also notified and stated in reply that Hilden had "left for parts unknown."

July 27, 1885, your office requested of the local office an immediate report showing what action had been taken by the local office and claim

ant.

August 3, 1885, the local office reported to your office that "neither John Hilden nor the present claimant to the land by purchase-Daniel F. Law-have taken any action in compliance with said requirement." With said report the local office also transmitted two letters of David D. Wright, written to the local office. In one of said letters, bearing date July 13, 1884, he states that "Daniel F. Law, the present occupant and owner (by purchase from Hilden) of said tract was by me duly notified as per request in your letter." Said report of the local office further shows that "said David D. Wright, as deputy clerk United States court, was the officer before whom John Hilden had made final proof in the case."

March 31, 1887, your office suspended the entry for the reason that the proof was not made in accordance with the published notice which fixed the time for making final proof for August 25, and proof was made August 28, 1882, and required claimant to make "new publication and new proof," and to furnish the record evidence of naturalization or declaration of his intention to become a citizen of the United States.

He was allowed ninety days to comply with or appeal from your said decision.

August 1, 1887, the local office reported to your office that notice of the requirements of your letter of March 31, 1887, was mailed by registered letter to the claimant and his receipt therefor, bearing date April 21, 1887, was returned to your office, and reported "no action has been taken, ninety-five days having expired from date of mailing."

By your office decision of October 9, 1888, you held the entry for cancellation giving sixty days for appeal.

November 21, 1888, the local office reported notice addressed to claimant returned "unclaimed" and also that the local officers had been informed that Hilden is, and has been confined, in the asylum for the insane.

March 6, 1889, your office directed the local office to notify Daniel F. Law, present owner, of your decision of October 9, 1838, holding said entry for cancellation and allowing him sixty days for appeal to the Hon. Secretary.

Daniel F. Law appeals from your office decision of October 9, 1888. On January 20, 1890, you transmitted to this Department an application of appellant for modification of your decision holding the entry for cancellation, in so far as the requirement to furnish new proof is concerned, but proposing to transmit a copy of the naturalization papers of Hilden. The reason assigned for the non-compliance with the requirements of your office is that Hilden had been confined in the Iusane Asylum of Idaho for some eighteen months prior to December 16, 1889,

when he was discharged as shown by the affidavit of the medical superintendent of the asylum.

One of the questions arising upon the record in this case is upon your requirement of October 9, 1888, requiring new notice and new proof for the reason the proof on file was taken three days subsequent to the time designated in the published notice. Where the officers of the local office have accepted the proof, and where no cause is shown for the delay, as in this case, then the defect may be cured by reference to the board of equitable adjudication, under section nine of final proof rules, dated July 17, 1889 (9 L. D,, 123).

See Elias Rosenthal (10 L. D., 596).

The other question in the case relates to the right of appellant to furnish the necessary proof as to citizenship of the entryman and while I am not willing to sanction the laches as shown on the part of the appellant, yet in view of the insanity of the pre-emptor as shown, and all the facts and circumstances in the case, I am of the opinion that the appellant should have an opportunity to furnish the proof required by law as to citizenship of the pre-emptor; and under the circumstances, the appellant should show by affidavit the facts and circumstances connected with his purchase of the lands.

You will, therefore, direct that the transferee, or claimant be required. to furnish supplemental proof within sixty days from notice hereof, showing compliance with the requirements of the pre-emption law as to the citizenship of the entryman, and also the facts and circumstances connected with the purchase by, and transfer of the lands to appellant Daniel F. Law.

You will readjudicate the case upon the receipt of such new evidence. In case of a failure to comply herewith in the time named, the entry will be canceled.

Your said office decision is accordingly modified.

I

CONTEST-COMPLIANCE WITH LAW PRIOR TO NOTICE.

ANDERSON v. BULLOCK.

f the entryman prior to service of notice in good faith cures his default, the contest must be dismissed.

Actual knowledge of an impending contest will not prejudice the claimant if his subsequent compliance with law is in pursuance of a previous bona fide intent. No preference right can be acquired under a contest begun and prosecuted for other purposes than in good faith to acquire title to the land.

Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 1, 1890.

This Department, by decision of June 11, 1888, affirmed the decision of your office in the case of Lee W. Anderson v. Percy Bullock, holding for cancellation the latter's timber culture entry No. 8268, for the

NW. of Sec. 15, T. 110, R. 65, Huron district, Dakota. After notice of said decision. Bullock duly filed a motion for review and rehearing. The entry was made April 1, 1882, and Anderson initiated a contest April 2, 1883, the day after the expiration of the first year of the entry. The ground of the contest was, that Bullock had failed "to break or cause to be broken five acres within a year from making said entry." Notice was not issued on this contest until August 28, 1883, and service thereof was made on Bullock October 18, of that year.

Leaving the question of the bona fides of the entryman out of the consideration of this case, I think this motion for review must be sustained, for the reason that it seems that the fact relative to the claimant curing his laches after the time of the contest, and before notice thereof was served upon him, has been entirely overlooked in the former adjudications in this case. It is conceded that, while the contest was initiated April 2, 1883, notice thereof was not served on Bullock until October 18, 1883, long after the default set up in the contest had been cured. In the case of Scott v. King (9 L. D., 299), it is held that—

The fact of compliance with law after affidavit of contest is filed and before legal notice thereof, goes to the weight, and not to the admissibility, of the testimony, and

actual knowledge of an impending contest will not prejudice the claimant, if his subsequent compliance with the law is in pursuance of a previous bona fide intent.

