. Political nationality, it has lately been suggested by some eminent English and Foreign publicists, might in many cases advantageously be substituted for domicile. This would itself be a change, and it might be well perhaps at the same time to see whether a change could not be effected in the territorial law of nationality by birth. Otherwise, it may be feared that the conflicts of law would only slightly alter their nominal cause, and in practice would subsist as before. To take up but one more point. Expatriation, says M. Cogordan, should be freely conceded. To the old "Nemo potest exuere patriam,” he opposes Cicero's still older “Ne quis invitus in civitate maneat." We quite agree with the Ciceronian view, and can see the force of M. Cogordan's deduction from it that free will is the basis, as of every contract, so of the contract of nationality, supposing that we can agree to allow that position to what other jurists might call by a different name. The indelible character which the birth theory and the old doctrine of allegiance imposed upon nationality is gone. But we do not think that its place has yet been taken by any one clear, harmonious system of doctrine, and therefore we recommend to jurists of all countries the careful study of M. Cogordan's very thoughtful and interesting volume, as a help towards the solution of the intricate problem of Nationality in International Law.

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Our able American contemporary, the Albany Law Journal, in its issue of October 9th, notices a case which involves a grave question of International Policy as well as International Law, in relation to the mixed tribunals in Egypt. A naturalised American citizen, commorant within the jurisdiction of the Courts, was indicted on a capital offence. In such cases, it would seem, the U. S. revised statutes allow a concurrent jurisdiction to their Minister and their Consul, but with this curious difference, that the Consul must associate with himself on the trial, at least four citizens, whom the Minister selects from a list furnished by the Consul, and no conviction can be had without the unanimous assent of the assessors. If the Minister tries the case, however, there appears to be no such provision. The consequence of this remarkable condition of the American

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