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and distinctly from the Legal ownership, contrary to the design of the Statute.

But the decision which had the most important and extensive results in defeating the design of the Statute was that known as the decision in Tyrrell's Case (Dyer, 155a), which was, that where one Use is declared upon another Use, the second Use so declared is repugnant and void; for Equity, regarding the intention of the parties, held that the Equitable or beneficial ownership vested in the person in whose favour the last Use was declared, although this Use was at law held to be void. In every case, therefore, where an Use is declared upon an Use the Equitable ownership exists distinctly and separately from the Legal ownership, contrary to the design of the Statute.

The result of this decision is, that in the only case to which the Statute applies at all, namely, where one person becomes seised of land to the Use of another, its application may be prevented by the simple expedient of interposing a merely formal limitation of an Use; and this is, in practice, the method resorted to whenever it is desired to prevent the operation of the Statute in those cases to which it applies.

Another result of this decision is, that the meaning of the term Use has been materially altered. Prior to the Statute the term Use was synonymous with the Equitable estate or beneficial interest in the land; but after the Statute, by virtue of the decision in Tyrrell's Case, it was a mere formal term or expression used for the purpose of denoting in whom the Legal estate was intended to reside, whether the beneficial interest was intended to be in that person or

not.

Although the design of the Statute of Uses was thus defeated, the Statute itself had the most important effects in enlarging the power of disposition which the owner of land possessed over the Legal estate therein. For the

Statute, it must be observed, does not in any manner prohibit or restrict the creation of Uses, but merely operates. upon the Use when created by uniting to it the Legal estate, which it invests with the "quality, manner, form, and condition" of the Use. The Statute, therefore, in effect made the Legal estate as malleable as formerly the Use or Equitable estate was, and (speaking generally) enabled the owner of land to deal with the Legal estate therein as freely as formerly he might have dealt with the Use or Equitable estate.

With reference to the operation of the Statute in these respects, it may truly be said to have revolutionised the methods of conveyancing.

The operation of the Statute upon dispositions of the Legal estate in land was principally twofold; (a) in the first place, it had an important effect upon the dispositions which might be made of the Legal estate; and (b) in the next place, it affected the form of the disposition of the Legal estate.

It is proposed to consider the effects of the Statute in these respects in detail.

(a) In the first place, as to the effect of the Statute upon the dispositions which might be made of the Legal estate.

At the common law, all limitations contained in conveyances operating inter vivos of Legal estates of freehold duration, were governed by the following rules :-(1.) That the right to the seisin or feudal possession must never be in abeyance; and (2) that the right to the seisin must not be shifted about from one person to another without open livery of seisin or other ceremony.

These two rules are of a distinctly feudal origin, their object being to ensure that there shall always be some ostensible tenant of the freehold liable to the lord for the services due in respect of the feud, and answerable in a real action to all persons claiming right in the land.

The practical operation of the two rules above stated was, that in a conveyance made inter vivos, a Legal estate of freehold duration could only be limited in possession, that is, so as to confer an immediate power of possession and enjoyment of the land; or in remainder, that is, so as to confer a power of possession and enjoyment of the land. upon the regular determination of some preceding particular Legal estate of freehold duration in possession, which the conveying party at the same time parted with. On every conveyance of a Legal estate of freehold duration, therefore, it was necessary that the conveying party should presently part with the freehold in possession; for, as it was said, every conveyance of the freehold must take immediate effect.

Where the limitation was of an estate in remainder, the limitation might be either an executed limitation, that is, a limitation by virtue whereof the estate limited is immediately acquired by, and vests in, the person to whom it is limited; or an executory limitation, that is, a limitation of an estate to be acquired by and to vest in the person to whom it is limited, not presently, but only upon the happening of some future event. A limitation of an estate in possession was necessarily an executed limitation. At the common law, therefore, an executory limitation of a freehold estate was only valid when it was a limitation of an estate in remainder.

A limitation of a Legal estate of freehold to vest in the person to whom it is limited at some future time, if not preceded in the same conveyance by a limitation of a particular Legal estate of freehold, was clearly rendered void by the rules above stated; for if such a limitation were valid, either the right to the seisin would, until the happening of the event specified, be in suspense, which is contrary to the first rule; or upon the happening of the event specified, the right to the seisin would, without any livery

or other ceremony, shift away from the grantor to the grantee, which is contrary to the second rule.

And a limitation of a Legal estate of freehold to take effect in defeasance of a preceding limitation contained in the same instrument was also rendered void by the second of the rules above mentioned; for the effect of such a limitation, if valid, would be that upon the happening of the event specified, the right to the seisin would, without any livery or other ceremony, shift away from the first grantee to the second grantee. A limitation in defeasance of a preceding limitation contained in the same instrument was also invalidated by another rule of the common law, namely, that a man may not derogate from his own grant; for at the common law this principle was applied as between several limitations contained in the same instrument.

Moreover, not only were all executory limitations of Legal estates of freehold, other than those by way of remainder, void at the common law, but even an executory limitation by way of remainder, though valid in its origin, became void and failed of effect, unless the limitation was executed, and the estate limited thereby was completely acquired by and vested in the person to whom it was limited, by the happening of the event specified, either during the continuance of the particular estate, or, at the latest, at the instant of the determination of the particular estate. For if the executory limitation had been held valid, notwithstanding the determination of the particular estate before the happening of the event on which such limitation was to become executed, either the right to the seisin would, in the meantime and until the happening of the event, be in abeyance, contrary to our first rule; or it would result to the grantor, and afterwards, upon the happening of the event, without livery of seisin or other ceremony, shift away to the grantee, which is contrary to our second rule. By the determination of the particular estate, therefore,

before the estate limited by the executory limitation became vested, the limitation became void.

Thus stood the common law before the Statute of Uses with respect to limitations of Legal estates of freehold.

It is necessary now to advert to the rules of Equity, which, before the Statute of Uses, governed limitations of Uses or Equitable estates; for, as has been already shown, the effect of the Statute was indirectly to enable the Legal estate to be dealt with in the same manner in which, at the time of the passing of the Statute, the Use or Equitable estate might be dealt with.

It has already been stated that the Use or Equitable estate in land was a right not recognised by the Courts of Law; it was the creature of and was recognised only by the Court of Chancery. The Equitable estate was not the subject of tenure, nor was it of a feudal origin or nature. It, therefore, conferred no right to the seisin or feudal possession.

Now the rules which have been stated above as governing all limitations of Legal estates of freehold, related only to the right to the seisin; they had no relation to estates which conferred no right to the seisin. Limitations, therefore, of Uses or Equitable estates were not affected by these rules.

From this important difference it followed, not only that executory limitations of Uses were valid, though not by way of remainder, but also that no executory limitations of Uses were limitations by way of remainder.

In the first place, then, executory limitations of Uses were valid, though not by way of remainder. The Use or Equitable estate, since it conferred no right to the seisin, might be shifted about at pleasure from one person to another without any ceremony. An Use, therefore, might well be limited to come into existence and to vest in a person upon the happening of some future event, without being preceded in the same instrument by any limitation of

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