It does not appear that claimant had knowledge of the contest the latter part of April, 1883, when Anderson completed the breaking. It is the uniform ruling of the Department that where the entryman, prior to service of notice of contest upon him in good faith cures his laches, that the contest must be dismissed. (Stayton v. Carroll, 7 L.D., 198; Hunter . Haynes, ib., 8; St. John v. Raff, 8 L.D., 552.)

In consideration, however, of the fact that Anderson, as successful contestant, has been permitted, since the departmental decision, to make timber culture entry of the land, you are instructed, in order that he may have an opportunity to show cause why said entry should not be canceled, to direct the local officers to order a hearing to be had thirty days after notice thereof is served upon the parties. At this hearing any further testimony that can be had relating to the validity of Bullock's entry and particularly to the charge set up in the affidavit of contest may be submitted, and, also, testimomy bearing upon the charges contained in a corroborated affidavit filed by Bullock with his motion for review, to the effect that Anderson offered on several occasions to dismiss his contest for a pecuniary consideration, and also proposed that, if Bullock would give up his claim, he (Anderson) would sell the land and divide the proceeds with him. If these charges are true, the contest of Anderson would appear to have been begun and prosecuted for other purposes than in good faith to acquire title to this tract. In either case, Anderson could acquire no preference right of entry by his contest. (Dayton r. Dayton, 8 L. D., 248.)

PRE-EMPTION ENTRY-TIMBER LANDS.

GEORGE H. HEGEMAN.

The acquisition of title under the pre-emption law to lands chiefly valuable for timber, can only be permitted when the good faith of the claimant is clearly manifest.

First Assistant Secretary Chandler to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 2, 1890.

This is an appeal by George H. Hegeman from your office decision of March 13, 1889, rejecting his proof for the SE.Sec. 22, T. 16 N., R. 4 W., Vancouver, Washington, made in support of his pre-emption declaratory statement filed June 11, 1888, alleging settlement the 8th upon the tract named.

His declaratory statement was filed simultaneously with the like filings of George Ellis, William L. Horner and Louis F. Toellner, who also alleged settlement June 8, 1888, upon the NE. 4, the SW. and the NW. of said section 22, respectively.

Proofs under said filings were made by Toellner and Ellis, December 14, 1888, and by Horner and the claimant (Hegeman) on the following day before the clerk of the district court for Chehalis county, and in each instance two of the parties named testified as witnesses to the proof submitted.

These proofs were as shown by the register's endorsement rejected at the local office September 20, 1888, for failure to show sufficient residence, cultivation and improvement.

The appeals of the several parties named were forwarded with a letter dated February 5, 1889, wherein the local officers set out that the said section was "densely timbered and more valuable now for its timber than for any other purpose," that the said filings had been made "upon the strength" of a telegram asking if said section was vacant, sent the local office by "J. C. Ellis of Olympia, a wealthy logger," the day preceding the date of said settlements (June 8, 1888), that the same were made under the supervision of Geo. C. Israel, a close friend and legal adviser of J. C. Ellis, a person who had been "reported guilty of unprofessional conduct relating to public lands."

Hegeman's proof set out that he was a single man twenty-eight years of age, that he made actual settlement on the land June 16, 1888, when he built a house and cleared one and a half acres, that his residence, established the same day, had been continuous, that his improvements valued at $320 comprised a log house twelve by sixteen feet with shake roof and board floor, woodshed, road, and one and a half acres prepared for crop and that the tract contains about one million feet of fir timber.

Along with his appeal, the appellant Hegeman files an affidavit made by J. C. Ellis, April 4, 1890, setting out that he had as an act of friendship sent said telegram at the request of his nephew George Ellis, then

in his employ and that he "was not at that or at any other time interested directly or indirectly in above said land.”

The record shows the tract involved to be chiefly valuable for timber. This being so, the good faith of the claimant should be clearly shown before he can be allowed to acquire the same under the pre-emption law. Daniel R. McIntosh (8 L. D., 641); State of California v. Sevoy (9 L. D., 139).

That the claimant's good faith is not clearly shown is, I think, manifest. His proof showing meager improvements was made within about the briefest permissible period following the initiation of his claim, and when considered with the surrounding circumstances, in the light of which his good faith must be determined, fails to satisfactorily show that he went on the land for the purpose of rendering a bona fide compliance with the pre-emption law.

The decision appealed from is accordingly affirmed.

MINING CLAIM-STATUTORY EXPENDITURE-ADVERSE RIGHTS

REVIEW.

NICHOLS ET AL. v. BECker.

Failure to prosecute an adverse claim, or in other manner assert a right against a known pending application is conclusive as against the existence of such right. The individual rights of an applicant are not waived by his executing, as president of a mining company, an agreement wherein certain interests adverse to said company are recognized.

The action of the Department, on an application for a mineral patent, can not be controlled by judicial proceedings instituted outside of the authority of section 2326 of the Revised Statutes.

Where several claims are embraced within one application, the annual work required by statute may be done on one of such claims for the common benefit of the claims included within said application.

Specifications of error, on motion for review, must be definite, and clearly set forth the particular facts or issues on which a ruling is desired.

Secretary Noble to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, July 2, 1890.

This is a motion by William H. Nichols, Joseph M. Marshall and John Truan for review of a decision of this Department, rendered February 28, 1889, in the case of William H. Nichols et al. v. Theodore H. Becker, involving the latter's application for patent under the mining laws, for certain claims on what is known as the " Bates lode," situated in Gregory mining district, Gilpin county, Colorado.

The decision complained of is a formal affirmance by the Department of a decision rendered by your office December 7, 1887, adverse to Nichols, et al. upon an appeal by them from a decision of the local officers, also adverse to them, in the matter of their protest against the issue of patent to Becker for the premises in question.