admiralty cases, may ask a captain or navigating officer to sit with him as an assessor in a complicated case of marine navigation.

A question has arisen whether the order of the court directing that experts be called in a hearing or inquiry similar to this can be of any aid. I am in doubt, but can not decide. It must be borne in mind that the case had passed beyond the trial stage, and the inquiry was conducted by judges observing the rules of evidence, which medical men are not usually considered competent to decide. If an opinion of a commission is to be secured, which is to be free from bias, full and explicit, then its members should certainly be exempt from cross-examination as to the manner in which a conclusion may have been reached, and, in declining to permit the counsel in this case to cross-examine the commission, the court did right. If a cross-examination is permitted the opinion will neither be just, full, or explicit, but carefully guarded and defensive. A commission, it is true, may err in its conclusions, and the experts may also disagree, presenting the not infrequent spectacle of medical men reaching opposite conclusions from precisely the same statement of facts.

It may be alleged that in a questionable case doubts and differences are inevitable if two groups of experts sit in a case; also that the rights of the defendant must under all conditions be guarded. If the attorney for the people and the defendant can agree upon an equal number of qualified experts for submission to the court, from which say three may be selected, it would seem the proceeding would be perfectly fair, much simplified, and a satisfactory conclusion would be reached in any case where a medical commission might seem desirable, and in every case where experts are called, without prejudice to the rights of the defendant. The only pretext for introducing experts for the defendant, in a case such as has been presented, is that their views and testimony may enlighten the court and aid a commission, and a desire of the court to give the defendant every opportunity to show his mental condition.

The Hon. C. C. Cole, who was the district attorney of the District of Columbia, and engaged in prosecuting Howard J. Schneider on behalf of the people, and who is now a judge of a court in the District of Columbia, in a letter written to the writer, states: "I have no hesitation in saying that the investigations and report of the commission of medical experts were of the

utmost importance and assistance to the court in arriving at a correct conclusion in that case.

"There can be no doubt of the great value to the court of such a commission, where the court itself is charged with the duty of determining the question of present sanity as a fact, as in the Schneider case, where it was claimed that after conviction insanity developed and existed at the time fixed for execution of the prisoner and that the execution should be delayed until recovery. It would apply equally to a case where, at the arraignment of the prisoner, it should be claimed that he was then insane, and not capable of pleading or proceeding with the trial."

"Such a proceeding would have no proper application when the defense is insanity at the time of the commission of the alleged crime. Insanity as a defense to the alleged criminal act is a question of fact solely for the jury under the guidance of the court to determine."

"From my observation and experience in the Schneider case and other cases, I have no doubt but that the proceeding adopted in that case is the best possible to ascertain the mental condition of the party, and I am certain that the judges who heard and determined the case agree with me in that opinion, and they have each had great judicial experience in such matters."

The proceeding which has been presented, so far as I have been able to learn, is without precedent, but whether this statement shall prove to be correct or not, I have presumed to name it "A new departure in medical jurisprudence" practice, and trust that it may be one step in advance toward the adoption of some practical plan that will enable the expert to appear in court in such a manner that his independent judgment may be secured, and that it may be presented free from bias, or the suspicion of its existence, for all of which service he should be paid, by an order of the court, a suitable compensation.

If it be alleged that the court erred in its conclusions; that danger may arise lest an insane person be condemned and punished; or that the court sought to be informed in an unsual manner, it may also be asserted the whole proceeding will tend to make human life more sacred, and exercise a wholesome deterrent influence against violence and criminal acts.

A NEW DEPARTURE IN MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE.

BY W. W. GODDING, M. D.,

Superintendent Government Hospital for Insane, Washington, D. C.

The points in this judicial procedure have been so well presented by Doctor Chapin that it seems hardly necessary to add anything further.

I will say, however, that I am thankful for the departure. I feel that the United States' courts in the District of Columbia have taken a step in advance, and have established a precedent for humanity in every case where, after conviction and sentence, pending the infliction of the penalty, the question of the present insanity of the convict has been legally raised. It should hereafter be impossible to legally hang an insane man in the District of Columbia.

In this case the court properly held that a prima facie case of insanity must be made out before any action could be taken from the bench, and that the affidavit of the convict's counsel and of the physician of the jail to his insanity was not sufficient ground for an official inquiry, since the physician of the jail could not be presumed to be an expert in insanity. I was accordingly asked to examine the man, which I did, and added my affidavit that he appeared to have the belief that attempts were being constantly made to poison him, which belief, if is was not feigned, of which I saw no evidence, was an insane delusion, and he was insane.

The court accordingly issued an order, appointing a commission of three well known experts in insanity to examine the condemned man in regard to his mental condition, also appointing a time for a hearing of witness on the subject of his sanity, witnesses who might be called both by the man's counsel and by the government, together with three medical experts in insanity, selected by the convict's counsel and called in his behalf. All this testimony was to be taken before the judges in the presence of the commission of experts, who should have power to ask questions, and who, after the examination was over, should make a written report to the court of their finding in the case. Later the court would render its decision.

A wide latitude was allowed in the testimony, the question of insanity not having been raised at the time of the trial when he was found guilty of murder. The testimony at this hearing went over the whole life of the convict, from the time when a demented father begot him, down to and including his nine months' residence in the jail, awaiting the coming of his execution. There was also the testimony of three medical experts who had, after examination of the man, pronounced him insane.

The hearing was patient and exhaustive. The commission of experts unanimously reached the conclusion that he was sane. The court declined to interfere, and the man was properly hung for his crimes.

I think this judicial proceeding was most salutary. The court was relieved from the possible imputation of having permitted the execution of one who, by reason of the loss of his mind, had been rendered incapable of comprehending his punishment; and the community was relieved by finding that the wretch, against whom the popular feeling was most intense, had not, by feigning insanity, been able to escape the gallows he so richly deserved. The criminal seemed also to have entered into the spirit of the occasion, and appeared as stolid and indifferent at the hanging as if he did not know what was taking place.

A few words of comment on the procedure, from the standpoint of the expert, are proper here. It seems unfortunate that the court allowed three experts in insanity to be called in behalf of the convict. It goes without saying that if their testimony was that the man was sane, they would not have been placed on the stand by his counsel. The man, having been convicted and having exhausted every chance for a new trial, had no right in the premises. The rights were simply those of a common humanity, which permits no punishment where there is no mind. Evidence of his former life, his heredity, and his conduct was properly introduced, as it might help both judges and commission of experts in arriving at a correct conclusion in regard to the mental state of the man. But what earthly use had they for the opinion of these quasi- or (as it proved in this case) pseudo-experts? Had they chanced to agree with the commissioners, this would have added nothing to the enlightenment of the judges, while disagreeing, their weight with that tribunal was lighter than the vanity that might have deceived them into thinking that they were of some importance there. A

commission of three impartial experts, who were the "amici curiæ," afforded the man all the protection that he needed, and the introduction of the other three only served to detract from the solemnity of the commission's responsibility, and to still farther weaken the faith of the public in medical expert testimony. I

trust that the order of the court in the next case will omit the pseudo-expert.

But while regretting this one "fly in the ointment," I can not think the procedure has "lost its savor" thereby. Hereafter, I say again, no condemned man who is really insane needs to hang in the District of Columbia. When three able and impartial experts have passed upon his sanity, we have a right to claim that the wretched convict has had all the protection which is possible, or that a reasonable philanthropy has any right to demand. Even if he should appear a little strange at the scaffold, it would be far more reasonable to attribute his conduct to his eccentricities than to suppose that we, as experts, had made any mistake.